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61 .  I n t r o d u c t i o n
Since the end of the 19th century, individuals and groups with a concern for the natural 
environment and the biodiversity it possesses have gone about establishing protected areas 
that they deem to be especially important or representative. These protected natural areas 
have been called forest reserves, game sanctuaries, national parks and so forth. Over the 
past century, this phenomenon has spread throughout the world, to the point where today 
nature and wildlife conservation is a global phenomenon: the World Database on 
Protected Areas states that 11.58% of the earth's surface is currently under protection 
(http://sea.unep-wcmc.org/wdbpa/). The intentions lying behind the efforts of 
conservationists and environmentalists to protect sections of the planet's surface are 
generally noble: the protection of rare plant and animal species, the security of national 
economies as well as the over–arching goal of perpetuating humanity into the long–term 
future. Indeed, without conservation, many nation–states in particular, and the world in 
general, would be facing far greater challenges than they are today. 
However, whilst usually well–intended, the establishment of protected areas has, 
historically, been very problematic. This is because where there are areas rich in 
biodiversity and natural resources there are often humans too. From this situation comes 
an obvious problem: conservationists, usually using a model of conservation based on 
'western' science, wish a particular area to be protected, but there are indigenous people 
present who often have long historical links with the area and depend on it for their 
ongoing survival. Both groups have interests in the area that necessarily clash: one wants 
the area protected; the other wants the area used. What happens, then, when conservation 
and local people meet? Who benefits and who 'loses'? Any why? Are all local people 
affected in the same way by conservation? How do local people manage the effects that 
conservation has on their lives? These are the general questions that underpin this piece of 
research.  
Anthropologists – and social scientists more generally – began to take an interest in 
these issues, collectively referred to as the 'people and parks' debate, from the 1980s 
7onwards (Richards, 1985; Anderson and Grove, 1987; Hannah et al, 1992). More 
specifically, since this time critics of both development and conservation policies have 
produced a body of literature demonstrating 'both the cultural specificity and 
inappropriateness of applications of western science in non–western environments, and 
the locally attuned value of much indigenous knowledge' (Campbell, 2002:274). The main 
contribution anthropologists have made to this debate has been their ability to bring to 
light the fact that projects of nature and wildlife conservation are not an inherent good 
that operate in the best interests of everyone. Rather, their 'success' or 'failure' depends in 
large measure upon social factors, namely, the extent to which they pay close attention and 
sensitively adjust to the local social worlds that they encounter. Today, the anthropology of 
conservation is an increasingly popular topic within the discipline; the recent publication 
of several ethnographies and edited volumes attests to this (Brockington, 2002; Colchester 
& Chatty, 2002; Fabricius and De Wet, 2002; Anderson and Berglund, 2003; Mosse, 
2005).
The problems that generally characterise the 'people and parks' issue apply directly 
to sub–Saharan Africa and to Nigeria, in particular. According to the World Database on 
Protected Areas, in sub–Saharan Africa there are currently 6,664 protected areas covering 
an area of nearly three million km². The interaction between local indigenous people and 
externally introduced conservation initiatives in this area is a topic that has been the 
subject of numerous anthropological studies (Anderson and Grove, 1987; Adams and 
McShane, 1992; Mohammed Salih, 1999; Brockington, 2002; Thompson and Homewood, 
2002; Cernea, 2003). 
Roughly one sixth (1,017) of the protected areas in sub–Saharan Africa are in 
Nigeria (http://sea.unep-wcmc.org/wdbpa/). Thus, one would expect a significant 
anthropological literature on the social impacts of conservation to have accumulated. 
Surprisingly, case studies on the relationship between 'western' conservation and local 
indigenous people in Nigeria are sparse. Ite's (2001) study of the Cross River National Park 
stands out as the main exception to this trend. There have been other studies of the 
community–conservation dynamic in Nigeria, but these studies often pander to 
environmentalist arguments and do not offer much insight into how conservation projects 
8might disrupt the lives of indigenous people (Madu, 1991; James and Nwomonoh, 1994; 
James, 1996). The 'people and parks' issue, then, is something of importance in Nigeria but 
has not received much attention from the anthropological community. The study I am 
presenting here – an anthropological piece of research that deals with these issues in this 
particular locale – is thus appropriate and timely.
Late in 2005 it was brought to my attention that Dr Hazel Chapman, the head of 
the Nigerian Montane Forest Project (NMFP), a biological conservation project at the Ngel 
Nyaki Forest Reserve, eastern Nigeria, felt that there was potential for a post–graduate 
student to conduct ethnographic research in the area on the 'people and parks' issue. I was 
instantly excited at the prospect of going to Africa and became committed to the idea 
almost immediately. After establishing with my supervisors that the research was feasible 
and after having obtained funding for fieldwork, I was on my way. 
In early 2006 I spent three months at the Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve, eastern 
Nigeria, conducting the fieldwork for this thesis (see map on next page). When I arrived at 
Ngel Nyaki, I possessed a relatively clear idea about the places where I would conduct my 
fieldwork, what I would do whilst there, and a general picture of how the final written 
product would turn out. I believed I was going to Ngel Nyaki to live in a village called Musa 
Akwole for three months. Whilst there I imagined that I would acquire information from 
local people – through interviews, observation, and possibly participation – about their 
lives as they related to the forests within the reserve. More specifically, I thought I was 
going to find out about how local people's lives were related to the forests, how 
conservation projects in the area were potentially going to change those relationships, and 
also about how people thought about such change. These lines of enquiry were predicated 
on the belief I held at the time that local people had an active social, spiritual and 
economic relationship with the forests. However, once I had established myself at Musa 
Akwole and managed to gauge what was going on, my formerly clear ideas about my 
fieldwork were fundamentally altered.
After having been in Musa Akwole a couple of nights, I became aware that local 
people's relationship with the forests inside the reserve was nothing like what I had 
envisaged. Through talking with my assistant, a local man from the village, I found out 
9that, apart from a small number of people belonging to one ethnic group, local people 
seldom used the reserve for any purpose, material or otherwise; it appeared that most 
people hadn't stepped foot inside the reserve for ten years! Therefore, my initial objective 
of acquiring data about people's current and ongoing relationships with the forests was 
negated and my general conception of the final written product was dissolved. I had to 
adapt if I was to salvage both my fieldwork and thesis.
As I couldn't base my fieldwork on how people were currently connected to the 
forests, I decided instead to gather data on how people had related to them in the past, 
how that relationship had been affected by the protection of the reserve, and also how 
people might have negotiated these effects. The objective now became to find people with 
strong historical links to the reserve and whose lives had been significantly affected by its 
protection. The people of Musa Akwole, whilst meeting the above 'criteria,' were not ideal 
for my study. It seemed that in the past they had relied on the reserve for a significant 
amount of their subsistence needs and they had also been affected by being prohibited 
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from entering that space. However, as the village is situated at least three kilometres away 
from the reserve's boundary, both the historical connection and the effects of protection 
were not going to be as pronounced as they would be at other settlements that I knew to be 
lying closer to the reserve. Therefore, I organised with my assistant to go and visit these 
other places to see if they would be appropriate sites to conduct my fieldwork. In the 
subsequent three or four days I managed to make day trips to a number of settlements. 
These included the hamlets of Mayo Ambak and Musa Gamba, both of which lay close to 
the boundary of the reserve. Due to this proximity I figured that the inhabitants of these 
places would have had a strong historical relationship with the forests; and, judging by the 
state of their villages, they had been more seriously affected than any other people in the 
area as a result of protecting the reserve. I decided that these were the places I needed to 
be. 
After returning, I made it clear, to many people's disappointment (possibly because 
they thought they might have gained some material or social advantage from my presence), 
that I would not be staying in Musa Akwole but that I would be moving, firstly, to the 
hamlet of Mayo Ambak. Whilst not effected with ease, the move was nonetheless 
accomplished. I stayed at Mayo Ambak for roughly five weeks. Here I conducted around 
five or six recorded interviews, held many more informal discussions, and also made 
frequent trips to the farms where people worked. Then I moved to Musa Gamba for the 
next three weeks. Here I conducted similar activities but in less quantity, conducting 
probably only one or two recorded interviews and a handful of informal discussions. At 
these places I lived in a tent, which proved to be, especially at Mayo Ambak, where there 
was little shade, very uncomfortable. These stints were followed by two weeks in Musa 
Akwole. Here I conducted several recorded interviews with my assistant and the headman 
of the village. Observations and trips to the farms of local people were kept to a minimum 
as this was a time in which I was attempting to recover from the seven or eight tiresome 
weeks that preceded it. My stay at Musa Akwole was much more comfortable, owing to the 
fact that (a) I was living in a hut that contained a bed on which to sleep and (b) I had access 
to certain goods from which I strangely derived a degree of contentment, such as Coke and 
Fanta and sugary baking. Whilst living at Musa Akwole I conducted a few days fieldwork at 
11
the village of Yabri. Due to my contact with the people of this village being so brief, I did 
not have the opportunity to engage in much informal conversation, but still managed to 
hold a couple of recorded interviews with the headman and his close friends and relatives. 
After leaving Musa Akwole I shifted back up to the NMFP field station in preparation for 
my journey home. I made a couple of trips to the nearby village of Gidan Kuma during this 
time, where I managed to record two interviews with its headman. Before leaving the area I 
made a two day trip to the town of Gembu, where I managed to record an interview with a 
local government official that knew a good deal about the history and current 
administration of the forest reserve. 
The temporal and spatial structure of my fieldwork is reflected in the content of 
this thesis. Although I collected data from the people of all of the villages that immediately 
surround the reserve, including information from all of the parties responsible for 
protecting the reserve, the majority of the data I collected came from the people of Mayo 
Ambak and Musa Gamba. So, while local people in general are the object of study for my 
thesis, the inhabitants of the respective hamlets receive most of the attention.
The methods I employed in gathering information for this thesis are varied. Most 
of the data I present has come from my fieldwork around the Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve, as 
described above. Whilst in the area I conducted numerous interviews with men and 
women from a variety of ethnic groups, ages, and socio–economic positions. These 
interviews took various forms: sometimes I would be sitting down in a hut or under a tree 
with an interviewee, asking them specific questions about the reserve, and tape recording 
their responses; other interviews were much more casual, and here I am referring to the 
many times I held informal, unrecorded discussions with various people whilst they went 
about their daily business, writing down the things that I thought were pertinent to my 
research. Apart from one or two interviews conducted shortly before I left the area, all of 
these discussions were organised and translated by my assistant, a young man from the 
village of Musa Akwole, who was employed by the Nigerian Montane Forest Project. He 
was my primary link with the local people and without him my research would definitely 
not have been possible. In addition to my fieldwork, I also employed the published and 
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unpublished reports of conservationists who have worked in area, and the main person I 
have to thank for access to these is Dr Hazel Chapman. 
Lastly, I have gained a considerable amount of information from scholarly 
publications on my topic. Books, articles, journals, and so forth, were all invaluable in 
providing me with knowledge of how the relationship between conservation and local 
people has played out around the world, as well as furnishing analytic and theoretical 
frameworks through which to interpret my data. The main source of these publications was 
the library at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand. However, I also obtained 
material from outside the country. In transit to Nigeria I spent two weeks in London, 
where I received the welcome and assistance of David Zeitlyn. He provided me with a 
significant amount of ethnographic material on the area I would be working in and the 
people that I would be working with, not to mention invaluable pieces of advice about 
conducting fieldwork. 
To this list of methods I would have liked to add archival research, but I was not 
able to access any forestry records whilst in Nigeria, nor did I manage to access any colonial 
administrative reports during my stay in London. Whilst in Gembu, the headquarters of 
the local government area in which I conducted by fieldwork, I hoped to locate relevant 
historical information on the reserve but it proved much more difficult than I had 
expected. On my journey out of the country I intended to collect similar data at Jalingo, 
the capital of Taraba State, but due to significant travel delays, time constraints, and a 
general difficulty navigating a busy Nigerian city, I was again prevented from doing so. 
Having more official historical data would have been beneficial for my research, as I would 
have been able to better contextualise the establishment of the Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve. 
Despite this fact, I feel that the official information I obtained on the area from Hazel 
Chapman as well as other people I interviewed during my fieldwork, will be sufficient. 
In addition to being unable to access archival information whilst in Nigeria, I 
encountered other difficulties during my fieldwork. Many of these problems related to my 
field assistant but few were entirely his own fault. As stated, shortly after arriving in the 
area I decided to move from the village of Musa Akwole to the hamlets of Mayo Ambak
and Musa Gamba. This caused problems for my assistant, who lived in Musa Akwole and 
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who had a farm and family to take care of. As a result, he was not able to make the trip to 
where I was staying everyday; in fact, I estimate that in any given week I stayed in these 
places he was present for only three or four days. This had important effects on my 
fieldwork as well as personally. Firstly, in his absence I could not communicate with 
anyone. Any questions I wanted to ask, any observation that I needed confirmed, any food 
that I wanted to buy, indeed, anything that required communication had to wait until my 
assistant arrived. Personally, the experience of spending a considerable amount of time 
alone in a dilapidated rural African village was not a comfortable one. The BBC World 
Service was a lifesaver at this time. I will now outline what I will be examining in this study 
and also provide an overview of the structure of the thesis.
In this thesis I will be looking at: (1) how the conservation of the Ngel Nyaki Forest 
Reserve has affected the lives of the local people who live in its vicinity; and (2) how these 
local people have negotiated the effects of this conservation. As regards the first of these 
stated aims, in Chapter 4 I will show that the effects of protecting the reserve have been 
total, embracing every dimension of people's lives. The places where they can live, the 
activities they engage in to make a living, the traditional institutions through which they 
maintain a rigorous social life, the way they behave toward their neighbours, as well as the 
way they think about themselves and the world around them, have all been affected by the 
conservation of the reserve. Further, not only have these effects been total they have also 
been largely negative; only in rare instances has anything beneficial to local people been 
generated out of protecting the reserve. However, as will be seen in Chapter 5, people have 
not simply felt the effects of conservation; they have negotiated them in various ways. It is a 
description of these coping mechanisms that constitutes the second aim of the thesis. I will 
show that people have probably adapted to the effects of conservation through migrating 
away from their homes to places where they can obtain better access to resources; by 
becoming increasingly dependent on economic relationships with their better off 
neighbours; and, lastly, by diversifying their livelihoods, that is, placing more time and 
energy into alternative income–generating strategies than they had before.
The data I present in support of these two aims will be interpreted using the ideas 
of Michel Foucault and his followers. In particular, I will be employing Foucault's 
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understanding of power and how it operates in society. It will be argued, firstly, that the 
protection of the reserve is an exercise of power. The individuals and groups responsible 
for protecting the reserve have used and continue to use their actions to influence the 
actions of local people, namely, in enforcing their exclusion from the reserve. The 
dominant position conservationists occupy in this power relation hinges on the use of
discourse as well as various mechanisms or technologies of control. Forest guards, 
patrollers, and material coercions such as fines and court orders have been used to 
maintain local people's exclusion from the forests, and this has been both facilitated and 
justified by the application of a particular field of knowledge or discourse that constructs 
local people as environmentally ignorant and dangerous objects. The effects of this exercise 
of power are those detailed in Chapter 4. 
However, whilst this exercise of power has reduced the possibility of acting in ways 
that relate to the reserve, it has not significantly altered other activities that do not depend 
on the reserve. As shown above, these activities constitute probable adaptations to the 
protection of the reserve. On a theoretical level, I will show that these adaptations can be 
interpreted as indirect and non–confrontational forms of resistance. Through migrating, 
shifting their economic dependence and diversifying their livelihoods local people have not 
just dealt with being excluded from the reserve; they have attempted to circumvent, 
negotiate, and ultimately contest the effects produced by an unequal exercise of power. 
In order to provide a framework in which the two main chapters can be 
understood, I will firstly discuss the literature that pertains to my research and, second, 
provide a general background of the area and its inhabitants. In my literature review 
(Chapter 2) I locate my work within three of the main fields of scholarly publication that 
relate to this study: conservation in sub–Saharan Africa; the anthropology of conservation; 
and displacement and forced resettlement. I draw out the main problems, themes, and 
principles underlying each field and show in each instance how they relate to my own 
research. Immediately after this literature review, in Chapter 3, I begin to 'paint' a picture 
of the area in which I conducted my research as well as the people who live there. I 
introduce the various ethnic groups that live on the Mambilla Plateau (the area of land on 
which the reserve is located) and provide a general overview of their settlement patterns 
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and ways of life; I provide an overview of the reserve itself, including its ecology as well as 
its history; and, lastly, I show what relationship local people have had with the reserve, 
both before and after it's establishment as such. 
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2 .  L i t e r a t u r e  r e v i e w
Overview
In this chapter I will identify and discuss the academic literature that relates to my topic. I 
have identified the following three fields that are of importance: (1) Conservation in sub–
Saharan Africa; this consists of analyses and descriptions of conservation in this part of the 
world and includes studies of the environment as well as of the interaction between 
conservationists and local people; (2) The anthropology of conservation; as the title 
suggests, this is a field concerned with the cultural underpinnings of conservation 
initiatives in general and also with the impacts that projects of conservation conceived in a 
particular social context can have when implemented in foreign contexts; and, lastly (3) 
Displacement and involuntary relocation, which deals with an important and controversial 
dimension of conservation, namely, the forced relocation of people from their homes in 
the name of protecting an area for its perceived ecological value. My discussion will extract 
the main themes, problems, and premises that underpin each of these areas of scholarly 
production and show how they relate to my thesis. 
Conservation in sub–Saharan Africa
Approaches to conserving nature and wildlife in sub–Saharan Africa have changed 
significantly since the establishment of the first protected natural areas at the end of the 
19th century. The evolution of these approaches has been outlined by Dubois in his preface 
to the Forest Participation Series (1997) and Chatty and Colchester in Conservation and 
Mobile Indigenous Peoples (2002). The model proposed by Dubois overlaps considerably with 
that of Chatty and Colchester. Both begin by describing the colonial approach to 
conservation that prevailed from the late 19th century until the middle of the 20th. This 
model of conservation, which was first implemented at the Yellowstone National Park in 
North America, simply 'meant the preservation of flora and fauna and the exclusion of 
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people' (Chatty & Colchester, 2002:5). Local indigenous people, who were seen as 
backward and ignorant, had their land expropriated, were subject to significant socio–
economic disruption and were often displaced or resettled against their will. Dubois 
(1997:1) summarises the approach as 'management for the forest and against the people,' 
whilst Ite (2001) calls it the 'fines–and–fences' model of conservation, as people were 
evicted from protected areas and then fined if they re–entered it. Chatty and Colchester 
add that this sort of policy underwent important changes when countries began to achieve 
independence from the 1960s onwards. The most important of these changes was the way 
in which indigenous people were seen by conservationists. Whilst still construed as 
backward and primitive, in post–colonial discourse indigenous people also came to be 
thought of as 'dangerous and uncivilized…as impediments not only to the state's 
conservation policy, but also to its general desire to modernise and develop' (Chatty & 
Colchester, 2002:5). However, although the discourse on the stereotypical African 'native' 
was modified, the procedure and effects of peremptorily removing humanity from nature 
in line with the establishment of protected areas remained constant. 
The next main phase in the evolution of approaches to conservation in Africa was 
driven by the need to overcome the main flaw of the colonial and post–colonial models, 
namely, their general neglect of indigenous people. Emerging from the 1970s onwards, 
these approaches to conservation have been referred to variously as 'participatory forest 
management,' 'forest management for and by the people' (Dubois, 1997:1), 'conservation 
with a human face' (Bell, 1987), or 'community–based natural resource management' 
(Chatty & Colchester, 2002:9). Models of this sort revolve around the concept of 
'participation' mainly 'as a means to ensure that local people's interests and needs are taken 
into account in the decisions concerning the fate of forests' (Dubois, 1997:2). Local people 
who use the forests are supposed to be participants in all stages of the conservation process, 
from the planning and demarcation of the protected area to its ongoing management and 
protection. However, participatory forest management is now recognised as possessing 
flaws of its own. 'Participation' has proven difficult to implement when it means going 
beyond mere consultation and achieving active involvement of forest users in decision 
making, which Dubois believes is due to a number of reasons (1997:1–2). Mosse (2005) 
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shares this view, and argues that representations of participation are rarely fully realised on 
the ground. Consequently, the participatory model is beginning to give way to another, 
more nuanced approach. This next model of conservation Dubois calls 'forest management 
with the people and other actors' (1997:2). This approach seeks to address the highly 
political character of conservation. Its core aim is to make the management of protected 
areas the outcome of negotiation between all stakeholders, especially weaker ones. Local 
people are thus not just 'participants' in conservation any longer, but become vital voices in 
the political process itself. 
The evolution of approaches to conservation in sub–Saharan Africa, then, can be 
seen as a process where the needs, wants and interests of local people have gradually been 
incorporated into conservation discourses; indigenous people have gone from being a 
nuisance to be got rid of to the holders and users of rights, responsibilities and resources 
(Dubois, 1997). A last and important point to make before going on is that whilst 
representations of conservation have undergone change and moved toward a more socially 
sensitive position, in reality people continue to be evicted from protected areas for the 
benefit of the natural environment. As Chatty and Colchester state (2002:3): 'Now, more 
than a century later, most national parks in Latin America, Asia, Africa and the rest of the 
developing world have been, and to an extent continue to be, created on the model 
pioneered at Yellowstone.'
Of the approaches I have discussed, the post–colonial is the most relevant to my 
thesis. Local people living in the vicinity of the Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve have, historically 
and contemporaneously, been seen as dangerous and ignorant where the natural 
environment is concerned and this discursive construction, along with other technologies 
of control, has led to their exclusion from the protected area. I will discuss these things in 
more detail later in the thesis. It has only been in the last two years that a participatory 
approach has been introduced in the area and, therefore, it is too soon to say what the 
impacts of this latter type of conservation have been. On the other hand, the effects of the 
post–colonial model are clearly established. Those produced at Ngel Nyaki, which will be 
outlined in detail in a later chapter, are representative of most conservation projects in the 
pre–participatory era. Before going on to mention any other examples, however, I will 
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show why environmentalists feel that the natural environment in Africa should be 
protected.
Many environmentalists believe that there is an 'ecological crisis' in sub–Saharan 
Africa. Historically, proponents of this idea have sought a remedy for the 'crisis' in the 
establishment of protected areas that grant people varying rights of access, ranging from the 
exclusion entailed by the colonial and post–colonial models to the empowerment granted 
by approaches oriented around participation and stakeholder negotiation. An example of 
the environmentalist way of thinking is shown in an article written by Onweluzo and 
Onyemelukwe (1977:24). They argue both that 'the vast majority of Nigerian wildlife today 
is in great danger of total extinction' and also that 'the decimation, if not total elimination, 
of certain wildlife in most parts of the continent has followed especially from man's 
encroachment on wildlife habitat' (ibid.). This point of view is shared by Madu (1991:103), 
who claims that in Africa there has been 'mass destruction of wildlife and natural forest.' In 
a more recent piece of research on conservation policy in West Africa, James (1996), 
following this environmentalist discourse, states that Africa is confronted with 'a myriad of 
problems, but the most vivid and probably the worst is the destruction of the environment 
and the natural resources' (1996:13). Furthermore, not only does James perceive the 'crisis' 
facing the environment in West Africa to be more important than the disease and poverty 
currently ravaging the continent but that it must be addressed immediately lest some 
colossal disaster occur: 'All across Africa there is a race against time. The resources are 
dwindling and the pressure to continue to use the resources is increasing rapidly as the 
population of African countries increases geometrically' (1996:19). The solution he 
proposes is simple: the protection of more of the natural environment. He implores that 'it 
is important to have policy that allows the addition of more forest lands into protected 
areas…If it appears that enough areas are not set aside for the protection of forest 
resources, efforts should be put into establishing protected areas' (1996:37–38). Despite 
being conceived in the era of participatory forest management, this plan bears all the 
hallmarks of colonial and post–colonial conservation: it places emphasis on the forest and 
it nowhere mentions the people who may be happening to live in or around the forests to 
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be cordoned off and who will in all likelihood be at least partly depending on them to 
survive. 
The arguments put forward by environmentalists have found favour among the 
parties who have protected the Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve over its history. Like the authors 
I have cited, the organisations that protected the reserve until a couple of years ago believed 
the natural environment to be an entity under threat from humans who, if not supervised, 
would senselessly destroy it, a point of view coextensive with the post–colonial approach to 
conservation in Africa. The recent introduction of a participatory forest management 
project will hopefully see this attitude become more socially sensitive and incorporate the 
interests of local people. 
The environmentalist argument is forceful and conveyed unequivocally. Is it 
irrefutable? Bell (1987) would claim not. Whilst acknowledging that the human population 
in Africa is increasing, he contends that the environment is capable of handling this rise 
and, therefore, that the continent is not facing any ecological crisis. It is worth quoting him 
at length:
'The human population in Africa is increasing rapidly, but the overall population density is still 
relatively low except in certain localised concentrations. Extensive surveys indicate the availability of 
considerable areas of useable land. Crop production per area is roughly constant, frequent 
prediction of soil exhaustion and catchment degradation are rarely fulfilled. Livestock numbers 
continue to increase, although there have been localised die–offs due to droughts. Undisturbed 
natural biotic communities remain in considerable quantities both inside and outside protected 
areas. The protected area system is large and generally representative of Africa's biotic communities. 
Africa's fauna has been relatively lightly affected by Pleistocene and recent extinctions, and 
spectacular, large mammal communities exist in many countries. A small number of large mammal 
species is seriously endangered mainly due to illegal hunting for high cash value products such as 
rhinoceros horns.
We appear, then, to be faced with a paradox. On the one hand, the human population is 
increasing very rapidly, but on the other hand the overall ecological situation seems generally 
satisfactory with considerable room for further human increase without either ecological collapse, 
elimination of major biotic communities, or extinction of many species' (Bell, 1987:88–89).
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Although now twenty years old, this is clearly a far cry from the claims of the 'mass 
destruction' and 'near extinction' of numerous plant and animal species noted earlier. In 
place of the fragile and threatened African environment constructed by conservationists in 
their efforts to establish protected areas, Bell has substituted a stable and robust one 
capable of supporting a growing population well into the future. If Bell's comments are 
accurate, this means that the idea that humans and nature in Africa should remain 
separate, or at least have their relationship weakened, does not gain its force from
ecological reality. 
The article written by Bell is taken from a volume edited by Anderson and Grove 
entitled Conservation in Africa: people, policies and practice (1987). This book is the 
foundation stone of critical literature on conservation in Africa. In addition to exposing 
the sometimes spurious claims of environmentalists about the state of the environment, a 
more general theoretical aim of the book is to bring to light the socio–cultural origin of 
these claims. Anderson and Grove argue that the idea of an ecological crisis in Africa 'has 
as much to do with the development of European perceptions of Africa as it has to do with 
the undeniable reality of environmental degradation engendered directly and indirectly by 
the penetration of western economic forces, technology and medicine' (1987:5). These 
European perceptions are centred on 'the symbol of Africa as a yet unspoilt Eden,' a 
pristine and exotic paradise filled with wildlife (1987:4). Such images, they continue, find 
their appeal for conservationists, and 'Western' people in general, in the depiction of an 
escape from banality, 'a refuge from the technological society of Europe' (1987:5). This 
argument is like that advanced by Edward Said in his seminal Orientalism (1978). In it Said 
demonstrates how 'the Orient' was constructed by Europeans as the converse of European 
society, a process that eventually rendered an image of 'the East' that was mysterious, 
irrational, and sexualised, in short, all the things that Europeans at the time prided 
themselves on not being. Whilst the European construction of the African environment 
described by Anderson and Grove is not an effort to extol the virtues of European society 
(in fact, it appears quite the reverse!) it nonetheless provides insight into how these 
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societies construct images of far away places in order to appraise their own way of life. This 
is the only point I wish to make on the similarity. 
The European image of a pristine and wild Africa referred to by Anderson and 
Grove has also received a thorough investigation by Adams and McShane (1992). In The 
Myth of Wild Africa: Conservation Without Illusion the pair argues that this image of 'Africa–
as–Eden' is so deeply entrenched in the Western collective psyche and has persisted for 
such a long time that it warrants being called a 'myth.' This belief in and yearning for a 
pristine and unspoilt natural paradise leads to the perspective that it should not be 
endangered by human beings. For the people living in close proximity to, or even within a 
protected area, this obviously has serious implications: because seen as plunderers of 
natural riches, they are given little or no consideration when protected areas are 
demarcated. The mentality is to get people out and to keep them out so that nature is 
allowed to reassert itself. Humans and the natural environment do not belong together. 
This notion, Adams and McShane (1992:xviii) point out, 'does not hold in Africa, because 
man and animals have evolved together in the continent's diverse ecosystems.' Even so, it 
has been put into practice innumerable times with the same result: 'the simple exclusion of 
rural people from national parks and reserves in the interests of the protection of large 
animal species and preservation of habitats' (Anderson & Grove, 1987:7). 
Anderson and Grove and Adams and McShane are clearly referring to the attitudes 
and beliefs that underpin the colonial and post–colonial approaches to conservation in 
sub–Saharan Africa. The image of 'Africa–as–Eden' is inextricably linked to conservation 
projects that generally fail to acknowledge their social impacts. Participatory forest 
management was still in its infancy at the time of their writings and thus preserving nature 
inviolate from humans was still the received way of thinking about conservation. 
Motivated by the belief that natural areas harbouring wildlife or rare plant species 
are, on the one hand, of immeasurable ecological value and that, on the other, they are in a 
state of crisis precipitated by ignorant and unthinking humans who hold little regard for 
preserving their natural resources (both of which premises have been shown to be, at best, 
precarious), conservationists have set about establishing protected areas in Africa, whether 
national parks, forest reserves, or game sanctuaries, in order to foster the growth or 
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regrowth of nature. This approach to forest management has been accompanied by 
deleterious socio–economic effects, which I will now outline. 
Egbe (1997) notes, in his study of conservation in Cameroon, that since the 
colonial period the organisations responsible for constructing policy on natural resource 
tenure and access have 'generally ignored the existence of the local population, [and] have 
done little to strengthen the ability of the peasants and their institutions to cope with the 
blunt nationalisation of the resources upon which their lives are inextricably linked' 
(1997:iii). This has resulted in a local population alienated from the resources it needs for 
its continued survival. Also in Cameroon, Drijver (1992:40), working in the Waza National 
Park, states that 'the establishment of the Park, rather than improving prospects of most of 
the population, have made them even worse. They have lost the right to pastures, fields 
and forests, and their present fields are exposed to the detrimental impact of weaver birds 
and elephants that are based in the Park but leave it regularly to look for food.' Similarly, 
Ite (2001:7), in his study of the community–conservation dynamic in the Cross River 
National Park, southeastern Nigeria, argues that the creation of the park resulted in the 
'restriction of access to resources, the disruption of local cultures and economies by 
tourists, increased depredations on crops by wild animals, and the displacement of people 
from their traditional lands.' Hagberg (1992) shows that the Toumousséni Forest Reserve, 
Burkina Faso, has been 'protected with military force by the Forestry Service and people of 
the surrounding villages learned to completely avoid the forests.' In their book on modern 
conservation and historical land use in Guinea, Fairhead and Leach (1992) show how the 
Toma people have been stopped from entering, as well as living inside the Ziama Reserve, 
an area of land that for generations constituted their main source of livelihood as well as 
the basis of their cultural identity. They describe (page 24) local people's experience of this 
expropriation and the difficulty they faced having to daily behold the villages they were 
forced to desert: 'villagers seem to traverse not an a–social, naturally awesome domain, but 
one that is ex–social.' These abandoned village sites are to the local population 'constant 
reminders of social and political downfall.' Elsewhere in Africa, Thompson and 
Homewood (2002) show how at the Maasai Mara National Reserve, Kenya, many Maasai 
pastoralists have had their grazing lands reduced in size by government agencies espousing 
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the ideals of conservation. Also working with the Maasai, yet in Tanzania, Brockington 
(2001, 2002) shows how considerable numbers of people were evicted from a protected 
area without due ecological cause, without compensation and causing widespread 
impoverishment. 
The disruptions mentioned above have also been manifested at the Ngel Nyaki 
Forest Reserve. There people excluded from the reserve have lost rights of access to 
resources, been displaced from their homes (a dimension of conservation that will be dealt 
with in a separate discussion), had their society and culture disrupted and suffered 
psychological stress. Unlike the experience of the people studied by Hagberg, however, I 
found no evidence of 'military force' being used to keep people out of the reserve. It 
seemed as though the possibility of being fined was enough to keep a poor population away 
from the area. Another important way my thesis departs from the mentioned examples is 
in its description of the relationship between the establishment of the 'park' and the effects 
produced upon people's lives. The examples described above seem to exhibit a fixed and 
final relationship: the park is established then the people negotiate the effects. Yet at Ngel 
Nyaki this is not the case. The establishment of the reserve did produce social effects: 
people were displaced from their homes inside the forest and had their access to resources 
reduced. However, these effects were not final. A few years after the reserve was established, 
the amount of government protection it received significantly declined. This allowed 
people to reclaim the forest for farming and general subsistence and thus to mitigate the 
effects produced by the initial establishment. Then after a couple of decades of inattention 
the government reasserted its command over the reserve. This then produced a second 
wave of effects similar to the first: people again had their access to the forests removed and 
some of the people displaced after the reserve's establishment were again forced to leave 
their homes and resettle elsewhere. Chapter 4 will deal with all of these effects in detail.  
The Anthropology of Conservation
Through my discussion of the anthropology of conservation it will be seen that the post–
colonial approach in Nigeria can be understood in a broader framework, as the 
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manifestation of a more general phenomenon. The image of a precious and fragile natural 
environment in need of protection from human interference is part of a wider evaluation 
made by environmentalists of the relationship between nature and culture, and the effects 
that implementing the approach has had on local people in Africa are just one example of 
the effects produced by models of conservation that inadequately address local social 
contexts. 
A recent and noteworthy contribution to this field is Anderson and Berglund's 
Ethnographies of Conservation: Environmentalism and the Distribution of Privilege (2003). It 
presents a number of studies on the politics of conservation in different parts of the 
developing world and one of its core aims is to make visible 'not only the effects of 
environmentalism on marginal peoples in a context of economic polarisation, but the 
lifeworlds of environmentalists themselves' (2003:4). Regarding the lifeworlds of 
environmentalists, in their introduction the editors claim that conservation projects tend 
to be based on the assumption that nature and culture are not only separate entities, but 
mutually exclusive ones that must be kept apart at all costs. This is a crucial point, for it 
pertains to the case studies within the book, the literary field as a whole, and my thesis in 
particular. Milton (1996:33) states that environmentalism revolves around the image of an 
'irreplaceable nature' that must be preserved inviolate from human intervention. This, she 
argues, is 'unambiguously part of culture,' insofar as 'it is part of the way in which people 
understand the world and their place within it. It belongs to the sphere that includes 
people's feelings, thoughts, interpretations, knowledge, ideology, values, and so on.' The 
image of 'Africa–as–Eden' advanced by Adams and McShane (1992) can thus be seen as a 
variation of this fundamental idea. These images and categories are embedded in practice, 
a point that Anderson and Berglund understand. Conservation, they claim (2003:7), is 'a 
set of practices which flow out of the everyday life of concrete, committed people, many of 
whom live in the metropole and not in the hinterlands which they strive to protect.' Milton 
also suggests that conservationists attach a positive moral value to nature, making the 
process of establishing protected areas 'the right thing to do.' The converse of this is that 
anything that threatens nature is wrong, such as local communities who depend on the 
prospective protected area. This converse idea is a patently ethnocentric judgment, for it 
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totally neglects how local people themselves conceive of the relationship between humans 
and the environment.
In the third chapter to Anderson and Berglund's volume, Nygren (2003:40) 
synthesises these two ideas – that nature is moral and that anything that threatens it is 
immoral – by showing how conservationists in Rio San Juan, Nicaragua, constructed 
people as 'reprehensible invaders of a mythic wilderness' and 'rootless perpetrators who 
mindlessly destroy nature's precious gifts.' Through the lens of environmentalism forest 
users therefore become criminals. These points connect with the work of Ferguson 
(1996:258). In his study of 'development' in Lesotho, he argues that local people are 
constituted through the employment and application of discourses as particular objects of 
knowledge. This is done in order to facilitate the planned interventions of a 'small, 
interlocked network of experts.' Indeed, describing local people as a threat to nature and 
nature as a moral sanctuary provides justification for conservationists to fence off areas that 
they deem to be of value. What are the consequences of putting this environmentalist 
discourse into practice?
The immediate consequence of the implementation of a model of conservation 
that inadequately addresses the local social context is that one finds 'a park surrounded by 
people who were excluded from the planning of the area, do not understand its purposes, 
derive little or no benefit from the money poured into its creation, and hence do not 
support its existence' (Adams & McShane, 1992:xv). The post–colonial approach, as an 
example of this general phenomenon, has had similar effects at Ngel Nyaki; all efforts to 
conserve the forest have excluded local people in their planning; many people do not 
understand why the reserve exists; and only a small number of people have benefited from 
its existence. 
The associated effects that people endure as a result of being excluded from a 
protected area are diverse. In a recent study, Colchester (2004) enumerates 16 effects that 
can result from the process, the most important particulars being the denial of rights to 
land; denial of access to natural resources; forced resettlement; undermining of livelihoods; 
loss of property; no compensation; poverty; enforced illegality; and cultural identity 
weakened. Adams (2003:29) shows that local Caiçaras people in Brazil were, based on a 
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misrepresentation of them as primitive savages, prohibited from exploiting their formerly 
taken–for–granted resources. This impacted on their livelihoods severely, yet they received 
no compensation. Further, the establishment of the area perpetuated 'already existing 
social, political, ecological and economic inequality.' In Nicaragua, Nygren (2003:37) 
details similar effects. Conservationists that held 'the view that local extractors encroach on 
the forests with little environmental awareness' ejected people from the protected area and 
as a result they suffered economic as well as socio–cultural disruption. This series of effects 
has been reproduced all over the developing world.
The 'failure' of the conservation projects (in their capacity to combine development 
and biodiversity conservation) mentioned in this chapter, including the post–colonial 
approach at Ngel Nyaki, is due to a general neglect of the local social context. To 
environmentalists, nature and people are things to be kept apart, but for many of the 
contexts in which conservation projects are introduced nature and people are inextricably 
linked. Many indigenous people rely on the natural environment for land to grow food on, 
for medicine to help the sick, for building materials and so forth. Thus, the introduction of 
a model antithetical to this relationship is usually very disruptive, as I have shown. In order 
for conservation efforts to succeed – to simultaneously protect both the natural 
environment and people's livelihoods – they must be conceived, implemented and 
managed in ways that are sensitive to the local social context. This point has now become a 
precondition of modern conservation efforts.
I have given reference to a number of ethnographic studies that show the social 
effects of protected areas. The effects, however, are not the entire picture. Once effects are 
created, people will typically resist them by whatever means possible, a dimension of 
conservation that can be seen as positive and productive. This resistance is not addressed 
in most of the studies discussed here, yet some authors do make mention of it. Bryceson 
(2002) has written on 'multiplex livelihoods' in rural Africa. Whilst her article is not about 
conservation, her general ideas can be applied to it easily. Her basic argument is that as 
returns from agriculture decrease, rural Africans 'have experimented with new forms of 
livelihood, expanding their non–agricultural income sources, while retaining their base in 
subsistence farming' (2002:1). Thus, where agriculturalists are excluded from areas 
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protected for the wildlife and nature they possess then they too will resist these effects by 
turning to alternative, non–agricultural income sources. Agyemang (1990) shows how a 
local community in Ghana have shifted their economic energies onto the collection and 
sale of non–timber forest products such as leaves in response to their exclusion from a 
protected area. Lastly, Brockington (2001) shows how Maasai women in Tanzania have 
adapted to their eviction from a protected area by relying on alternative livelihood 
strategies. 
My thesis aims to contribute to this area of research. Chapter 5 deals explicitly with 
the ways in which people have most likely resisted the effects of a post–colonial model of 
conservation. The resistances I discuss are responses mainly to the effects produced by the 
reassertion of control of the reserve by the government from the mid–1990s onwards. They 
include the sorts of livelihood diversification mentioned by Bryceson, but also include 
shifting economic dependence onto others, and migrating to places with better access to 
resources, all of which will be discussed in detail in the respective chapter. 
So, in this piece of research I will try to show how a post–colonial model of 
conservation has affected the lives of people and also how those people have probably 
resisted those effects. Yet, what does this mean on a more general level? At Ngel Nyaki, a 
model of conservation has been employed without due consideration of the local social 
context and this has brought with it various consequences, but what are the theoretical 
issues that need to be acknowledged? In short, what higher level abstractions and 
interpretations can be made about the phenomena I am describing? 
To introduce this argument, it is instructive to think about the case studies that 
have been mentioned up until this point. Even a desultory glance over them will show that, 
in the overwhelming majority of cases, governments and conservation organisations have 
used both knowledge about the environment, plus sanctioned force (forest guards, 
patrollers etc), to guide and influence the actions of local people vis–a–vis protected areas. 
Therefore, these types of interactions are in fact power relationships; individuals and 
groups are using whatever forces they can marshal in order to achieve their interests. This 
correlates with the work of James Ferguson (1996), who argues in The Anti–Politics Machine
that agricultural and economic 'development' in Lesotho, despite being represented as 
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something designed to improve the living conditions of local people, has been 'a machine 
for reinforcing and expanding the exercise of bureaucratic state power, which incidentally 
takes 'poverty' as its point of entry – launching an intervention that may have no effect on 
the poverty but does in fact have other concrete effects' (Ferguson, 1996:255–256). The 
effects of which he speaks are the establishment of 'anonymous constellations of control' 
(1996:20), webs of power wherein the intended beneficiaries of development are instead 
eventually enmeshed in wider and oppressive matrixes of governance. Ferguson's argument 
is original and insightful, and in this thesis I would like to try to build upon it, if only 
slightly. This I will attempt to do through employing further of Foucault's ideas, mainly 
regarding his conception of power as well as how it operates in social networks.
What is power? How does it operate? What supports it? Is it simply a case of 
oppression or is it able to be resisted? These are questions that I will presently explore in 
relation to Foucault, in the process tracing connections back to my own work. Foucault 
(1978:93) defines power as 'a complex strategical situation in a particular society.' I believe 
that what he means by this is that power refers to the principle underlying a set of ongoing 
and negotiated social relations in which individuals or groups are attempting to guide or 
influence each others conduct, trying to get the better of each other. His definition means 
that power is something that is done or performed by people; it is not action itself but 'only 
exists in action' (Foucault, 1980:89). Foucauldian power, then, is some kind of meta–social 
dynamism that animates all those through which it passes. This goes against other 
definitions that see power as a static and alienable 'thing' that can be possessed, held on to, 
shared, seized, and so on. So, how is power exercised? 
If power is the force that drives ongoing, strategical social interaction then its 
exercise entails jockeying for position in that situation, struggling to influence its flow and 
direction. But, Foucault emphasises again, that it is not on individual people, but on action 
that we need to focus when considering the exercise of power. The exercise of power, as a 
relational force, is 'a total structure of actions brought to bear on possible actions; it incites, 
it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or difficult; in the extreme it constrains or forbids 
absolutely; it is nevertheless always a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects 
by virtue of their acting or being capable of action. A set of actions upon other actions' 
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(Foucault, 1982:220). Power does not affect people but their possible actions; to be incited, 
induced, seduced, allowed or prevented, constrained or forbidden, is to be acted upon by 
power. In sum, power can be said to be exercised when an individual or group acts on the 
possible field of action of others, when they narrow their practical repertoire in ways 
designed to achieve a particular strategical end. 
However, power relations are never simply 'imposed' in a top–down fashion by the 
powerful onto the powerless in a one–way interaction. Rather, there is always potential 
room for resistance, for struggle and contestation, whether realised or not. Indeed, 
resistance is central to the Foucauldian concept of power. 'Where there is power there is 
resistance,' he claims (1978:95). Mills reinforces this notion in saying that 'in order for 
there to be a relation where power is exercised, there has to be someone who resists' 
(2003:40). The sites through which power circulates, namely, social practices, are points of 
potential resistance. This gets right to the heart of the relational character of power 
relations. It means that people who have their actions structured by the power controlled 
and directed by others are both (i) not completely powerless, in the sense that the action 
that conforms could always theoretically be the action that resists and also, because of this, 
(ii) people who conform do so because they are persuaded of their powerlessness vis–a–vis
those who would structure their behavioural field; they are duped to become active 
participants in their own subjugation. If power only ever said 'Thou shalt not,' Foucault 
maintains, compliance in unequal relations of power would not be as prevalent as it is. If 
people do not resist power relations, it is not because they cannot but because they think 
they cannot. 
Although resistance is central to Foucault's notion of power, only rarely does one 
find in his work a detailed explanation of how it operates in any given social context, 
something noted by various observers (Mills, 2003; Smart, 2002; Dreyfus & Rabinow, 
1982). More specifically, it is difficult to find in Foucault's work, especially his earlier 
books, exactly what sorts of things constitute resistance. Building on Foucault's ideas, James 
Scott has made important advances in filling this analytic void. In Weapons of the weak, 
Scott (1985:290) defines resistance as 'any act(s) or member(s) of a subordinate class that is 
or are intended either to mitigate or deny claims (for example, rents, taxes, prestige) made 
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on that class by superordinate classes (for example, landlords, large farmers, the state) or to 
advance its own claims (for example, work, land, charity, respect) vis–a–vis those 
superordinate classes.' In so defining resistance, Scott elucidates both the nature of 
Foucauldian power relations – the actions of individuals or groups influencing the actions 
of others – as well as what sorts of things constitute resistance, namely, any actions, real or 
intended, that negotiate the effects of an exercise of power. In Weapons of the weak (1985), 
Scott also advocates a view of resistance as something that does not necessarily challenge 
the basic structure of a power relationship and something that is not necessarily 
confrontational in nature. Acts of resistance, that is, do not always erode the configuration 
of power in which they are embedded. The fact that resistance can act indirectly on the 
effects of power (as well as directly on its exercise) and also be non–confrontational is an 
important theoretical point that I will return to below. 
Scott develops a more refined analysis of resistance to power in Domination and the 
Arts of Resistance (1990). In particular, Scott argues that in any power relationship there 
exist both 'public' and 'private' transcripts of power. The public transcript refers to the 
behaviour that the powerful and the powerless display when in each others company whilst 
the private transcript refers to the behaviour that the powerful or powerless display when 
amongst equals. Scott places emphasis on the latter in that it is in the private transcripts or 
discourses of the powerless that resistance is often found; the private transcript is usually 'a 
critique of power spoken behind the back of the dominant' (1990:ii). This point also has 
an important bearing on my work that I will outline later.
Foucault argues that power can be productive. It doesn't simply constrain and 
inhibit behavioural fields (though it does undoubtedly perform that function), it also 
produces and creates: new behaviours, social categories, gestures, spaces, relationships etc. 
How is this so? Let us consider an example from Foucault's History of Sexuality. In the 19th
century, there developed a repression of childhood sexuality, which saw the widespread 
publication of accounts designed to prevent and discourage young boys from masturbating. 
However, this technique did not just oppress boys and limit their sexual activities. It also 
set up a sexual nexus between parents and children that was based on watching, advising, 
punishing etc. the forbidden act, which in the final instance produced 'the very sexuality 
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which it was designed to eliminate' (Mills, 2003:37). In Discipline and Punish (1977), 
Foucault also shows how the functioning of the prison produced the category of the 
'delinquent' as 'a specific type, a politically or economically less dangerous – and, on
occasion, usable – form of illegality' (1977:277). I will pose two further questions in regard 
to Foucault's work before showing how all of the above theoretical material might relate to 
my own thesis. Power is exercised through structuring the possible field of action of others, 
but through what mechanisms does this occur? Finally, do power relations simply develop 
on their own, or are they supported and legitimated by something?
Firstly, the mechanisms through which power relations are installed and 
maintained are manifold. Modern power, Foucault ventures (1980:104), is 'constantly 
exercised by means of surveillance rather than in a discontinuous manner by means of a 
system of levies or obligations distributed over time. It presupposes a tightly knit grid of 
material coercions rather than the physical existence of a sovereign.' This is to say that 
these mechanisms of power – surveillance and material coercions – are able to maintain a 
grid of power relations even where not present. People will continue to have their field of 
possible action structured even where there is no person there to perform this function. 
Foucault developed this idea most clearly in Discipline and Punish (1977:170–177), where he 
argued that surveillance allows disciplinary–penal power to be:
'..both absolutely indiscreet, since it is everywhere and always alert, since by its very principle it 
leaves no zone or shade and constantly supervises the very individuals who are entrusted with the 
task of supervising; and absolutely 'discreet,' for it functions permanently and largely in silence' 
(page 177).
In this passage Foucault was referring to disciplinary power in general and Bentham's 
panopticon in particular. The panopticon was an ideal surveillance device designed on the 
principles outlined above. Prisoners would never know whether or not there was someone 
in the control tower watching over them so they were inclined to err on the side of caution 
and self–police themselves, thus effectively maintaining the power relations in which they 
were embedded as prisoners. It is the threat of being seen that compels individuals to 
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conform. Foucault argued that these types of networks of control permeate modern society 
and, indeed, I will show how they pertain to the operation of conservation in Nigeria. 
To now address the second question I posed: what does power rest upon? Foucault 
argued throughout his scholarly career, yet most notably in Discipline and Punish (1977) and 
The History of Sexuality Volume 1 (1978), that all forms of power relationships are 
intertwined with forms of knowledge and discourse. He states that:
'…in any society, there are manifold relations of power which permeate, characterise and constitute 
the social body and these relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor 
implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse'
(1980:93). 
Thus, in order for a set of power relations to function effectively, there must be a base of 
knowledge that lends legitimacy or 'truth' to those relations. Discourses are fields of 
accepted expression or understanding, frames through which any object is made 
intelligible. The functioning of the prison described in Discipline and Punish depended on 
the discourses of delinquency and criminality, whilst the interference with infantile 
sexuality depicted in The History of Sexuality was supported by various corrective medico–
sexual discourses. So, how might all of these characteristics of power and its operation 
relate to a conservation initiative in eastern Nigeria?
The establishment of the Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve marked the beginning of an 
ongoing and dynamic relation of power between local people and conservationists. As 
indicated above, Foucault argues that power operates as a set of actions upon other actions; 
it is exercised when a group or individual acts in a way which structures the possible field 
of action of others. Thus, I will be arguing that from the establishment of the reserve 
onwards local people have been enmeshed in a power relation that has fundamentally 
modified their field of possible action. The effects of this exercise of power have tended 
toward to the extreme end of the spectrum outlined by Foucault (1982:220); conservation 
has not induced or seduced but has significantly forbidden and constrained local people's 
actions. This will be shown in detail in Chapter 4. Power relations, I noted however, are 
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not simply imposed by a powerful actor or actors onto a passive other; the other has to be 
capable of acting for there to be a power relation. There is always room for resistance. In 
my thesis I will show how this is the case, as local people resist, directly and indirectly, 
materially and discursively, the effects of the power relation. The main attributes of 
resistance as understood by Foucault and Scott will be developed throughout the thesis, 
especially in Chapter 5, where I deal with how local people have adapted to their exclusion 
from the reserve. However, conformity is equally pervasive at Ngel Nyaki and this is, 
following Foucault, due to the persuasion of the local people of their powerlessness and the 
legitimacy of the reserve. Foucault states that power produces as well as takes away. Whilst 
the negative effects of power at Ngel Nyaki are the most numerous and important, there 
still exist things that power has produced that were not there before. New spaces and 
places, new categories of people, new social relations, new behaviours, have all been 
generated out of the exercise of power installed by the establishment of the reserve. In 
regards to the mechanisms of power talked about earlier, it will be seen that surveillance, 
chiefly in the form of forest guards, and more recently in the form of strategically located 
'control posts,' is the primary way in which the unequal relations of power that exist are 
maintained. Other material coercions will also be seen to be effective in this respect. Lastly, 
an aspect of Foucault's work that is of cardinal importance is that of the interrelationship 
between power and knowledge. New forms of power emerge alongside new forms of 
knowledge, each reinforcing each other. This link has been loosely sketched out earlier in 
this section, but I shall restate it. At Ngel Nyaki, the discourse of post–colonial 
environmentalism has been intimately connected with the justification and establishment 
of the reserve and thus the instalment of the unequal power relation that obtains between 
local people and the purveyors of that discourse. I do not possess a great amount of data on 
the discourse of the parties historically and contemporaneously responsible for protecting 
the reserve but I feel that what I do know will suffice in conveying my argument. In my 
thesis I will also make brief mention of local discourse, especially as it relates to the 
resistance of power. The following chapters will provide clear and detailed examples of 
these and all other aspects of Foucault's work I have discussed.
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Up to this point I have not dealt with one of the main dimensions of conservation, 
namely, the displacement and forced resettlement of people inside protected areas. This is 
a crucial aspect of the community–conservation dynamic.
Displacement and Forced Resettlement
The establishment and expansion of protected areas is often predicated on the forced 
displacement and consequent impoverishment of local people (Cernea and Schmidt–
Soltau, 2003). To West et al. (2006:257) this 'is one of the most controversial and contested 
aspects of protected areas.' Why? Because displacing people from their homes in order to 
protect an area for the biodiversity it is heralded to possess can have many serious 
consequences. The move itself is emotionally and physically painful, requiring a change in 
residence from a place where people may have lived for many generations to a foreign and 
sometimes unwelcoming new home environment. Further, displaced people may, due to a 
lack of access to land, jobs, etc., become impoverished, something that Cernea (1997:1569) 
claims to be 'the central risk in development–caused involuntary population settlement.' 
The volume of academic work on this phenomenon is quite considerable and is especially 
rich in studies conducted in Africa. Before looking at examples I will frame the discussion 
with some general remarks about displacement and resettlement.
Mohammed Salih (1999:37) states that displacement, is 'no longer treated as the 
mere relocation of population from one region, country or continent to another,' but that 
it is 'a social phenomenon, with far–reaching economic, political and environmental 
ramifications emanating from a complex web of issues.' That is, the consequences of 
displacement are total; they embrace all facets of life for those who are displaced: their 
livelihood prospects, their social and cultural life, their political status and the natural 
environment that has to withstand their arrival. 
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De Wet and Fox (2001) make a distinction between two ideal types of 
displacement: (1) Development–Induced Displacement and Resettlement (DIDR) and (2) 
Development–Induced Displacement (DID). The former refers to assisted resettlement 
'which is planned at each stage by the authorities and implementing agencies,' whilst the 
latter refers to resettlement 'where the removal may or may not be planned. In some cases, 
people may be expelled from the area and left to their own devices' (De Wet & Fox, 
2001:8). The latter type of displacement is the most commonly found. Only rarely does 
one find instances of settlement prudently organised by conservationists in order to 
effectively minimise the social and economic costs of displacement for those forced to 
move. Cernea and Schmidt–Soltau show this in their study of nine conservation projects 
in the Central African region (2003). Only two of the protected areas 'had any explicit 
resettlement initiatives dealing with resident and mobile people within their borders,' and 
'none of the surveyed protected areas had adopted an official strategy to integrate local 
inhabitants into the park–management' (2003:43). Both types of displacement are found at 
Ngel Nyaki. As the empirical chapters of my thesis show, there have been two cases of 
forced resettlement at Ngel Nyaki. One case entailed the assisted removal and resettlement 
of a village community living inside the forest to a new site five or six kilometres away on 
the main road. This fits accurately into the category of DIDR. The other case, whereby a 
village community living inside the forest was twice evicted and then left to fend for itself, 
fits accurately into the latter category. 
Both types of displacement carry certain risks, which can, without thoughtful 
planning, turn into real life effects. Cernea outlines eight interrelated risks that accompany 
displacement in his model of 'risk and reconstruction' for resettling displaced people 
(1997). They are the risks of: (a) landlessness, whereby displacees have the land on which 
their productive systems, commercial activities and livelihoods were based, expropriated; 
(b) joblessness, referring to the loss of wage employment incurred by displacees, particularly 
landless labourers who could lose access to work on land owned by others and the use of 
assets under common property regimes; (c) homelessness, a sort of liminal state wherein 
people remain homeless, sometimes long after their initial displacement; (d) 
marginalisation, which refers to what happens 'when families lose economic power and 
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slide on a 'downward mobility' path: middle–income farm households do not become 
landless, they become small landholders; small shopkeepers and craftsmen downsize and 
slip below poverty thresholds…Marginalisation materialises also in a drop in social status 
and in a psychological downward slide of resettlers' confidence in society and self, a sense 
of injustice, a premise of anomic behaviour' (Cernea, 1997:1574); (e) increased morbidity 
and mortality, a risk that relates to the decline in health standards and life expectancy as a 
direct correlate of displacement. Displacees' health declines as a result of psychological 
stress and trauma as well as 'relocation–related illnesses' (ibid.) such as malaria; (f) food 
insecurity and undernourishment, which refers to what can happen when the diversity of 
food crops drops as a result of displacement, sometimes leading to a simplified diet lacking 
essential nutrients; (g) loss of access to common property, another risk of displacement 
where displacees lose access to resources held in common by a community, such as water 
bodies, grazing areas, forested land, burial grounds etc.; and, lastly, (h) social 
disarticulation, a risk that relates to the disintegration of the relationships and groups that 
provide predictability and stability in people's lives. Cernea (1997:1575) states that 
displacement often 'tears apart the existing social fabric: it disperses and fragments 
communities, dismantles patterns of social organisation and interpersonal ties: kinship 
groups become scattered as well.' Whilst Cernea's model is very helpful in predicting and 
understanding the side–effects of displacement, it is limited in the sense of not considering 
how local people may directly or indirectly challenge or resist displacement. This ties back 
into the work of Foucault and the particular notion that power relations are predicated on 
the possibility of resistance. The point where power is manifested, namely, people's actions, 
can be the point where power meets with resistance. So, although it is rare, when people 
are physically displaced they may turn the move into an act of resistance. Instead of moving 
to the site where they have been advised to settle by authorities, displaced people may move 
to a place that is better suited to their own interests. Thus, in such an example, the 
displaced could be said to be resisting power by determining the structure of their own 
field of possible action (where they can live) and not relinquishing it to official forces. An 
example of this nature has taken place at Ngel Nyaki, which will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 4.
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Where resettlement is assisted and provisions are made for those people forced to 
move many of these risks are prevented from becoming real life effects (De Wet, 2006). 
The example of assisted resettlement that took place at Ngel Nyaki clearly shows this. 
Those who were resettled in an assisted manner were moved by authorities to a 
predetermined site where they were allocated alternative lands on which to farm and build, 
although far smaller than what they previously had access to. Thus the risks of landlessness 
and homelessness were never realised. However, whilst their resettlement was assisted, the 
respective displacees were still negatively affected by the move. They undoubtedly faced a 
downward economic slide and a degree of related marginalisation, they have lost access to 
the reserve, which was a large common resource, and probably had their social 
relationships, dietary patterns and health significantly disrupted. 
The main risks of impoverishment outlined by Cernea (1997) have, in varying 
degrees, become reality in other instances of forced resettlement. Fabricius and De Wet 
(2002:144) show that conservation–driven displacement in pre–democratic South Africa 
'generally left the relocated people worse off in every respect. Often compensated 
inadequately or not at all, they were further impoverished due to diminished access to 
natural resources in the areas to which they had been moved.' Implemented by a racist 
government wanting to impose centralised control on humans and natural resources, 
forced resettlement saw displacees lose access to land; the land to which they shifted could 
not sustain their livelihood practices; they developed negative attitudes toward 
conservation and its agents; and, lastly, they also saw their stock of traditional ecological 
knowledge eroded. A number of these effects were later alleviated by a program of land 
restitution which saw displacees given back the land from which they were evicted, a 
process that the authors show has had positive effects for both people and the natural 
environment. A similar example of DIDR in South Africa is that of 'betterment' planning. 
From the 1950s through until the 1980s the Nationalist Government implemented large–
scale projects of agricultural rationalisation amongst the indigenous, rural black 
population, which they termed 'betterment' planning. Inter alia, the projects entailed the
classification of all available land into residential, crop or range usage, as well as the 
consolidation of the scattered population into planned, grid–like village settlements. These 
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conservation and development projects quickly came to be seen in a very different light by 
both academics and the local populations themselves; instead of the elixir it was purported 
to be, through its workings 'betterment' planning revealed itself as a stratagem of the 
government employed to directly control and manipulate the black population, a goal 
indivisibly connected with apartheid (Hendricks, 1989). The failure of the stated aims of 
'betterment' further exposed this political function.
McAllister has written two articles on the effects of 'betterment' on rural Xhosa 
people in the Transkei and Ciskei regions (1988, 1989). Conservative ('Red') Xhosa have 
had their settlements significantly reorganised, which has disrupted their neighbourhoods 
and their social identities. People have been forced to settle next to strangers, which has 
created suspicion, arguments and conflict. As well as these social impacts, McAllister also 
examines the economic effects of 'betterment.' The Xhosa lost control of and access to 
resources and were forced to build new homesteads without compensation. When first 
introduced, 'betterment' – as a manifestation of apartheid – was resisted by the Xhosa 
community. However, as time wore on and the effects of the programme became 
established, this resistance was broken down. This leads McAllister to conclude that 
'betterment' planning 'seriously disrupts the social structure, economy and ability of Red 
Xhosa to maintain their particular response to apartheid…wherever 'betterment' has been 
imposed in the Ciskei and Transkei, the Red lifestyle and its associated values have 
disappeared' (1988:31). De Wet, in his study of 'betterment' in Chatha, a rural village in 
the Ciskei district, makes similar observations to McAllister. He shows that although the 
stance of the government was to economically develop the community and protect the 
environment, in the final instance the planning 'has led to the people of Chatha as well as 
of countless other similar settlements having been moved against their will, and having 
experienced social disruption. Although some communities have benefited, many have 
found themselves economically worse off and with parts of their environment more 
ecologically vulnerable than before' (De Wet, 1989:345). Whilst not made explicit by either 
author, it can be assumed that people's health has also been negatively impacted by the 
turbulence of being displaced in this fashion. 
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The instance of DIDR that took place at Ngel Nyaki is in some respects different to 
the resettlements that McAllister, Fabricius and De Wet describe. This concerns the logic 
and effects of the respective schemes. As advanced by Hendricks (1989), the South African 
resettlement schemes were essentially tools of apartheid masked under the labels of 
conservation and development. The logic of the projects was about centralised control, 
about manipulating and dominating the black rural population. Whilst not fully agreeing 
with Hendricks in this respect, De Wet nonetheless acknowledges that the effects of these 
schemes were in line with the logic described (see below). The assisted resettlement at Ngel 
Nyaki, on the other hand, was essentially a land clearance and was not facilitated around 
any notions of development. The logic of this removal at Ngel Nyaki was simply to bleach a 
protected area of humanity and to move those people elsewhere. From this difference in 
logic have also come some differences in effects. There are important similarities that need 
to be noted first. The South African examples and the assisted resettlement at Ngel Nyaki 
significantly disrupted the lives of the people subject to their workings and exposed them 
to the risks of displacement discussed by Cernea (1997). All of these people lost access to 
resources and endured socio–economic disruption in some shape or form. However, as 
shown, the risks of displacement were borne out much more clearly in South Africa than 
they were at Ngel Nyaki. Even though resettled by authorities, displacees in South Africa 
seldom received compensation or alternative land and they had the fabric of their 
communities torn apart. Further, the displaced in the South African examples became 
deeply embedded in a racist and exploitative political system. Without having been 
overseen by authorities the projects of resettlement in South Africa would fit comfortably 
into the category of DID. I would say that the reason why these formal schemes of 
resettlement disrupted people's lives so significantly was due in large part to how the black 
rural population was seen by the Nationalist government. At Ngel Nyaki these main risks 
of impoverishment were prevented from becoming reality by governmental planning.
The example of DID at Ngel Nyaki is different from both the instance of DIDR 
and the South African examples in a further and fundamental respect. Unlike these 
examples, the instance of DID was not subject to any formal oversight and was left to run 
its own course. Why some people living inside the forest were provided for whilst others 
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were not remains a mystery to me and is a question that could be answered through future 
research. Like most people subject to DID, these people were not resettled or moved to a 
predetermined site by authorities, they were not allocated any alternative land on which to 
farm or build and they did not receive any compensation. They were simply evicted from 
the forest and left to fend for themselves. Consequently, people have lost nearly all access 
to land, they have seen some of their traditional social institutions disappear, their kinship 
and residential structures have been badly disrupted and their health and diets have 
deteriorated. Like the examples of forced resettlement in South Africa, I contend that this 
is due to a pronounced lack of planning on the part of the authorities. This difference in 
exposure to the risks of displacement will become clearer throughout the thesis. As I will 
now show, these risks have been realised in other examples of DID elsewhere in Africa.
Hitchcock (1999) shows that the relocation of Bushmen in the Kalahari Desert, 
Botswana, has had significant consequences. In response to the increasing pressure placed 
on them from environmentalists, the government began to remove Bushmen from their 
marginal homelands from the 1970s onwards, a top–down process that has continued up 
to the present day. As Hitchcock shows, development–induced displacement has affected 
the communities in important ways: 'The resettlement process has had significant effects 
on [people's] well–being, it reduces their access to natural resources with which they are 
familiar, restricts the amount of land they have to reside in and use, and puts them in 
positions where they are impinging on other groups, a process which has sometimes led to 
social conflicts' (1999: page number unknown). In addition, the groups forced to move 
have not received compensation and have experienced significant social disruption. In 
Zimbabwe, Ranger (1989:247) shows that forced relocation and resettlement is intimately 
linked with socio–economic disruption and goes so far as to call the process of relocating 
segments of the population inhabiting the Matobo National Park 'a nightmare both for the 
resettled African and for the Native Department.' Remaining in Africa, Ringo (1999) 
describes the removal of Maasai from their ancestral grazing lands in Tanzania through 
government–backed evictions. This is an ongoing process that has operated on the margins 
of legality; the people have been 'neither compensated nor offered alternative residential or 
grazing lands, as the law required' (Ringo, 1999: page number unknown). The 
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displacement also resulted in 'unprecedented loss and suffering to families and property' 
(Ringo, 1999: page number unknown).  
 Therefore, one important and controversial implication of conservation projects is 
that they often force the people living inside protected areas to leave and live somewhere 
else. Whether organised by authorities or not, it is something invariably connected with 
impoverishment. Displacees are seldom provided for and in the rare cases where alternative 
livelihood strategies are put in place for those forced to move they are usually inadequate. 
Nonetheless, there is a broad correlation between planning and 'successful' resettlement: 
overall, people subject to DIDR fare better than those of DID. The empirical chapters of 
my thesis will flesh out these ideas in greater detail. Before discussing that data, however, I 
will provide background information on the area in which I conducted my fieldwork.
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3 .  T h e  s o c i a l ,  e c o l o g i c a l  a n d  h i s t o r i c a l  
a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  N g e l  N y a k i  F o r e s t  R e s e r v e
Overview
Having now located my thesis in the relevant academic literature and sketched out a 
theoretical framework through which my data can be better understood, I will now begin 
to introduce some concrete information about the reserve and the people who live around 
it. The current chapter provides background information on the social, ecological and 
historical aspects of the Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve. I begin by describing the people that 
live in area, their general way of life, their modes of subsistence, the places where they live,
and the relevance each group has to this study. From there I discuss the anthropological 
literature on the various ethnic groups that inhabit the Mambila Plateau, in the process 
locating my own work within it. Following this I provide a brief outline of the geography of 
the plateau as well as the climate that obtains there. Then I move onto to look at the 
ecology of the reserve and the history of efforts to protect it. I describe all of the various 
parties who have protected the reserve over its history and also what their interests have 
been in this protection. To conclude the chapter I discuss the history of the relationship 
between local people and the reserve, showing what relationship they have had with the 
forests as well as how this relationship has fluctuated as a result of changes in the 
protection of the reserve. 
A broad picture of social reality
The people that live in and around the Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve belong to a variety of 
ethnic groups, including the Ndola, Fulani, Mambilla, Kaka, Chamba, Tigon, Wurkun and 
probably others still. Each group has its own language that is used when speaking to 
members of the same group. The lingua franca is the Fulani language of Fulfulde, although 
Hausa is also commonly used. The majority of the people that live in the immediate 
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vicinity of the Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve do so in permanent settlements. The only people 
that live in temporary accommodation are a small subsection of the Fulani population. 
Villagers are by and large agriculturalists that practice forms of both swidden–agriculture 
and crop rotation, and whose farming technology consists of the traditional African hoe, a 
steel machete and sometimes an axe, there being no machinery to speak of. The only 
exception to the villager–agriculturalist equation is the small number of Fulani who live in 
villages and who rear cattle. The staple crops cultivated by farmers in all villages are maize 
and guinea-corn. In addition to these basic crops, farmers in the area also cultivate cassava, 
coco-yam, groundnut, pepper and coffee. The farming calendar has changed little since 
Rehfisch's description of the Mambilla farming system (1972), and the general pattern that 
all farmers practice is as follows:
November: Fields are prepared for cultivation, involving either the clearing of regrown 
grass from the previous season or the felling of bush to create new fields.
December: The clearing of grass and bush continues.
January: Field preparation ceases, and all debris is left to dry. The least amount of labour is 
expended in this month and it is generally regarded as a time of relaxation.
February: The debris produced by field preparation is burnt, with the resultant ash acting 
as a natural fertilizer for the forthcoming crops. 
March: The rains begin to fall and the planting of crops commences. 
April: Planting continues, sometimes accompanied by the first periods of weeding
May: Weeding proper commences as the crops planted in the previous months now begin 
to germinate; mbangas, or storage houses, are constructed and repaired in anticipation of 
the maize harvest.
June: Weeding continues.
July: Most crops begin to be harvested.
August: Harvesting.
September: Harvesting.
October: Harvesting; some people even at this early stage will commence field preparation 
for the next agricultural year.
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Each village has the following political offices, listed in descending order of status: a jauro, 
or chief; a waikili, or second chief, who is the jauro's primary advisor; and, lastly, five to ten 
maingwas, or elders, who provide further advice and moral guidance to the jauro. 
There are four main villages that surround the reserve, all of which lie no farther 
than two to three kilometres from the reserve itself, with some merely a couple of hundred 
metres from the boundary (see map on page 59). The village of Gidan Kuma sits astride the 
only sealed road in the region, which runs southeast–northwest over the Mambilla Plateau. 
According to an unpublished report made by the Nigerian Conservation Foundation 
(NCF), the village has a population of approximately 15,000 people. This population is 
ethnically diverse; members of the Kaka, Mambilla, Ndola, Fulani and Chamba ethnic 
groups all live here. With the exception of a small number of Fulani, most residents of 
Gidan Kuma are agricultural farmers, with a small number engaged in other occupations 
such as butchery, petty trading, hospitality, teaching etc.
Living conditions in Gidan Kuma are simple. There is no running water and 
electricity comes from highly erratic petrol and diesel powered generators that only a few 
people can afford. People live in mud-brick houses, some of which have roofs made from 
corrugated iron whilst many still rely on the thatching grass provided by nature. In contrast 
to many parts of sub-Saharan Africa there are no cellular phones, and perhaps only 20 or 
30 people own motorised transport. In terms of the religions that are practiced in Gidan 
Kuma, Christianity and Islam are the most popular, and there are numerous churches and 
mosques scattered throughout the village. I was informed that pockets of traditional 
religion still persisted in places. 
The second village is that of Yabri. As this village lies ten kilometres down a very 
rough dirt track that turns off the main road at the trading town of Maisamari, access to it 
can be obtained only by foot or an adequate four–wheel drive vehicle or motorbike. If 
travelling to Yabri from Gidan Kuma the only option is by foot, as there is only a long, 
winding single–track that eventually joins the wider dirt track approximately two to three 
kilometres from the village. The population of Yabri is much smaller than Gidan Kuma; 
the head of the village estimates that it is around 250. The population is also less ethnically 
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diverse, comprising two ethnic groups, the Mambilla and Tigon. Owing to its small size 
and isolation, the living conditions here are even more basic than at Gidan Kuma. There 
are perhaps only a couple of houses in the village that do not have thatched grass roofs,
and not once in my travels through the village did I see any evidence of electricity or 
battery–powered electronics. It appeared that no-one owned any motorised transport. Most 
people in Yabri are cultivators, and the majority were practicing Muslims, there being little 
evidence of Christianity. 
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Moving further north toward the 'bottom' of the reserve, one then encounters the 
village of Musa Akwole. Musa Akwole lies at the northern tip of the reserve and is accessed 
either via the same dirt road as Yabri or, if coming from the western side of the reserve, 
from a single–track of the same nature that runs from Gidan Kuma down toward Yabri. 
The population of the village, which the unpublished NCF report puts at approximately 
2,000 people, is dominated mainly by the Ndola ethnic group, although there are a 
number of Fulani, Kaka and Mambilla living there, as well as one Wurkun family. The 
population of Musa Akwole are mainly farmers. Like the farming groups in Gidan Kuma, 
small numbers also participate in other occupations such as butchery, trading, etc. The
living conditions that obtain here present an intermediate stage between Gidan Kuma and 
Yabri; there are a handful of people, mainly Fulani, who own motorised transport; perhaps 
a quarter or a fifth of all houses have corrugated iron roofs; and young men can often be 
seen carrying around portable radios and cassette players listening to a quite astonishing 
array of broadcasts and recordings, ranging from the BBC World Service, to modern 
American popular music, to dance music from neighbouring Cameroon. The village has 
roughly the same religious composition as Gidan Kuma: there are significant numbers of 
both Muslims and Christians and a smaller amount of people practicing traditional 
religions. The last village that I will provide an account of is that of Gidan Elom, in 
particular, two of its five constituent hamlets.
The village of Gidan Elom is situated on the western side of the Ngel Nyaki Forest 
Reserve and is by far the most isolated and poorest of all the settlements that lie around 
the reserve's perimeter. Access to the settlement is gained from the western side only by 
means of a vague track cut through often dense bush, and from the north and Musa 
Akwole by means of a similarly vague pathway. The population of Gidan Elom would not 
exceed 150 people and is ethnically homogenous; all people belong to the Ndola ethnic 
group. Its people are all farmers who practice a small amount of additional trading. The 
village consists of five hamlets – Mayo Ambak, Musa Gamba, Andaka, Berabera and Ako 
Fonja – separated from each other by distances of no more than one to two kilometres.1
                                                
1 Whilst this distance would seem to suggest that the hamlets would be better conceptualised as individual 
villages it is not how the people themselves understand it.
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The living conditions here are harsh; the people are very poor, there are no iron–roofed 
houses, there is no electricity in any of the hamlets, no running water and in one of the 
hamlets there are no trees to provide respite from the powerful sun. The majority of the 
population are Christian and a handful of people practice traditional religion. 
There are a small number of people that live in and around the Ngel Nyaki Forest 
Reserve that do not live permanently in any one place. I am referring specifically to a small 
subsection of the Fulani population, namely, the cattle herders known locally and in the 
anthropological literature as the M'bororo (Frantz, 1981). The M'bororo are engaged in 
basically the same livelihood strategies as their permanently settled fellow citizens, that is, 
the supervision of widely roaming herds of cattle, yet are marked out as different due to 
their impermanent residence. These usually young, male shepherds live in temporary one 
or two–man huts known to the Fulani as bukas, and traverse the landscape as they keep 
watch of the cattle usually owned by those Fulani living in the larger trading towns such as 
Maisamari or Nguroje. I presume that once of a mature age these men become more 
sedentary and the next generation of young men fill their place.
Unfortunately, however, I was effectively prohibited from studying any of the 
Fulani people, transient or permanently settled. As I was told by my main informant, most 
Fulani were deeply suspicious of my motives; many of them misconstrued me as a 
government official who wanted to arrest them and take them to court. This made them 
particularly difficult to approach, and even when I did manage to put myself in their 
immediate physical presence they either gave me a very frosty reception or simply ran away. 
This was a disappointment for me, as I would have liked to include them in the study for 
the important reason that they are the only people continuing to enter the reserve and 
exploit its resources on a day–to–day basis. Ironically, the reason why I found them 
analytically exciting was the same reason that underlies why the Fulani were evasive; they 
understood that by entering the reserve with their herds they were breaking the law and 
thus they sought to avoid anyone who could punish them for it.
In light of these comments it will come as no surprise that the Fulani play only a 
background role in my thesis hereafter, as I was unable to obtain any primary data 
concerning their interactions with the people involved in protecting the Ngel Nyaki Forest 
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Reserve or with the land on which they base their livelihood strategies. The result of this is 
that the thesis will focus on the ethnic groups that live in permanent villages and practice 
agriculture. 
The social anthropology of the Mambilla Plateau
The social anthropology of the Mambilla Plateau, that is, the ethnographic accounts of the 
various ethnic groups that live in this locale, is a body of scholarly work that, whilst slowly 
growing, is quite small. This is due mainly to the fact that very few social anthropologists 
have worked on the Plateau. Further, not only is the amount of published research scant 
but the issues and groups studied by their authors are disparate, meaning that there is no 
real degree of consistency or overlap between them. Notwithstanding these two main 
problems, I will proceed to discuss the literature and to locate my own research within it.
Some of the earliest accounts of social life on the Mambilla Plateau were produced 
in the 1930s by C.K. Meek, an official in the British colonial administration. Meek's main 
report on the area, published in 1931, was entitled Tribal Studies in Northern Nigeria, and 
was an amateur description of the customs and habits of the farming groups then 
inhabiting the Plateau, in particular, the Mambilla. This was followed by another short 
article on the Mambilla by Schneider (1955), published in the long–standing Nigerian Field
magazine. However, the first genuinely anthropological studies of social life on the plateau 
did not begin to appear in print until the 1960s, starting with a couple of articles about 
Mambilla kinship and descent written by Farnham Rehfisch (1960, 1966). Then, in 1972, 
he published the first comprehensive ethnographic account of the Mambilla, The Social 
Structure of a Mambilla Village, essentially a reworking of his M.A. thesis submitted in 1955. 
The ethnography is based on information collected during a one year stint of fieldwork in 
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the village of Warwar2 and like the articles that preceded it the book consists of a dense, 
fine–grained description of the kinship and descent groups that organise social life 
amongst the Mambilla. Also in that year, Charles Frantz published one of his first articles 
on the Fulani. This article was the first of many that Frantz wrote on the pastoral, nomadic 
Fulani dwelling in the montane grasslands of the Mambilla Plateau, an environment he 
claims is among the most peculiar that the geographically diffuse Fulani inhabit.3 As 
Frantz's work is based solely on this group it possesses limited relevance to my own thesis, 
which is concerned with the ethnic groups that mainly practice cultivation and live in 
permanent villages. However, some of his work is still applicable, and here I am referring to 
the information he provides on the historical relationship of domination by the Fulani 
over their sedentary neighbours on the Mambilla Plateau (1981). In the second empirical 
chapter of my thesis I deal with the strategies employed by cultivator groups in their 
attempt to cope with the impacts produced upon their lives by the establishment and 
maintenance of the Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve. One of these coping mechanisms was to 
enter into relations of economic dependence with the neighbouring Fulani. Frantz's work 
allows me to place this within a broader historical context, and not treat it as a practice that 
was created ad hoc. 
The early 1980s saw, for the first time since Rehfisch, the production of more 
ethnographic accounts of social life amongst the sedentary groups living on the plateau. 
These were again mainly focussed on the Mambilla. Blench (1984) provides a 
disappointingly superficial account of interactions between Fulani pastoralists and their 
agricultural neighbours, the Mambilla and Samba. Whilst emphasising the history of 
Fulani domination and oppression and how this has contributed to the current status of 
the groups, there is no significant discussion of how this power–dynamic structures the 
practical economic interactions that take place between them on a daily basis. He simply 
states that the 'Fulani and the agriculturalists among whom they move have an 
interdependent relationship, based on the exchange of dairy products for grain, and a 
                                                
2 Warwar is a settlement which I believe lies somewhere around 10–20 kilometres south of Gembu, in the 
Sardauna Local Government Area (then Sardauna Province).
3 Gausset (2006) has also made similar observations to this in his article on agro–pastoral conflict in the 
Cameroon.
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market for the animals that must be periodically sold to provide cash for domestic 
purposes, such as cloth or marriage payments' (Blench, 1984:5). Unfortunately, the author 
does not describe these practices in detail or explain them in terms of the historical 
relationship of oppression. I will try to fill this gap in the ethnography through discussing 
the adaptations made by the agriculturalist groups in the area to the impacts of 
conservation on their lives. 
The other anthropologist to commence, in the 1980s, the publication of 
anthropological research on the people living on the plateau was David Zeitlyn. In the 
nearly two decades since his first published article on the Mambilla people of Somie, a 
village located on the Cameroon side of the Mambilla Plateau, Zeitlyn has amassed
probably the most extensive publication record of any anthropologist to work in the area. 
Unfortunately, however, the bulk of Zeitlyn's work is concerned with the traditional 
religion practiced in Somie and is therefore only of minor import from the perspective of 
my thesis. I am aware that in the last few years he has given some of his energies to the 
study of Mambilla language, yet this too is only of minor relevance to my thesis, which is 
concerned with matters of the natural environment and how various people who have a 
stake in that environment have interacted with each other. In addition to these specific 
discrepancies between my work and the other anthropologists who work and have worked 
on the plateau, a more general one exists, namely, that nearly all of the ethnographic 
accounts of farming peoples have as their object of study the Mambilla ethnic group. As I 
clarify later, whilst I did engage with a small number of Mambilla men and women during 
my fieldwork, the majority of people included in this thesis belong to the Ndola ethnic 
group. To the best of my knowledge, the Ndola have not been the subject of any serious 
anthropological studies, and thus my thesis, whilst only peripherally connected to matters 
of cultural and social distinctiveness, will hopefully be able to shed some light on the lives 
of people that belong to this ethnic group. Now that the people that inhabit the area have 
been introduced, as well as the attention they have received from ethnographers, I can 
bring into the picture the reserve itself.
Geography and Climate
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The Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve is situated near the western escarpment of the Mambilla 
Plateau, which itself lies in the southeastern corner of Taraba State, eastern Nigeria. The 
plateau is approximately 3100km² in area and its surface consists mainly of open, rolling 
grasslands, with this grassland being interspersed with fragments of forest, of which the 
forest within the boundaries of the Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve is one. Although known and 
referred to in all areas of discourse as a 'plateau,' it is quite apparent after having seen it 
that the Mambilla Plateau is far from the stereotypical image of a flat area of raised land. 
Other authors (Chapman and Chapman, 2001; Hurault, 1998; Rehfisch, 1972) have made 
this same observation. In many places the topography is uneven and angular, whether this 
is in the form of sharply rising hills or deep, trench-like valleys that have been carved out of 
the landscape. The plateau is drained by numerous water courses, ranging from small 
streams to powerful rivers, all of which discharge into the Benue River, the second largest 
river in the country after the Niger. The climate on the Mambilla Plateau is relatively 
moderate when compared with the rest of Nigeria. The Reverend G. Schneider captured it 
well when he described the climate as 'delightful and exhilarating' (Schneider, 1955:113). 
The mean maximum daily temperature is around or just above 30ºC, dropping to around 
15ºC at night, but it can sometimes get much colder than this. These figures vary with the 
seasonal changes on the Plateau. The dry season, an uninterrupted period of hot, dry 
weather, usually lasts for three months, starting in November and continuing until 
February. The wet season has various gradations. From the beginning of March until the 
end of May the first rains begin to fall, but these are light and intermittent, especially in the 
earlier months of March and April, and are not thought of locally as 'the rains' but as a sign 
that they are on their way. From the beginning of June the rainy season proper 
commences, and persists until the middle of November, when the dry season starts the 
seasonal cycle over again. It is in this period that the bulk of the annual 1780mm of rainfall 
is recorded (Chapman and Chapman, 2001).
                 However, rainfall is everywhere unpredictable, and this pattern occasionally errs; 
during my stay in the villages that surround the Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve, which lasted 
from early February to early May, the rains were late in arriving, much to the concern of all 
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people living in the area. Jokes were bandied around that 'this year there is going to be two 
dry seasons,' but I knew that people were seriously alarmed. By the middle of April, by 
which time there had been no substantial rainfall, prayer meetings were beginning to be 
held that assembled people from various faiths in a collective effort to mystically combat 
the forces of nature. Much to the relief of all people, by the opening of May the early rains 
had come, and were starting to strengthen at a remarkable rate.
The Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve: ecology and history
The Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve is a state–governed area of protected land comprised mainly 
of two montane/sub-montane forest stands: Kurmin Ngel Nyaki and Kurmin Danko.4 One 
of three main forested areas on the Mambilla Plateau, the reserve covers an area of 46km². 
Called 'the most diverse forest on the Mambilla Plateau,' by Chapman and Chapman 
(2001:19), the forests of Ngel Nyaki and Danko are rich in biodiversity; they house a wide 
range of globally rare plant and animal species, at least 24 IUCN (International Union for 
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources) endangered tree species, African wild 
dogs, the Nigerian chimpanzee, buffalo, klipspringer, and Tantalus, Putty-nosed and Mona 
monkeys. Furthermore, the whole area is an RSPB (Royal Society for the Protection of 
Birds) Important Bird Area. The reserve also possesses a wide range of natural resources 
used by people, such as fruits, building materials, natural medicines and honey, as well as 
the land itself. The fact that the name Ngel Nyaki actually means 'forest of honey' reveals 
this close nexus between the natural environment and people's livelihoods. The reserve is 
drained by numerous streams as well as one main river, known locally as the River Ngishi, 
which eventually discharges into the River Kam, itself a direct tributary of the Benue. 
The first formal written proposal to protect the forests of Ngel Nyaki and Danko 
was submitted on the 11th of March, 1961, and was signed by the then Government Forest 
Guard of the Mambilla District, M. Bukar Gaji (later Alhaji) and approved by the District 
Head and the District Officer. Although less than 100 words in length, the proposal, under 
                                                
4 The word 'Kurmin' is used locally to denote forest, especially forest that surrounds villages. I am unsure 
about which language it comes from, however.
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the subheading of 'Situation and Boundaries,' enumerates a large array of animals that at 
that time inhabited the forests: 
Crossing the forest can be frightfully dangerous, because of the big game, such as Lion, Tiger, Bush-
Cow, Hunting Leopard, Gorilla, Baboon, White Collared Mangabey, Colobus [monkey], 
Chimpanzee, also, you can see such as Red Pig, Bay Duiker, Ogilvy's Duiker, Yellow backed Duiker, 
Red Flanked Duiker. There is one big snake called by the Villagers (The owners of the forest) 
'Maijedi'; the snake is with a horn, I think a Python? (Gaji, 1961)
Eight years later, in April 1969, the reserve came into existence, gazetted as the Gashaka 
Mambilla Native Authority Kurmin Ngel Nyaki/Kurmin Danko Forest Reserve. A new 
space born out of and reinforcing exercise of power was born. The key motivation for 
gazetting the area was to protect the biodiversity within the forests of Ngel Nyaki and 
Danko that had been outlined in the proposal of 1961 (Hazel Chapman pers. comm.). In 
1973, a visit was made to the forest reserve by one Dr I. Colquhoun, the senior wildlife 
officer in the district at the time, who, after making some detailed observations, was so 
impressed with the rich biodiversity within the forest that he recommended to the relevant 
authorities that the status of the reserve be upgraded (Chapman and Chapman, 2001). A 
report made in the same year by the Forestry Division of the Ministry of Natural Resources 
precisely mirrors this sentiment, and thus one can presume that Colquhoun was involved 
in its writing. The report states that 'Ngel Nyaki must have great significance, both 
phytogeographical and biological. One would like to see it constituted a strict nature 
reserve.' As a result of Colquhoun's visit and the report, in 1975 the forest reserve was 
regazetted as the Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve. This reclassification theoretically (but not 
necessarily in practice, as I will show below) afforded the area a higher degree of protection 
from local people than it had previously. At the time of writing, the area still bears the 
same name and status. 
In addition to viewing the biodiversity within the forests of Ngel Nyaki and Danko 
as irreplaceable and unique, the authorities who brought the reserve into being also had 
certain views of local people. I am alluding to the discourse of post–colonial conservation 
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mentioned in my review of the literature. It will be remembered that within this particular 
field of knowledge indigenous people are seen as dangerous and ignorant vis–a–vis their 
natural environment and that they must be completely kept out of protected areas lest they 
senselessly destroy them. It is possible to discern these conceptions of local people in a 
report made shortly after the reserve's demarcation. Regarding Ngel Nyaki, the anonymous 
author writes that 'even though it is a Forest Reserve, farmers have cast covetous eyes on it 
and any relaxation of control could be disastrous' (Ministry of Natural Resources, 1973:4). 
These discourses have persisted up until the present day. Chapman and Chapman state 
(2001:8) that in the Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve 'many taxa are specifically targeted by 
humans for destruction' and that other plant and animal species are also 'targeted by 
humans,' statements that paint the local people as intentional exterminators of plants and 
animals, which they are not. Further, a government official that I interviewed in Gembu 
stated that:
'Farmers…they are ignorant. They do not understand the importance of the reserve.'
Therefore, local people have, historically and contemporaneously, been construed 
as both dangerous and ignorant concerning their use and appreciation of the reserve, 
evaluations that can be located within the discourse of post–colonial conservation and 
which justify the establishment of protected areas. 
Until quite recently, the Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve has been the administrative 
concern of state and local government alone (but predominantly the former), who have 
employed and continue to employ forest guards to enforce the legal sanctions preventing 
local communities from entering the reserve. However, the reserve has not been protected 
at all times over its history. According to Chapman's knowledge, during the 1970s – the 
period immediately after it had been gazetted – the reserve was frequently patrolled.  
Judging by interviews I conducted with some of the older people in the area, it appears that 
one individual was particularly important during this time: M. Bukar Gaji, the 
Government Forest Guard of the Mambilla District. Whenever I asked who it was that first 
told them that they could no longer enter the forests, the name invariably stated was 
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Bukar's. It seems that he played an instrumental role in both patrolling the area and 
attempting to enforce the community's exclusion, at least until the mid–1970s. In the 
1980s active protection of the forest lapsed. However, the 1990s, especially around the year 
1995, saw a return of official presence. A number of the villagers I spoke with remember 
this as the year that a government official came and took a number of people to court for 
entering the reserve. Today the reserve is still under the jurisdiction of the state, which 
continues (albeit highly irregularly) to employ forest guards. However, how the reserve is 
protected has changed significantly; today there are two other parties – a Nigerian non-
governmental organisation (NGO) and a foreign research project – operating under 
contractual agreement with the state government to protect the reserve. 
The contemporary picture
During a visit to the montane forests of Taraba State in May 2003, Dr Hazel Chapman, the 
daughter of a former forest officer in the area during the 1970s, initiated the Nigerian 
Montane Forest Project (NMFP) in the Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve. The project is a small 
scale scientific enterprise oriented toward achieving three interrelated goals. The project's 
first aim is to conduct biological research on the forests. The second aim is that of 
education; education of the students conducting biological research and also the education 
of local communities who live in the area about the importance of the reserve to the 
continuity of their livelihoods. Lastly, and closely interwoven with the two previous aims is 
that of conservation, i.e., to protect the reserve from the people who live in and around it 
(NMFP, n.d.). Thus, the main interest the NMFP has in the Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve is 
preserving its biodiversity for biological research. The NMFP has as its base a field station 
that is located roughly an hour's walk from the village of Gidan Kuma. The project 
currently employs 18 staff, all of whom are men that live in the villages that lie close to the 
perimeter of the reserve. This can definitely be seen as one of the 'productive' effects of the 
exercise of power I am dealing with in this thesis. One is employed as a full–time project 
manager who oversees the operation in Chapman's absence; one is employed as a part-time 
cook, providing meals for any guests that may happen to be staying at the field station; two 
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are employed as part–time watchmen, who work in shifts around the clock, ensuring that 
the field station is exempt from harm; six are employed as full–time field assistants, all of 
whom are trained to collect biological data from the forest on Chapman's behalf as well as 
to assist any visiting scientists in their research; and, lastly, eight are employed as part–time 
patrollers, all of which make frequent journeys into and around the reserve in an attempt 
to keep out hunters, farmers, herders and any other persons who may want to enter the 
forbidden space. This last occupational category is of special interest to me because it is 
local men, and not others from outside the area, who are employed as patrollers. The 
implication of this is that whereas in the past the mechanisms of power installed to 
maintain the unequal power relation were largely exogenous, with the establishment of the 
NMFP today they have been localised; the agents of surveillance and control, the people 
who direct the flow of power onto the actions of local people, are local people themselves. 
These patrollers are thus co–opted by the powerful and charged with the responsibility of 
enforcing the exclusion of their neighbours, their own communities, and even their own 
kin. What sort of dynamic must exist between the patrollers, as nodes of dominant power 
relations, and the communities of which they are a part, I can only speculate, yet I wish 
that I had focussed more on this when in the area. Are they spurned by their communities 
for supposedly siding with the powerful? Or, do the patrollers have both a public and 
private transcript of power, sometimes keeping their neighbours out and sometimes 
turning a blind eye to illegality? This is very interesting and something I hope to look more 
into in the future. 
In terms of development, the NMFP was previously engaged in supporting one 
economic activity in the village of Gidan Kuma, namely, basket making, whereby the 
baskets made by women in the village would be transported to Lagos (where they would 
fetch a much higher price than if marketed locally) and sold by the NMFP on the women's 
behalf, with all profits accruing from the sales going directly back to the community. This 
activity was supported for only a year or so, with the result being that today the NMFP is 
not engaged in any developmental activity. I will now consider the other main group 
involved in the conservation of the Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve, the Nigerian Conservation 
Foundation (NCF).
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According to their website (http://www.africanconservation.org), NCF is 'Nigeria's 
foremost non-governmental organisation dedicated to the promotion of nature 
conservation.' Established in 1982, NCF has three main goals: to conserve biodiversity; to 
facilitate sustainable natural resource use; and to help realise a goal of reducing pollution 
and wasteful consumption. Therefore, in contrast to the NMFP, NCF seem to be more 
interested in conserving the natural environment for the Nigerian population and not for 
the biological information it can yield to scientific analysis. 
Although NCF is nearly 25 years old, its formal involvement in the conservation of 
the Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve dates from only recent times. Its current director, Professor 
E. A. Obot, made a biodiversity survey of Kurmin Ngel Nyaki sometime in the latter part of 
the 1990s, and during the first few years of the second millennium they started a 
'participatory forest management' project with the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds 
(RSPB) and the UK branch of the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF–UK) elsewhere on 
the plateau, but until 2003 NCF did not have any specific interest in the Ngel Nyaki Forest 
Reserve. In 2005 they became more significantly involved, as it was in this year that they 
received financial assistance from Taraba State Forestry (TSF) in order to protect the 
reserve. The balance of this grant was then counter-funded by two British organisations, 
RSPB and the Department for Foreign International Development (DFID) funded Darwin 
Initiative. All three parties then implemented another 'participatory forest management' 
programme at the Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve, which was to be run by NCF. This 
conservation project was just starting to gain momentum as I conducted my fieldwork in 
the area from February to May 2006. However, although TSF is an official partner in the 
project, it seems that they have played the most insignificant role of all in both the 
development of the villages that surround the reserve as well as the protection of the 
reserve itself. They have officially sanctioned the activities of foreign-funded conservation 
and scientific projects but have practically, in the sense of making physically real the 
ideologies they support, done nothing. This fact harmonizes with the point made by Areola 
in his article on the political aspects of conservation in Nigeria that:
59
'…Nigeria's government continues to adopt indirect measures in the field of conservation and 
environmental management, preferring to use surrogate agencies to undertake research and 
analysis, without showing any commitment to action' (1987:289).
During the early stages of the participatory conservation project, NCF were starting to 
construct 'control posts' at strategic points around the reserve's perimeter, sites where 
guards will enforce, through surveillance, the exclusion of local people from the forests. 
They had also begun building a main project office on the outskirts of Gidan Kuma on 
land provided by the jauro, or headman of the village. Although at the time of writing NCF 
does not officially employ any patrollers, it seemed as though they may have been providing 
financial or domestic support to the erratically employed state forest guards, but I cannot 
confirm this. In addition to having commenced the construction of these buildings, NCF 
have also begun the more ideological task of what they call 'the enlightenment of the 
community.' Basically, NCF take 'enlightening the community' to mean providing villagers 
with information about the indispensability of the reserve to their continued survival. The 
one example of 'enlightenment' I heard of was teaching the young, primary-school children 
of Gidan Kuma a song about conservation and biodiversity. I expect that in the coming 
months this process of inculcating the local communities with conservationist ideologies 
will increase in depth (reaching more age groups) and breadth (penetrating a wider range of 
villages). This process of 'enlightenment,' whereby general environmentalist values are 
circulated around the community, can be seen as a vital mechanism in the persuasion of 
local people of the legitimacy of the reserve.
NCF also employ an officer who intermittently visits the villages around the reserve 
making surveys of demographics, religion, social structure etc. I had organised to interview 
this man in the last days of my fieldwork but, having been delayed from an official 
conference in the local government headquarters of Gembu, he could not fulfil our 
arrangement. This new system of knowledge acquisition is emerging alongside the new 
power relations inherent in the new project and the interrelationship between the two 
could make for interesting future research.
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The people and the reserve: the history and dynamics of a relationship
Although the Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve has been protected by legal sanctions since 1969, 
over the area's history the local population have at various times successfully resisted these 
sanctions and entered the reserve to exploit its resources. Obtaining information 
concerning the historical interaction between the reserve and these communities has 
proven extremely difficult. However, I feel I have gathered enough data through my 
fieldwork and other research to present a basic skeleton of the relationship, which will 
form the baseline of the subsequent empirical chapters. 
Before the area of land that today constitutes the Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve was 
gazetted and made forbidden for anyone except scientists and government officials to 
enter, it seems that all people living in the area had relatively easy access to the land and 
that they depended on it significantly for their subsistence. Although at this time there 
most likely would have existed customary rules that regulated any individual's access to the 
forests, it can be presumed that the majority of people had no serious problems obtaining 
the full range of resources that the forests possessed. As one Mambilla man, a farmer from 
the village of Gidan Kuma who works for the NMFP put it:
By that time [before the reserve was gazetted] the people used to hunt there, farm there, get honey, 
get everything.
Similarly, my main informant, when relaying the thoughts of the headman of the hamlet of 
Mayo Ambak, stated that:
Before the reserve they was farming inside…they have plenty of food, they do hunting. Formerly 
there was a hunter in the village and they was getting something, like meat, in the reserve. They 
used to hunt chimpanzee, monkey.
As soon as the reserve was gazetted people's lives began to change. The establishment of the 
reserve marked the advent of a power relation between local people and all those who 
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wanted the reserve to be protected. Through the operation of forest guards, patrollers, and 
material coercions such as fines, this power relation constrained the field of possible action 
of local people. They could no longer physically enter the reserve for nearly all practical 
purposes, and this brought with it a wide range of effects. However, as well as 'taking away,' 
the new power relation also produced and 'made happen.' In the first instance, a new type 
of space was created out of the newly established power relation: a forest reserve. The 
creation of this new type of space produced new legal categories: forest–related practices 
became illegal activities; local people who entered the reserve were transformed into 
poachers; and people living inside the reserve were thus trespassers who had to be evicted. 
In 1969, the presence of forest guards patrolling the reserve (such as M. Bukar Gaji) 
was high, and as a result people had their lives and livelihoods seriously impacted. To 
frame this in a Foucauldian manner, one could say that such surveillance was a mechanism 
of power that coerced by means of observation, whereby 'the techniques that make it 
possible to see induce effects of power' (Foucault, 1977:170–171). Simply put, people 
feared being seen and caught and thus involuntarily subjected themselves to an unequal 
exercise of power, they succumbed to a structuring of their field of possible action. Their 
main source of cultivable land, game, fruit, medicine, building materials etc., was in one 
motion taken away. The sudden upheaval was also felt domestically. The people living in 
villages within the newly forbidden space were permanently relocated at the hands of local 
and state governments. The current villages of Gidan Kuma and Gidan Elom are, in fact, 
products of such forced relocation. I will discuss these moves in more detail later in the 
thesis. The implementation of the reserve also brought about socio–cultural and 
psychological impacts. 
It is safe to say that the majority of these initial impacts were not as keenly felt by 
the Fulani population; the exercise of power was directly resisted by this segment of the 
local population. This is because, owing to the wealth derived from their cattle, the Fulani 
had much more political power than their agricultural neighbours and were thus able to 
negotiate their way out of any legal quagmire they found themselves in, something they 
continue to do today. As documented by the two ethnographers who have worked on the 
Mambilla Plateau, Charles Frantz and Farnham Rehfisch, the Fulani have a long history of 
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political domination in the area, whereby they have systematically subordinated and 
exploited their neighbours for at least the last two centuries (Frantz, 1981; Rehfisch, 1972). 
The court system in the area has historically consisted mainly of Fulani men who have 
looked favourably upon any Fulani case brought before them or, failing this, due to their 
wealth Fulani cattle owners have always had recourse to bribery, or 'dashing,' an 
institutionalised medium of exchange in Nigeria. 
The first wave of effects produced by the gazettement of the reserve in 1969 did not 
last. The network of power that drove a wedge between local people and their natural 
environment was disrupted. According to some personal communication I have had with 
Dr Hazel Chapman of the NMFP, although the forest reserve was accorded a significant 
degree of protection in the few years immediately following its gazettement, in the late 
1970s the official attention it was receiving rapidly declined, a lapse that was presumably 
due to a lack of financial resources. Consequently, people promptly resumed their more or 
less unrestricted exploitation of the forests of Ngel Nyaki and Danko; without the 
instruments of coercion the power relation was quickly eroded. An Ndola man had this to 
say on the matter:
After they came out from the forest [referring to the period of time immediately following the 
removal of the villages within Ngel Nyaki] they left everything. There was no patrollers, no anyone 
taking care of the forest…there was hunting, trapping, and all other things, and slashing in the 
forest to make farm.
Local people's use of the reserve persisted into the mid–1990s, at which point things 
changed irrevocably: the once erratic and unstable relation of power became firmly 
entrenched.
Around 1995, a state or local government–employed forest guard descended upon 
the reserve and took a number of people who were farming inside its boundaries to court, 
wherein they were meted out serious fines. The abovementioned Mambilla man working 
for the NMFP proved to be a reliable source of information on this topic. He told me that:
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He [the forest guard] asked everyone to be out from the forest and he carried them to court. He 
told them that the forest was a reserve and then he took 30 men who were farming in the reserve to 
court. After that people started to leave the forest.
This reestablishment of power significantly influenced how people related to the reserve. 
They realized that it was no longer possible to enter the reserve and exploit its resources 
with impunity; there was now a risk that serious punishment could be and sometimes was 
attached to such actions. Up until this point, although there had been important points of 
disjuncture in their access to the forests of Ngel Nyaki and Danko, people had enjoyed a 
consistent historical–economic relationship with the reserve. But now, fearing reprisal 
from the government, people began to permanently change their livelihood strategies. The 
respective mechanisms of power – surveillance and material coercion – thus functioned 
successfully to consolidate the structuring of the local field of possible action. The power 
relation was re–achieved as the actions of others guided the actions of the local people. 
Because of the infrequency of patrolling, a very small number of villagers openly 
resisted the official legal framework and continued to farm and hunt in the reserve. These 
illegalities persisted until Chapman's NMFP was established near Gidan Kuma. At some 
places within the reserve one can see sections of bush regenerating, evidence that some 
people were continuing to farm inside the reserve until quite recently. 
With Chapman's arrival and her employment of forest patrollers, local peoples' 
perspectives on putting the reserve to economic use underwent further modification. Eight 
patrollers daily moving about the perimeter of the reserve, checking for evidence of 
farming, hunting, and any human influence further deepened the domination by 
conservationists of local people. Where they had previously been somewhat tentative to 
enter the reserve, they were now totally dissuaded; the risk of being caught farming in the 
reserve and being taken to court was too high to take any chances. Then, in 2005, as part 
of the new participatory conservation project, NCF began the construction of their control 
posts, material sites for further surveillance of the local population. Surprisingly, however, 
although local people are now nearly completely excluded from the reserve, TSF has 
granted the local population a degree, albeit very insignificant, of access to the reserve. 
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They are currently allowed to obtain a limited range of resources from the forests, 
including fruits, medicine and rope, yet they are not permitted to enter the reserve at their 
leisure; they must first obtain the permission of NCF, as the jauro of Gidan Kuma, using an 
ad hoc interpreter, informed me:
They [the people of Gidan Kuma] must ask first. The NCF, they put a guard and they have to ask 
the guard. They must go to NCF to ask the guard if they can enter the reserve and he says yes or no.
Although the majority of the local population has stringently avoided entering the area 
from the mid–1990s onwards, a considerable amount of Fulani have continued to graze 
their cattle on the hillsides within the reserve. At the time I was in the area conducting my 
fieldwork, evidence of the Fulani occupation of the reserve was ubiquitous; indeed, only a 
quick glance over the terrain showed hillsides burnt in order to spur the regeneration of 
fresh grasses, bukas, the temporary living quarters of the M'bororo herdsmen and, of 
course, the Fulani herdsmen and their cattle.
After having now provided an overview of the historical–economic nexus that has 
obtained between the people that live in and around the reserve and the reserve itself, this 
section is now complete and, in turn, so is the chapter of which it is a part. With this 
knowledge of how people have been economically engaged with the reserve from the 
period preceding its gazettement up until the present day now in place, I will now look at 
how the local population living in and around the Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve have been 
affected as a result of being excluded from the reserve, that is, of being inserted at a 
subordinate level into an oppressive relation of power.
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4 .  T h e  e f f e c t s  o f  p r o t e c t i n g  t h e  N g e l  N y a k i  
F o r e s t  R e s e r v e
Overview
The effects produced on local people by the power relations installed and maintained by 
conservationists have been manifold. Through the deployment of post–colonial 
environmentalist discourse and the two power–instruments of surveillance and material 
coercions, people have had their field of possible action fundamentally modified. The 
purpose of this chapter is to discuss the effects that have stemmed from this exercise of 
power. I will show that excluding people from the reserve has produced disruptions that 
have been felt domestically, economically, culturally and socially, as well as psychologically. 
This dovetails with the point made by Ite (2001:7) when commenting on the situation in 
Nigeria that 'the negative consequences of the imposition of National Parks on rural 
communities are diverse…The results are evident in social and cultural disruption, 
enforced poverty and even death. These adverse effects generate resentment and hostility 
against protected area management.' I will show in this chapter that many of the things Ite 
writes of find their expression at Ngel Nyaki. 
Displacement and forced resettlement
The authorities who in 1969 brought into existence the Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve based 
their actions on the double premise that indigenous people are dangerous where the 
natural environment is concerned and also that nature is something possessing inherent 
moral value. As I detailed in the previous chapter, local people, even though they had lived 
in and used the forests for decades, perhaps even a century, were seen by the authorities as 
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casting covetous eyes on the reserve and targeting certain species for destruction. In my 
review of the literature that pertains to my topic, I showed this way of thinking to be 
coextensive with a body of knowledge referred to as post–colonial environmentalist 
discourse (Chatty and Colchester, 2002). If the forests of Ngel Nyaki and Danko were to be 
effectively protected, all people within the area had to be removed. Foucault said that 
discourse and power relations are interwoven, and in this case it is no different: this 
particular discourse provided justification for the relocation of people who at the time were 
living inside the boundaries of the Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve. As will be shown throughout 
the rest of my thesis, the displacement of people from their homes has given rise to a wide 
range of other related complications. It will be seen in this chapter and in greater detail 
throughout the rest of the thesis that people forced to relocate where they live, especially 
where such relocation has been formally unassisted, have been dangerously exposed to the 
risks of displacement outlined by Cernea (1997), which I discussed in Chapter 2.
Before 1969 there existed inside the forests of Ngel Nyaki and Danko two main 
villages: Gari Mando and Gidan Elom. The establishment of the reserve revoked the right 
of both villages' to live in the forest, and at the behest of the government they were 
permanently displaced from their homes. No longer could people live in the places where 
they and their kin had chosen to live for generations; they were forced by the actions of 
others to move. An exercise of power was taking place, that is, a set of actions upon other 
actions. The occupants of the village of Gari Mando were resettled at a site along the main 
highway on the plateau, a move that brought into being the village of Gidan Kuma. The 
population of this village were not supplied with much information concerning the reasons 
for their removal from the forest. Concerning this matter, one of my assistants told me 
during an interview we jointly conducted with the jauro of Gidan Kuma that 'the 
government come and ask them to leave Ngel Nyaki because they have important thing to 
do.' Nonetheless, this act of relocation appears to have been well planned; the resettled 
families were allocated land on which to farm as well as to build a new home. As outlined 
in my literature review, this example falls within the boundary of what De Wet and Fox 
(2001) call 'development–induced displacement and resettlement,' or DIDR. The more 
organised nature of this relocation is shown also by the fact that the first move was final; 
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people were moved from Gari Mando to Gidan Kuma and they have, in general, remained 
there. However, the other instance of displacement caused by the creation of the reserve 
was more problematic. 
When ordered to leave their home in the forest of Ngel Nyaki in 1969, the 
inhabitants of the village of Gidan Elom were not relocated by the government to any 
predetermined site, they did not receive any compensation to re–establish themselves at a 
new site, and they were not allocated any land on which to farm or build. They were simply 
told to leave and then left to fend for themselves. This latter example thus falls within the 
conceptual boundaries of 'development–induced displacement,' or DID (De Wet and Fox, 
2001). As a result of not being organised by the government, the displacement of these 
people has been a much more chaotic and also problematic process. Instead of following a 
direct path as it did with the village of Gari Mando, the flow of people out of Gidan Elom
was splintered in numerous directions. From the interpreted accounts of the current 
headman of the hamlet of Mayo Ambak, a now elderly man who was a small child at the 
time of the initial removal, one segment of the people resettled at a site six or seven 
kilometres away that was out of the forest yet was still within the boundaries of the reserve.5
If, following Foucault, an exercise of power consists of the structuring of others' 
fields of possible action, then resistance, the 'irreducible opposite' (1978:96) of power, 
consists in the structuring of one's own field of possible action in a way that either subtly or 
overtly runs against the structure of action envisaged by those driving the power relation. 
Therefore, presuming that, among the meagre amount of information they received 
regarding their removal from the forest, these people were given a clear idea of the 
boundary of the reserve, this act of moving to a place away from their previous home yet 
still within the reserve itself could be construed as an act of resistance, an act that occurred 
at the precise place where the power harnessed by the government could have circulated 
and been exercised, namely, in people's actions. These people could be seen as performing 
an alternative reality to that imagined by the government. This performance of an 
alternative reality persisted insofar as the mechanisms of power employed by the 
government to keep people out of the reserve were absent, which, as I show below, was not 
                                                
5 As will be shown, this fact was brought forcefully to their attention decades later.
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for long. Another portion of the population evicted from the original village of Gidan 
Elom travelled three or four kilometres further than their kinsmen to a site where they 
established the hamlet of Musa Gamba. Others travelled even further to go on and 
establish the hamlets of Andaka, Berabera and Ako Fonja. 
Several decades later in the mid–1990s – an important period in the history of the 
reserve, when the government re–established its control over the reserve and the people 
living in its vicinity after a lapse in the 1980s – the people inhabiting the village site out of 
the forest yet inside the boundary of the reserve were again forced by the government to 
move elsewhere. This second wave of forced and unplanned displacement brought into 
existence the current hamlet of Mayo Ambak and sent other members of the disrupted 
settlement's population to the hamlets created as a result of the initial move in 1969. Thus, 
all of the five hamlets that today constitute the village of Gidan Elom were created out of 
an exercise of power. But, in spite of this discrepancy in the flows of people out of Gari 
Mando and Gidan Elom, there exists one similarity between the two cases: the lack of 
information supplied to the people regarding their removal. Even today some people who I 
talked with did not know why it was that they were expelled from the forest. One woman
from the hamlet of Musa Gamba told me:
We lived there [at the former Gidan Elom] and had to leave. We do not understand how this 
happen or why this had to happen.
Another man from the same hamlet simply expressed incredulity at the decision to force 
people to leave their homes when he said 'how can people say to get out when it is their 
home?'
In addition to the speculative example I dealt with earlier, I am unsure as to 
whether or not the forced displacements I have described were met with any local 
resistance. Although I managed to gain some important information about the 
resettlements that took place, I did not focus my fieldwork on this area and, in any case, 
obtaining information from villagers on events that reach back in some cases nearly 40 
years into the past would not have been easy. Nonetheless, I assume that surely not all 
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people simply acquiesced to the government's plans unless, that is, they were physically 
forced. 
The displacement of people from their villages in the name of preserving the forests 
of Ngel Nyaki and Danko was an uneven process that affected different people in different 
ways. How it played out depended largely on whether or not the displacement was 
planned. Where it was planned, as in the case of the village of Gari Mando, displacement 
followed a direct and more or less 'successful' path (De Wet, 2006); where it was simply a 
matter of ejecting people from their homes and leaving them to fend for themselves, as at 
Gidan Elom, displacement was far more problematic. An important implication of this is 
that the latter group of people today live in less favourable conditions than those people 
whose resettlement was well organised as well as, of course, people who did not have to 
move at all. To put this in terms of the literature, in contrast to those of DIDR, the 
subjects of DID were much more exposed to the inherent risks of displacement (Cernea, 
1997). This point will emerge with greater clarity throughout the rest of my thesis, but it is 
important that I at least briefly outline this argument here.
As shown in my review of the literature, Cernea (1997) proposes eight main risks 
inherent in any project of displacement. These are the risks of landlessness, joblessness, 
homelessness, marginalisation, increased morbidity and mortality, food insecurity and 
malnourishment, loss of access to common property, and social disarticulation. The people 
of Gari Mando received a good deal of protection from these risks through the careful 
planning of the government (moving people to a predetermined site and allocating them 
land on which to farm and build). However, whilst nearly wholly safeguarded by the 
provisions of the government from the risks of landlessness and homelessness, these people 
have surely still had to experience certain of the other risks. Whilst I cannot state with any 
precision exactly how and to what extent these risks have been borne out at Gidan Kuma
(the village produced by this instance of displacement), it is safe to presume, based on what 
I do know, that they have in some way or other been manifested. Firstly, the land allocated 
to them by the government was smaller in size and, they claim, poorer in quality, than the 
land that they previously had access to as inhabitants of the forest. Consequently, people 
would not have been able to produce as much food and income as they formerly had and 
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thus would have been, to some degree, marginalized.  This reduction in land size and 
quality would have forced a simplification of food crops. In turn, people's diets could have 
lost essential nutrients that their former way of life afforded and a degree of 
malnourishment and perhaps increased morbidity and mortality could well have resulted. 
Through their displacement the people of Gari Mando also lost access to the reserve, 
which was, of course, a large and important common resource. Whilst the land provided 
by the government was and continues to be held in common and distributed by the jauro
of Gidan Kuma, it can not be said to be an equivalent substitute, due to the vast decrease 
in area. Lastly, the process of displacement probably disrupted 'the relationships and 
groups that provide predictability and stability in people's lives' (Cernea, 1997:1575). As I 
have been careful to point out, due to a lack of data on this example, the above remarks are 
mainly inferential; I have not been able to put forward with much certainty exactly how 
potently the risks of displacement outlined by Cernea have been realised at Gidan Kuma. 
With the displacement of the people of Gidan Elom I thankfully have much more concrete 
evidence.
The people of Gidan Elom were not safeguarded through the planning of the 
government from any of the risks of displacement. When people first dispersed from the 
forest in 1969, however, it is difficult to know if many of the risks of displacement, such as 
landlessness, marginalisation, food insecurity and malnourishment, loss of access to 
common property, or increased mortality and morbidity were realised. This is because, as 
stated in the background chapter, obtaining data on the removal was difficult; I managed 
to speak with only one person, an elderly man from the hamlet of Mayo Ambak, who 
experienced the shift first–hand, yet due to being only a young boy at the time of the event 
his recollection was understandably hazy. Thus one cannot know for sure whether the land 
to which people had access to after their first removal was an adequate substitute for that 
which they had relinquished, whether they had experienced a downward slide in their 
economic fortunes, and so forth. In the event that the mentioned risks had become reality, 
people would not have had to endure them for long however, as throughout the 1970s and 
1980s the government's control over the area was erratic and presented no real obstacle to 
obtaining free access to the reserve. 
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Nonetheless, from the data I listed earlier one can confidently claim that one 
particular risk was realised as a result of the initial removal. The displacement of 1969 
fragmented the village of Gidan Elom into five geographically separate sections. This would 
have eroded or dismantled relationships that people would have depended on for social, 
economic and political purposes. Close interpersonal ties, and perhaps even links of 
kinship, would have been disrupted. The risk of social disarticulation inherent in 
displacement would thus have been realised. But what of the subsequent displacement that 
occurred? Did those people who moved to a second site away from their original village yet 
still inside the reserve, an act that could be construed as resistance, bear any of the risks 
outlined by Cernea when told to get out? 
When removed from their secondary place of residence inside the reserve some 
time in the mid–1990s, the people who would eventually come to establish the current 
hamlet of Mayo Ambak (as well as augment the populations of the other constituent 
hamlets of today's Gidan Elom) had their lives fundamentally altered. The exercise of 
power that the government re–established at this time forced them to again relocate where 
they lived as well as totally cutting off their access to the reserve. All but one of the risks 
that accompanied this particular act of displacement were realised in some shape or form. 
To begin with, due to their exclusion from the reserve being made much more 
complete, the amount of land that people had recourse to in the wake of this second 
displacement was far less than what they previously had access to. I outline this in greater 
detail in the following section. So while not completely landless, these people were still 
dangerously exposed to this risk. Homelessness was the one risk that people largely 
managed to avoid, as they were able to locate a site on which to build their new village 
reasonably quickly. However, it is possible that there may have been an interval, perhaps a 
couple of weeks or so, where they were betwixt and between their old and prospective 
places of residence. The serious economic disruption that resulted from their ejection and 
debarment from the forest caused these people to be pushed right to very margins of the 
local socio–economic system; in terms of outward indicators of wealth (land, property, etc), 
today the people of Mayo Ambak and Musa Gamba are the poorest in the area. With the 
increased surveillance of their lives and the looming threat of fines hovering over them 
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these people have also now lost all access to the reserve, which was previously a 
fundamental common resource. Compared to pre–displacement, the number of crops 
grown by people in these settlements has been dramatically reduced, and the accompanying 
risk of malnourishment has become a reality; in Mayo Ambak, the distended stomachs of 
children whose diet is lacking in essential nutrients is testament to this. Lastly, the people 
forced out of their homes in the mid–1990s have been subjected to further social 
disarticulation; as will be shown in greater detail later, the social fabric of the community 
forced to relocate has been seriously eroded. Pre–existing religious practices, social 
institutions, kinship links and so on, have all been disintegrated. As alluded to, all of these 
points will be given closer attention later in the thesis. Now I can move on to look at how 
all people living in the area have had their livelihoods affected by the establishment and 
protection of the reserve.
Economic effects
The local economic effects that the establishment and protection of protected areas 
produce are something that has taken the interest of many anthropologists. The general 
argument underlying most work in this field is that when conservationists establish a 
protected area they tend to disrupt the economic life of the people who previously 
depended on that area for their subsistence. This is the case at the Ngel Nyaki Forest 
Reserve today. In addition to the general economic disruption that people in this area have 
faced, a very limited number of them have been presented with economic opportunities. 
Following Foucault, these can be seen as the products of the enactment of the power 
relations between the government and local people. Whilst the equation is obviously 
lopsided, it can still be said that the exercise of power has given as well as taken away. 
Before discussing my findings I will outline precisely what I will be focussing on in this 
subsection. 
Although from 1969 onwards the Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve it was illegal for them 
to do so, the local population still entered the reserve whenever they could. People's 
relationship with the protected area had little to do with abstract law and relied much 
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more upon the actual or potential presence of people enforcing those laws such as forest 
guards and domestic and international conservation agencies. In conjunction with this, the 
loss of livelihood produced in the years immediately following the establishment of the 
area would have been offset by the lapse in protection the reserve received from the late 
1970s until the 1990s, a period of time when people had easy access to the reserve. 
Therefore, it can be presumed that by the 1990s the local population had probably 
recovered from the loss of livelihood generated by the initial gazettement of the reserve. 
This means that the economic effects I will be discussing below – those that are evident 
today – are those that were set in motion by the government in the mid–1990s and later 
consolidated by the activities of those organisations whose presence in the area is relatively 
recent, that is, the TSF, NCF, and the NMFP. 
Prior to the 1990s, people had a plentiful supply of land on which to farm; they 
had hunted a wide range of animals that lived in the forest, such as chimpanzee and 
monkey, and presumably other game that then inhabited the forests, for example, duiker; 
they had grown considerable amounts of fruit inside the boundaries of the reserve, such as 
avocado, mango, and banana; they had unrestricted access to the natural medicines that 
they knew to occur in particular places; they presumably collected honey in considerable 
quantities; they were free to fell trees in order to obtain building products; and they were 
free to enter the forest for any other subsistence activity that they might have participated 
in. This is not to say that people's use of the forests was uncontrolled, for it would have 
most likely been regulated by custom, but only to say that their access prior to their 
exclusion was far less restrained. 
The protection of the Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve from the mid–1990s onwards has 
seriously disrupted the state of affairs described above. The state government, later joined 
by their environmentalist associates, has expropriated the area of land that local people 
depended on for farming, hunting, fruit and medicine collection, building materials and 
any other income–generating activities. As I am arguing in this thesis, this has been 
achieved through the simultaneous operation of post–colonial environmentalist discourse, 
the employment of forest guards and patrollers, as well as threatening local people with 
fines and court orders if they transgress the laws debarring them from the reserve. With the 
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exception of the people of Gidan Kuma (who were given a small area of land on which to 
build and farm when first relocated from the village of Gari Mando in 1969) this loss of 
livelihood has not been offset by any form of compensation, whether in the form of land 
or money. As noted in the literature review, this has, historically, been a common 
occurrence in conservation and development projects. The economic disruption caused by 
this ongoing exercise of power has been clearly manifested at the hamlets of Mayo Ambak
and Musa Gamba, the locations at which I conducted the majority of my fieldwork.
Upon being excluded from the reserve in the mid–1990s, the current residents of 
Mayo Ambak and Musa Gamba had their modes of subsistence seriously disrupted. Both 
hamlets had their total area of arable land dramatically reduced. In order to properly 
appreciate these impacts it is important to understand what life was like for these people 
prior to this event and the ongoing exercise of power that it signified. Before their 
exclusion, the residents of Mayo Ambak and Musa Gamba (some of whom were still living 
in a settlement still inside the boundary of the reserve) had access to much larger areas of 
arable land (the exact dimensions of which I do not know), and the quality of this land 
was, in their eyes, also much higher. This meant that less time had to be invested in 
maintaining the farm in order for it to produce a sufficient yield. Regarding food 
production, the headman of Musa Gamba informed me that prior to being excluded from 
the reserve each household within the hamlet was annually harvesting approximately 30 
bags (weighing 50kgs each) of maize from their farms, a significant proportion of which 
they would sell at local markets. The social organisation of farming was also different prior 
to the 1990s. Access to a large amount of land meant that people had a good deal of 
control over where they would like to work and, consequently, people often chose to farm 
side by side with their neighbours. This system possessed certain benefits. Firstly, the social 
interaction that it facilitated would have lightened the burden of work. One is presumably 
happier when working together with one's neighbours than alone and thus work would 
have been much more enjoyable than otherwise, not to mention more productive. It also 
possessed other, technical benefits. Monkeys, 'bush' or wild fowl, and a variety of other 
birds are known to feed on, and generally ruin the crops of farmers. Working contiguously 
with one's neighbours was a means of reducing this danger. This is because if a farmer, due 
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to either wanting to relax or suffering from sickness, did not work on any given day his 
crops remained safe from pests as his neighbours were there to guard them in his absence. 
Like most others in the region at the time, these people also hunted game, grew a 
considerable amount of fruit in the area, collected honey, and also natural medicines 
where necessary, felled trees for purposes of domestic construction, and generally enjoyed a 
relatively unrestrained relationship with the forests. How has this picture of the economic 
life of the current inhabitants of Mayo Ambak and Musa Gamba been affected by the 
exercise of power implemented and sustained by the government and its conservationist 
affiliates?
As a point of entry into this discussion, let me first give some insight into what 
exclusion meant for those people who had to undergo it and endure its effects first–hand. 
The headman of Mayo Ambak, an elderly man who had experienced both displacements 
from the reserve, said this to me during my first ever meeting with him: 
You see this man? [points to an elderly blind man who lives in the hamlet] You see that mango tree? 
[points to the site, roughly 2–3 kilometres away, to where they initially moved after the initial 
relocation of 1969 and where they were subsequently displaced from sometime in the mid–1990s] 
There used to be farms right over there and now there is nothing. How is a man like this going to 
manage? How are any of us going to manage? We have no place to farm; we have nothing to do 
[meaning no paid employment options] and no education for our children and their children.
As this man clearly expresses, for the people of Mayo Ambak and Musa Gamba exclusion 
from the reserve has had important economic consequences. To begin with, the total area 
of arable land which they continued to have access to was much smaller than before. Today 
each hamlet possesses only four or five approximately 50m² blocks and the equivalent in 
bush yet to be converted, land that is not only small in size but also poor in quality, being 
situated on hillsides and at high elevation. Due to its continuous use over the past decade 
the soil is now becoming exhausted and yields are said to be at an all–time low: the same 
man from Mayo Ambak informed me that people had now been reduced to a hand–to–
mouth existence, taking whatever they could off their farms in order to survive, a situation 
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that seemed to prevail in the hamlet of Musa Gamba as well. This has meant for both 
groups that the storage of surplus crops, as well as their market sale for cash, has become a 
thing of the past. This last fact was further confirmed by the sight of the mbanga's, or corn 
storage houses, within both hamlets, falling apart. The social organisation of farming has 
also been profoundly altered as a result of being excluded from the reserve. Before people 
had worked side by side with their neighbours in a socially and technically beneficial 
system of labour, yet now many people are forced to work isolated plots of land 
individually. This has negated the advantages that the prior system had attached to it; 
people are forced to work away from their neighbours in isolation, thus not having any 
social interaction to make the day pass more enjoyably, and no longer is there any 
safeguard against pests ravaging crops in one's absence, which means that people are having 
to spend much more time on their farms, some even having constructed huts to sleep 
overnight. Another facet of food production that has been affected is hunting. Prior to the 
1990s hunting was a lucrative income–generating activity, but since exclusion it seems to 
have nearly disappeared. All of the other facets of economic production have also been 
impacted: no longer can people collect honey (or natural medicines) from the forests; they 
have been forbidden to fell trees for domestic housing purposes, now having to obtain 
wood from the small areas of bush immediately surrounding their hamlets; and they are 
not allowed to plant and harvest fruit inside the forest either. 
The loss in food production has reduced the diversity of what people eat; today in 
Mayo Ambak and Musa Gamba the range of foods that people eat has been reduced from a 
wide array of grown crops, fruit and meat down to simply maize and whatever fruit 
happens to be growing on the scarce amount of land that they still possess, such as banana, 
avocado and mango. This is manifested in the people's physical appearance, especially 
children; in the hamlets of Mayo Ambak and Musa Gamba it was not unusual to notice 
crying children whose stomachs were enlarged due to a lack protein. Other signs that 
suggest an economic downslide are the dilapidated houses in which people live (their roofs 
in need of repair, their brickwork beginning to disintegrate) as well as the fact that the 
clothes that people wore in either settlement were usually torn and ragged. I am not 
arguing that prior to exclusion all of these people would have lived a life of plenty and that 
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no–one would have been malnourished, poorly clothed or living in houses in need of 
repair; rather, I am simply saying that life for these people has surely not always been so 
hard. That is, the control of the local possible field of action by the government and its 
environmental associates has made life worse.
The facts elicited above provide evidence to suggest that the protection of the Ngel 
Nyaki Forest Reserve, especially since the 1990s, has affected the livelihoods of the 
population that currently inhabit the villages and hamlets that fringe its boundary. 
However, these specific facts, being drawn from only two hamlets, do not give insight into 
how this process has played out elsewhere in the area. 
The negative effects on each village's economy as a result of being excluded from 
the reserve have not been consistent. While all groups have borne significant costs as a 
result of being prohibited from entering the reserve, the process has been uneven, affecting 
different groups in different ways. Village groups that had reserves of unused land to 
employ for subsistence activities when the reserve was reclaimed by the government in the 
1990s were not as negatively affected as those without such options. For example, the 
inhabitants of the village of Gidan Kuma, who had an area of land provided for them 
upon their initial removal from the forest, or those of Musa Akwole, who had to their 
south a reasonably large area of unused bush, have not have felt the negative economic 
effects of exclusion as acutely as those groups that did not have recourse to these options, 
such as the residents of Mayo Ambak, Musa Gamba and Yabri. The former two residential 
groups had only a meagre amount of spare land to fall back on after being debarred (and in 
the case of Mayo Ambak relocated) from the reserve in the 1990s, whilst the residents of 
Yabri, although not subject to any involuntary resettlement, similarly had inadequate 
reserves of land to use in the wake of their exclusion. Thus, the economic disruption that 
has taken place within the hamlets of Mayo Ambak and Musa Gamba is, relative to the 
other settlements in the area, particularly serious. This is especially so at Mayo Ambak, 
where the inhabitants were also having to deal with being displaced for a second time. I do 
not want to understate the negative impacts that have been experienced by the other 
villages; the exclusion of people from the reserve has affected the economies of all people 
in the area, it is just that there has been considerable variation in how people have been 
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affected. So, these are the negative economic consequences of excluding people from the 
reserve, but were there any positive economic consequences? Did the exercise of power 
produce any economic opportunities for local people? 
The positive economic consequences produced by the re–establishment of 
government control over the reserve since the 1990s have been, whilst well–intended, 
insignificant. All of the economic opportunites created for local people have been done so 
by the NMFP.  Firstly, since establishing her project at Ngel Nyaki in 2003, Dr Hazel 
Chapman now employs 18 local people in various capacities. The NMFP was also 
previously engaged in supporting women's basket making in Gidan Kuma, transporting 
these local products to Lagos and selling them on the community's behalf, an economic 
service that has now ceased. Whilst Chapman's employment and assistance of local people 
is laudable, especially when one considers the fact that other organisations operating in the 
area, such as NCF, RSPB, and TSF, have at their disposal generous amounts of money 
specifically earmarked for the economic development of local people that they have not 
used to local people's benefit, it is a positive economic consequence belittled by the 
magnitude of the negative impacts people have been subjected to; regrettably, it has not 
come close to even beginning to repair the damage caused to local people's economic life 
by excluding them from the reserve. It is important to note that, like the negative economic 
effects I have described, the positive economic effects have also been distributed unevenly. 
This can be seen in relation to the social cleavages of gender, age and settlement location. 
Firstly, all of the people currently employed by the NMFP are men. Further, they are 
predominantly young, aged between 20–40. Lastly, although Chapman has made a 
conscious effort to employ people from all of the villages surrounding the reserve, the 
majority of those employed by the NMFP come from Gidan Kuma, owing mainly to its 
proximity to the project's field station and base. Therefore, women, children and the aged, 
as well as the residents of other villages around the reserve, have had unequal access to the 
positive economic effects produced by the exercise of power implemented and maintained 
by the government and its environmental associates.  
Social and cultural effects
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The establishment and protection of the Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve has seriously affected 
the society and culture of local people. This argument will be demonstrated with reference 
to data I collected at the Ndola hamlets of Mayo Ambak and Musa Gamba. The discussion 
will focus on the disturbance of one particular social institution – that of the communal 
cooking, distribution and consumption of food – and the attitude of generosity and 
sharing that existed alongside it.  As seen in my literature review, how the creation of 
protected areas has affected how people behave toward one another has received 
considerable attention in studies of the conservation–community dynamic (Brockington, 
2002; Thompson and Homewood, 2002; Fabricius and De Wet, 2002; Anderson and 
Berglund, 2003).
As clearly established in the previous section, prior to the 1990s the inhabitants of 
the hamlets of Mayo Ambak and Musa Gamba were economically better off than today. 
They had more land, harvested more food, hunted wild game, and generally had open 
access to the forests within the reserve. Within this context of socio–economic stability 
there existed in both hamlets, and perhaps in all Ndola settlements, a social institution 
known locally as 'contribution.' This institution is a series of interwoven practices whereby 
people would gather at a specially constructed communal shelter to collectively cook, 
distribute and consume food amidst a casual and lively atmosphere. Due to the seasonal 
variations in food production, one would presume that this type of event would have taken 
place some time shortly after the harvest, probably in December or January. A man from 
Musa Gamba provided this short account of 'contribution':
With contribution everyone come together to cook and eat, and even if you did not have 
something you will still get food…People used to keep on into the night and they would sing and 
dance too.
After the government reasserted its control over the reserve from the 1990s onward, this 
institution was significantly eroded. Exclusion from the reserve meant a decrease in the 
amount of food each household could produce and therefore a decrease in any surplus 
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food that could be shared in 'contribution.' According to my assistant, because people 
possessed less food they became increasingly selfish when considering its distribution. This 
parallels Turnbull's controversial work on the Ik of Uganda, The Mountain People (1972). 
Pushed to the brink of starvation as a result of forced relocation out of their traditional 
hunting grounds, the Ik became not only selfish, but in Turnbull's descriptions, 
dehumanised. At Mayo Ambak and Musa Gamba, the reduction in food surpluses meant 
that people chose not to participate in 'contribution' as this, of course, entailed giving food 
generously to others. Over time the institution thus began to erode to the point where 
today 'contribution' seems to be rarely, if ever, practiced. It must be remembered that this 
institution would have undoubtedly given to all those people who participated in it a good 
deal of enjoyment and with its demise, therefore, this happiness has also been taken from 
people's lives.
At Mayo Ambak, the erosion of 'contribution' has resulted in the decline of the 
building designed to house it; today, the former eating house is just a skeleton used to hang 
washing. Yet, when I went and stayed in the hamlet of Musa Gamba, I saw something 
different: a communal eating house in good repair and with fresh roofing, looking not over 
a couple of months old. How could this anomaly possibly be explained? Were the 
inhabitants of this hamlet really not in such a bad socio–economic state after all? Had they 
somehow managed to avoid the economic disruption so apparent at Mayo Ambak? If my 
data on their economy was correct, then I had to find a way of explaining the discrepancy 
between their lack of resources and this symbol of economic stability. I asked my assistant 
numerous questions about why it was that the communal eating house in Musa Gamba
was in good repair whilst the people seemed to lack access to the resources they needed to 
survive. His answers showed me some important things about the customs of the Ndola 
ethnic group in particular and about anthropological inquiry in general. 
The principle reason why the eating house at Musa Gamba was in good condition 
was not that the group was actually better off than what I had been led to believe. Rather, 
the answer was intimately related to the ongoing process of social life within the hamlet, 
and its members' connections to other Ndola villages. About two months before I arrived 
in Musa Gamba, the elderly headman of the hamlet had passed away. This had resulted in 
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relatives and friends belonging to other villages in the area coming to Musa Gamba to pay 
their respects and offer their condolences. The offerings they made were material as well as 
emotional and included, most notably, food. The death of the headman, as a public figure, 
was the concern of the entire hamlet. Therefore, this food was dealt with in a similarly 
public manner: it was cooked, distributed and consumed socially, a set of practices that 
necessitated the reconstruction of the communal eating house. 
The facts I have presented show that the communal eating house at Musa Gamba
was in good repair because of the Ndola custom to bring food to bereaved friends and 
relatives and not because of a generally improved or improving socio–economic situation 
within the hamlet. The appearance of the structure masked the actual poverty lying 
beneath, a mask that was betrayed by an enquiry into the process of social life within the 
hamlet and the customs of the wider ethnic group to which its inhabitants belong. 
Therefore, although the inter–group custom of 'contribution' is still observed by these two 
hamlets the intra–group variation of the custom has nearly disappeared. 
Psychological effects
How people think about themselves and the world around them has been significantly 
affected by the protection of the reserve. In this final segment of the chapter I will be 
supplying data that suggests the exercise of power implemented and maintained by the 
government and the other environmentalist organisations in the area since the 1990s has, 
on the one hand, convinced local people that they have no control over their lives and, on 
the other hand, also made them distrustful of the people who have played important roles 
in protecting the reserve. I am not here deliberately emphasising the negative things people 
had to say about the reserve and its protection; they simply have very little positive to say 
about the reserve. Although a few individuals issued favourable statements about the 
protection of the reserve, these were either answers designed to protect a group from 
suspicion or attempts to satisfy personal and collective wants and needs and not, as would 
demonstrate bona fide support, spontaneous expressions of positive feeling.  
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Over the history of the reserve, yet especially since the 1990s, local people have 
been informed by forest guards, patrollers and other local agents of conservation, that their 
traditional modes of subsistence as they related to the forest reserve are illegitimate, 
destructive and, ultimately, wrong. In conjunction with the dissemination of this post–
colonial environmentalist discourse, the government and its conservationist associates 
have, through the deployment of the instruments of surveillance and material coercions 
(fines and court orders) structured some of the most basic aspects of people's lives: where 
they can live and farm, what activities they are allowed to pursue in order to make a living, 
and so forth. This has had serious psychological consequences. 
Through the exercise of power mentioned above, people have been convinced of 
their powerlessness. In reality, resistance is still technically possible; there exist many real 
opportunities for people to enter the reserve. However, people have been persuaded that 
they are in the wrong and that open resistance to the relations of power tipped against 
their favour is futile. People believe that the path that their lives will take is now totally at 
the mercy of the external organisations in the area such as NCF, TSF as well as the NMFP,6
and they also believe that they have no power to improve their current trajectories. As one 
man from the hamlet of Musa Gamba said when talking with me about this 
administrative–community dynamic:
He feel like the government controls them and that they cannot make things better.
When thinking about the future of his village the headman of Yabri stated that:
They feel that [the] government is supposed to do something for them…The future, since the 
government have not given them anything, now they just think, they will just suffer.
A group of men from the village of Musa Akwole, one of which was the headman, 
informed me during an interview that:
                                                
6 These individual organisations are collapsed by most people into the category of 'government,' a fact that 
most likely represents the lack of information the people have been given about the groups operating in the 
area.
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…they say that they will do what the government tells them to do. If the government tells them to 
work they will work.
All of these statements support the argument that the protection of the Ngel Nyaki Forest 
Reserve has not only structured people's possible field of action but also their possible field 
of mental activity. What I mean is that this exercise of power has not just guided people's 
practices, but has also exerted a strong influence over what people can and cannot think. 
As well as not being able to physically enter the reserve, it seems, through these statements, 
that people are now encountering externally implemented psychological barriers to 
thinking about a better state of affairs. The attitude of powerlessness in the first comment, 
the anticipation of a bleak future in the second, and the submissiveness and fatalism 
expressed in the third all attest to this. 
Existing alongside these sentiments of disempowerment are the doubts and 
misgivings of the local people. Local people express unhappiness with the organisations 
that protect the reserve and they rightfully expect the harmful effects of this protection to 
be redressed. Regarding the failed promises of the organisations protecting the reserve to 
better the local population's standard of living, the headman of the hamlet of Mayo Ambak
had this to say:
He [the headman] says that even though they talk, their talk will not matter anything. What they 
say they will do they never do.
A statement made by the headman of Musa Gamba reveals the resentment that people feel 
about having the power to make basic decisions about their life taken away from them:
How can people say to get out [of the reserve] when it is their home? 
Connected to these responses about the imbalanced interaction between people protecting 
the reserve and people living around it have been statements that express the desire of the 
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people to be compensated for their losses. The headman of Yabri felt 'that [the]
government is supposed to do something for them,' whilst the group of men interviewed in 
the village of Musa Akwole stated that they wanted 'the government to give them forest, to 
show them another place to work.' The headman of the hamlet of Mayo Ambak also 
expressed his interest in being compensated for the losses he and his community have 
incurred as a result of being excluded from the reserve, which included being given two 
million naira (which is roughly equivalent to $20,000 NZD).7 As well as these examples 
that I managed to record in the course of interviews, I was told on numerous informal 
occasions by people from every village that I worked in that their exclusion from the 
reserve was unfair. 
It can clearly be seen that the creation and protection of the Ngel Nyaki Forest 
Reserve has had very significant effects upon how people conceive of themselves and their 
living circumstances. From considering the statements of the people who have experienced 
the events first–hand I think their general attitude can be described as follows: people 
lament the current situation and feel resentment towards the people responsible for 
creating the reserve, but they have been convinced they cannot do anything about it. 
From a theoretical perspective, I would suggest, following Foucault (1978; 1982) 
and Scott (1985; 1990), that the remarks showing both local people's perception of having 
been let down by the government as well as their desire to be 'looked after' by the 
government, are acts of resistance. I make this argument based on Foucault's (1978) notion 
that resistance is inherent in the operation of power and secondly, on Scott's proposition 
that resistance constitutes, inter alia, any act that challenges the claims made on the 
subordinate by the superordinate or any act by the subordinate group that advances its own 
claims vis–a–vis the powerful. The comments that describe local frustration at the 
supposedly empty promises of the government and the incredulity of having been ejected 
from the forests can be seen as ways in which people contest, on a discursive level, an 
exercise of power; they are statements that challenge the legitimacy of being excluded and 
displaced from the reserve. Secondly, the statement made regarding the desire of people to 
be compensated in some manner by the government exemplifies Scott's second criteria of 
                                                
7 Due to his intoxication I am unsure if his suggestion was realistic.
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resistance. Local people are advancing their own claims vis–a–vis the dominant group in 
this particular field of power. They want the government to compensate them for the losses 
they have incurred by being excluded and displaced from the reserve. 
Despite the negative remarks cited above, some individuals had good things to say 
about the protection of the reserve and the exclusion of the local people from it. But as I 
will show not only were these comments infrequent and isolated but they did not represent 
an honest affinity with the aims and ideas of the organisations currently protecting the 
reserve; rather, they were attempts to either avoid suspicion or to manipulate the presence 
of the mentioned parties for personal and collective wants and needs.
Joined by my assistant, one morning I made my way from the village of Musa 
Akwole to that of Yabri, where I was to conduct an interview with the head of the village 
and whoever else wished to participate in the conference. The interview, the first I had 
conducted at this village, commenced and all was going well until I asked (unbeknownst to 
me) a rather sensitive question: Did they think it was of benefit to have the land inside the 
reserve protected? By posing this question I hoped that they would openly express to me 
that no, they felt that there was no reason for the land to be protected and that they were 
frustrated at having been prohibited from using it for subsistence purposes. Therefore, 
what happened next was both surprising and disconcerting. In response to my query the 
group first laughed to each other. What was so funny? I wondered. Then they entered into 
an intense discussion which lasted for two or three minutes. When my assistant relayed 
their final answer to me I was baffled: they had said that having a reserve was of benefit and 
that they did not wish to use the land inside the boundaries of the reserve. How could this 
group of men possibly think, in the face of the undeniable hardship they were 
experiencing, that having a reserve was a positive thing and that they had no desire to use 
the land within its boundaries? I couldn't comprehend it! 
As is often the case when a piece of information so blatantly contradicts all ones 
assumptions, I did not accept this statement; I was sure that this line they had taken with 
me was not how they honestly felt, and I endeavoured to expose the hidden truth that their 
answer cloaked. This process of investigation commenced with a thorough re–examination 
of the recording of the interview, something I did with my assistant back at my residence in 
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Musa Akwole. I focussed on the period of time immediately following the posing of the 
question, when the assembled group first laughed in response to my question and then 
entered into a protracted discussion of their answer. By combing through the audio with 
my assistant I discovered that their answer was not a spontaneous expression of thought 
that all in attendance happened to share. No, quite the contrary; I found out that 
immediately after the short stint of laughter, the headman of the village clearly instructed 
the other men to think very carefully before answering my question. I took this to mean 
that the group of men felt apprehensive about openly expressing their real feelings to me. I 
now knew that during the interview they were maintaining a front, but what lay beneath I 
was still yet to find out. To get to the bottom of the issue I went back to Yabri the 
following morning with my assistant and asked the headman if he wouldn't mind showing 
me around the farms in the area and pointing out what crops were currently being grown. 
A number of people from the village showed some interest in coming along with the three 
of us, but I made it clear to my assistant that I did not want any other people to join us, as 
I thought that this may stymie my plan to extract the headman's real feelings during our 
walk. Whilst on the walk, after explaining clearly what my purpose in the area was and 
assuring him that he could express himself openly without fear of punishment, I raised the 
question that the previous morning had given rise to the guarded opinions; I was greatly 
relieved when in response to my question this time the headman stated:
He [the headman] say that if they can get land inside the reserve they would be very happy. The 
village would have a big dance.
The appreciative remark made about the existence of the reserve was, therefore, a front 
presented to me in order to maintain a particular impression of reality beneath which lay a 
critique of power. Following Scott (1990), then, I would argue that what is actually going 
on here is the interplay of a public and private transcript of power. The initial remark was 
the 'official' stance taken by the powerless when in the company of others deemed to be 
powerful; I was initially seen as a conservationist by these people and their statement was a 
way of indicating this, of recognising and paying 'lip service' to the interests of the parties 
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responsible for protecting the reserve. However, through the investigation described above, 
I discovered that there was also a private transcript of resistance in operation, 'a critique of 
power spoken behind the back of the dominant' (Scott, 1990:ii). Of course, their discourse 
was not literally spoken behind my back; indeed, it was done in my presence, but because it 
was performed in a language I could not comprehend it was done without my knowing. 
The public transcript denoted support for the reserve, whilst the private transcript 
intimated that local people do not support the reserve at all and that they, in fact, resist it. 
Thus, this example shows that both public discourse and private counter–discourse need to 
be taken into account in order to gain any insight into the dynamics of the power 
relationship that exists between local people and the parties responsible for protecting the 
reserve. 
Another positive statement about the reserve was made when conducting an 
interview with the jauro of Gidan Kuma at his compound. I was again confronted by 
statements that seemed to indicate that the psychological effects caused by the creation and 
protection of the reserve were not all bad. In response to my enquiries the jauro said that 
he was happy to have both the NCF and NMFP conducting their various activities in the 
area and that the reserve was, all in all, a positive thing. Again I was confounded; yet, due 
to the jauro's more forthright nature, I thankfully didn't have to ply any deeper in order to 
uncover the motivation behind these statements. Shortly after the jauro stated, through my 
assistant:
He feels like the project [NCF and NMFP] have not helped them enough. He wants them to build 
a new house for him. He says he has seen the houses built for jauro's at Kakara by tea [Highland 
Tea] and he wants this also. 
He continued later in the interview that:
He wants the project to build the village a school and to give the village money. He want them to 
build him a big house and give him and his family money. He also want them to give loan to other 
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people to start business and buy land…[He also wants the project to] build hospital and get 
education.
These statements demonstrate that the jauro accepts the presence of the NCF and NMFP 
insofar as they satisfy his personal predilections (acquiring wealth in the form of money 
and material commodities such as houses) as well as services he feels are important for the 
community which he represents (schools, hospitals, and general economic advancement). 
Like other people I talked with during my fieldwork, the jauro cares less for the 
conservation of the reserve as a site of biodiversity than for the material resources that he 
and his village can acquire as a result of having fiscally endowed external organisations 
protecting the reserve. 
I have shown in this sub–section that establishing and protecting the Ngel Nyaki 
Forest Reserve has affected the psychology of local people: they harbour doubt and 
misgiving about the people responsible for protecting the reserve and the disruptions that 
they have brought, but have been persuaded through the total exercise of power that they 
are powerless to change the situation. Further, it was seen that even where people did make 
favourable statements regarding the reserve and the organisations in charge of its 
management no bona fide support existed. Although on the surface it appeared that some 
people had an affinity with the activities and beliefs of the government and their 
environmental associates, beneath lay a fear of retribution as well as a wish to acquire 
personal and collective goods and services. 
More generally, in this chapter I have examined how the power relations 
implemented and maintained by the state and their environmentalist associates since the 
1990s have affected the lives of the local people who live in the vicinity of the Ngel Nyaki 
Forest Reserve. It has been seen that a power apparatus comprised of post–colonial 
environmentalist discourse and the technologies of surveillance and material coercion has 
functioned to keep local people from entering the reserve, and that this exclusion has 
brought with it significant residential, economic, social and cultural, as well as 
psychological disruption. As outlined in the introduction to this study, however, local 
people have not simply felt the effects of being excluded from the forests on which they 
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depended, but they have attempted to adapt to and resist these effects. I briefly outlined a 
couple of examples of resistance in this chapter, showing how what people say acts to 
challenge the legitimacy of the reserve and the disruption it has produced. The next 
chapter deals with these coping mechanisms in greater detail.
90
5 .  N e g o t i a t i n g  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  c o n s e r v a t i o n
Overview
Beginning in 1969, yet especially apparent since the 1990s, various organisations have 
implemented and maintained an exercise of power that has effectively controlled local 
people's behaviour as it relates to the Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve. Through constructing 
them as both ecologically ignorant and dangerous objects and then enforcing this notion 
by displacing and maintaining surveillance of them, local people can now no longer enter 
the reserve in pursuit of their livelihoods. The preceding chapter showed exactly what 
effects this has had on the lives of local people. In this chapter I suggest how these effects 
have likely been practically negotiated. I say 'suggest' advisedly, because apart from the data 
listed in the previous chapter I do not know exactly what life was like for people prior to 
their exclusion from the reserve. Thus the arguments that I am presenting in this chapter 
are, in the main, based on logical and not empirical grounds.
In this chapter I will argue that although people's field of possible action was 
significantly constrained by the protection of the reserve from the 1990s onwards, it still 
contained a number of alternative economic practices and techniques that continue to be 
put to use, and which might well now be put to greater use than before, in order to make a 
living. Whilst the exercise of power reduced the possibility of engaging in certain kinds of 
economic activity, other kinds of economic activities were not curtailed. Further, I suggest 
that these strategies are being employed in order to adapt to the effects of protecting the 
reserve. As the possibility of engaging in the livelihood activities that depended in large 
part on the reserve, such as farming, hunting, and so forth, has decreased, local reliance on 
the alternative economic strategies has increased. I will be focussing on three probable 
modes of adaptation: in response to their exclusion from the reserve local people may have 
(a) chosen to relocate where they live, whether temporarily or permanently; (b) shifted their 
economic dependence from themselves onto wealthier 'others' for their livelihood; or (c) 
reconfigured their economic systems by shifting their energies onto income-generating 
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activities formerly under–utilised. Ideally, to this list should be added a fourth point: that 
people have adapted to their situation with the assistance of compensation, both monetary 
and material. With the exception of the land given to the people of Gidan Kuma when 
first removed from the forest in 1969, however, this has not happened. Consequently, local 
people have had to adapt to the effects on their own. 
The more general, theoretical aim of this chapter is to treat these adaptations to 
conservation as resistance to power. But, one might ask: can these adaptations really be 
thought of as resistance? This is an important question that needs to be discussed before 
progressing any further. When I first started thinking about resistance to the reserve, my 
mind turned to the rare instances of direct resistance that take place. According to 
patrollers employed by the NMFP, a very small number of local villagers resist their 
exclusion from the reserve by illegally hunting inside the reserve using traps as well as 
collecting fruit from secretly planted trees. However, because of the surreptitious nature of 
these activities it was nearly impossible to obtain any first–hand information about them 
and therefore include them in anyway in this thesis. Could I look for resistance somewhere 
else? Might there be other acts of resistance that were less overt in their challenges to 
power? My supervisors goaded me on with such questioning. I looked to the work of 
Foucault and Scott for possible leads. 
Do all manifestations of resistance have to be direct challenges to power? Do they 
all have to in some way alter the structure of a power relationship? Does resistance have to 
always operate at the point where power is exercised or can it contest the effects of power? 
From my reading I was reminded that Foucault understands resistance to power as not 
only possible but mandatory; resistance is deeply embedded in any power relationship as an 
'irreducible opposite' (1978:96). Yet I also discovered that Foucault maintains that 
resistance often takes the form of an 'opposition to the effects of power' (1982:212, 
emphasis added). Therefore, to Foucault, resistance does not always have to confront the 
exercise of power head–on but can operate more subtly, responding to the effects that 
power produces. This notion articulates with the work of Scott, who claims that resistance 
does not always have to pose a threat to the basic structure of a power relationship but 
represents, in its essence, 'a constant process of testing and negotiation' (1985:255). Scott 
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synthesises these two ideas – that (a) actions negotiating the effects of power count as 
resistance and (b) resistance is not always efficacious – in defining resistance as 'any act(s)… 
of a subordinate class that is or are intended either to mitigate or deny claims…made on that 
class by superordinate classes' (1985:290). In light of what I learnt from reading these two 
observers of power, I reached the conclusion that the adaptations of local people to their 
exclusion from the reserve could indeed by interpreted as indirect, non–confrontational 
forms of resistance to the effects of power. The three modes of adaptation I have identified 
are ways that local people have negotiated the effects of conservation; people have not 
simply accepted the fate that has befallen them but have actively tried to circumvent and 




I have been arguing that the unequal relationship of power implemented and maintained 
by the government and the other parties responsible for protecting the reserve has imposed 
severe constraints on local people's 'field of possible action' (Foucault, 1982:220–221). Now 
I will show that one potential way people have practically negotiated the economic effects 
of constraining what they can and cannot do and, more importantly, where they can and 
cannot go, is to migrate. In so doing, local people circumvent the effects of an exercise of 
power. As I do not have data on the rates of migration prior to and since people's exclusion 
from the reserve in the 1990s I cannot unequivocally prove that reliance on it has 
increased, but I am still strongly inclined to think, based on my experiences in the field 
living with people and talking with them about their lives, that this is the case. 
When people migrate, they move from their home villages to places with better 
access to the resources they need to survive. Thus migration is driven primarily by 
economic forces. According to data I collected during my fieldwork, migration in the 
environs of the Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve takes two main forms: (a) what I term 'polar' 
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migration and (b) permanent migration. 'Polar' migration typically entails an individual 
(invariably a young man) or a household shifting their place of residence between their 
home village and another one, usually within close proximity, for various periods of time; 
thus, I have called it 'polar,' in the sense that each of the two villages act as migratory poles 
around which the individual or household revolves. This temporary residential oscillation 
appears to be regulated by various ecological–seasonal, economic and social factors. This 
first type of local migration exists particularly at the hamlet of Mayo Ambak and the village 
of Gidan Kuma.
The economic disruption caused by excluding local people from the reserve has 
probably been an important factor behind many young men from Mayo Ambak and Gidan 
Kuma moving elsewhere in order to make a living. That is, by migrating certain local 
people are resisting the effects of this particular exercise of power. Usually alone, 
sometimes as a family unit, they move away to villages where there is better access to 
resources and then return home at various times during the year for varying lengths of 
time. I was unable to find out the exact numbers of people temporarily leaving their home 
villages, yet through my observations and discussions with local people in both settlements 
I was able to deduce that a large portion of the young adult male population participated in 
it. In Gidan Kuma, temporary migration by young men is undertaken in such large 
numbers that it has a marked influence on the appearance of the village. After having 
walked many times between the NMFP research station and the village of Gidan Kuma, I 
had occasion to survey the farms that were located around the village. Something which 
struck me as strange was that the only people I ever saw working on these farms were 
women and young children. During a walk to the village one day I asked my companion, a 
young Kaka man who worked for the NMFP, why this was the case. He replied that the 
farms were empty of men because many of them had made temporary residence in other 
villages where there was a greater availability of land. I also noticed a lack of young men 
around the hamlet of Mayo Ambak. I propose that the prominence of migration is in some 
way due to local people being unable to maintain their livelihoods on the resources they 
have been left with since their exclusion from the reserve.
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Individuals and families migrate for economic reasons; they are looking for 
resources, food, and money. There are various reasons why they return to their home 
village. First, there are the social and cultural factors. If the migration is made by an 
individual man who has left a dependent family (including a wife, children, and possibly 
elderly parents) at home, his return visits are frequent, occurring perhaps once every week 
or every other week. During these times he will provide food, cash and other necessities for 
his family. I saw this happening at the hamlet of Mayo Ambak. During the four weeks I 
spent there two or three young men twice returned to the hamlet for around two days. If 
the migration is made by a household (typically involving a man, his wife, and their 
dependent children) the return visits are less frequent than those made by a young man 
with a dependent family. However, the link of kinship bonding the household to any 
significant others in the home village is strong enough to compel them to return home 
regularly. In addition to the habitual visits they make, temporary migrants (individual and 
household) return for special occasions such as religious holidays and the end of harvest. 
When returning at the end of harvest the family will be bearing a considerable amount of 
food, which valuably augments the food supply of the home village. As one of the wives of 
the headman of Mayo Ambak told me in an interview with my assistant:
It is very good when our sons come back to the village after harvest…they bring us things that we 
need…if they did not then we would only suffer with no food.
This comment supports the argument that I am making here, namely, that migration has 
become an increasingly important source of food for local people since being expelled from 
the forest. Returning shortly after the harvest is important also because the migrant may 
stay at their home village for up to three months, usually between the end of October and 
the beginning of February. This time at home allows friends and kin to refresh their social 
bonds after sometimes long periods spent apart. 
The other type of migration that I will discuss is permanent. Permanent migration 
has been the subject of many anthropological enquiries. However, many of these studies 
fail to mention the secondary processes of migration engaged in by local people as they 
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negotiate the effects produced by the power relations implemented by conservationists and 
it is this that I am focussed on currently.
Permanent migration is final; once people decide to migrate permanently away 
from their home village they rarely return. Like the people who migrate temporarily, I 
propose that permanent migrants move away in order to mitigate the loss in livelihood 
caused by being excluded from the reserve; they are resisting the effects of an exercise of 
power. The limits placed on their field of possible action presumably compel people to 
move away to villages with better access to resources and where they are likely to be near 
relatives and friends, social resources that they can utilise in order to construct new lives. 
Permanent migration is nearly always done as a household and is seldom undertaken 
alone. Although during my brief stay in the area I was unable to observe any permanent 
migration, I was able to establish that it did exist. The physical signs of permanent 
migration were obvious in some of the villages I visited. For example, when I entered the 
hamlets of Mayo Ambak and Musa Gamba, I saw that nearly half of the huts in both places 
were falling apart, their structures being abraded by sun, wind and rain, their inhabitants 
since moved away from the hardship they would inevitably have faced if they remained. 
These observable signs of migration were supported by statements made by the headmen of 
each respective hamlet in informal conversations that were not tape–recorded; both men 
stated that people were continuing to leave their villages in search of resources, food, and 
money.
Economic forces drive the choice to migrate, but what are the factors that 
determine whether or not migrants choose to return to their home village after they have 
made this move? Kinship appears to be the main factor influencing this decision. I am not 
arguing that it is the only factor that influences the decision to return or not, but it is 
undoubtedly one of the most important. Where family members remain in the home 
village there is a strong motive for migrants to make regular return visits and where there is 
no family tie then migrants are more inclined to stay away after leaving. I will attempt to 
show this through making some comparisons between the two small hamlets currently 
mentioned.  At the hamlet of Musa Gamba it is the permanent form of migration that 
dominates. According to the headman, in earlier times most people who chose to migrate 
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made frequent return visits; they were 'polar' migrants. Now, however, the majority of 
people who chose to leave the hamlet did not return. This trend, he said, was especially 
apparent over the two months preceding my arrival. On the other hand, at the hamlet of 
Mayo Ambak it is the 'polar' form of migration that dominates. I propose that kinship 
helps to explain why migrants, driven by economic forces, return to Mayo Ambak and not 
to Musa Gamba. 
I think that one of the main reasons why migrants from Mayo Ambak return to 
their home settlement after migrating is because they are linked through kinship to either 
of the two senior men of the village, the one being the current headman and the other 
being the former headman (who had to cede his position due to blindness), both of which 
are fathers to the various returning migrants. Conversely, I suggest that the reason why 
more and more people from Musa Gamba choose to stay after migrating can in some part 
be explained by the severing of the link of kinship that encouraged 'polar' migrants to 
return. 
The death of the former headman of Musa Gamba coincided with the jump in the 
rate of people who previously maintained links with the settlement choosing to 
permanently live abroad. The headman, whilst not the only senior man in the hamlet, did 
have the highest number of offspring. Therefore, the death of the headman disrupted the 
link that connected his children and their families, residentially and socially, to the 
settlement. His death would have weakened the link that temporary migrants had to the 
hamlet and it would have in some way obviated the reason that some potential permanent 
migrants would have had of remaining in their home settlement. 
Despite being one of the main reasons drawing migrants back to their home villages 
as well as, alternatively, making them stay away, kinship is perhaps not the only factor 
influencing this process. Migrants may encounter social or economic difficulty in their 
adopted place of residence, which may compel them to return home. So, if these factors 
might determine why a migrant chooses to return, then the converse could be true of 
migrants who choose not to. If a hostile social environment in the host village can be 
responsible for making people return, then a stable and welcoming environment might 
provide a reason why people may choose to stay. Further, if economic difficultly has 
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motivated migrants to return then it may be the case that economic stability may have 
caused them to stay in their new place of residence. The area and quality of land available 
to them in the host village may be superior to that which they formerly had access to and 
thus they may opt to remain in the new place in the hope of improving their standard of 
living. So, while kinship is one of the primary factors determining whether or not migrants 
return to their home villages, there are a number of other factors which need to be 
considered.
In my discussion of migration, nowhere have I mentioned the village of Musa 
Akwole. This is because the people of Musa Akwole did not have to migrate after being 
told to stop entering the reserve. Like all people in the area, the inhabitants of this village 
had their behaviour vis–a–vis the reserve altered by the exercise of power implemented and 
maintained by the government and its associates through the use of various technologies of 
power. However, this put no pressure on them to migrate. This was because the total area 
of arable land controlled by the village following the re–establishment of governmental 
control over the reserve from the mid–1990s onwards was an adequate substitute for 
whatever land they lost. People did not have to look elsewhere for the resources they 
needed; they could simply begin farming a formerly unused piece of land allocated by the 
jauro. In terms of the general thesis being presented here, despite having their behaviour as 
it related to the reserve controlled, the people of Musa Akwole did not have their field of 
possible action fundamentally altered. Of course they would have had their access to 
resources reduced, but this would not have prevented them from continuing in a similar 
manner the livelihood practices they had engaged in prior to being excluded from the 
reserve.
Compare this to the other villages and hamlets of Gidan Kuma, Yabri, Musa 
Gamba and Mayo Ambak, all of which, after the mid–1990s, had small amounts of spare 
land and all of which, consequently, had high rates of migration. The crux of what I am 
saying is that the rate of migration in any settlement depends on where the settlement is 
located and the amount of spare land belonging to its people following their debarment 
from the reserve during the 1990s. Through the data and analysis provided it should have 
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emerged, after Turton (2006:21) that 'most migrants make their decision to migrate in 
response to a complex set of external constraints and predisposing events.' 
Shifting economic dependence
The power relation into which local people have been incorporated since the 1990s has 
altered what they could and could not do. This exercise of power barred people from the 
reserve, a restriction in practice that for most people has meant a large reduction in the 
resources they have access to and a consequent decrease in livelihood. However, as noted 
in the introduction to this chapter, whilst their field of possible action has been 
importantly constrained by the operation of power, it has not been completely suffocated 
by it; there still exist for local people economic options through which they can deal with 
the effects of being excluded from the reserve, practices through which they can acquire the 
food and money they need to live. These activities, I am suggesting, insofar as they aim to 
mitigate the power effects of conservation, can be seen as acts of resistance; they challenge 
the state of affairs created by the protection of the reserve. Where a loss of livelihood has 
been incurred people do not simply accept the situation but try to change it, they try to 
regain what was lost through alternative means. As seen above, one of these modes of 
resistance has been to migrate away to areas believed to have better access to resources. In 
this section I will show that the economic effects of being excluded from the reserve have 
also probably been negotiated through working on their neighbours' land for food or 
money. 
I think that the economic linkages that obtain between local people and their 
neighbours may have been an important way that local people have dealt with their 
exclusion from the reserve and thus an important way they have resisted the power effects 
of conservation. The economic relationship between local people and their neighbours 
takes either of two forms: sharecropping, whereby a landless farmer works on the farm of 
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his neighbour for a percentage of the food harvested off the farm; or a wage paid in cash by 
the land owner for the same farming tasks. People engage in these activities with two main 
local groups: firstly, some of the people that I worked with have entered into relations of 
dependence with other cultivators that live in villages not significantly affected by the 
protection of the reserve; secondly, considerable numbers of people have entered into 
relations of economic dependence with the mainly pastoralist Fulani. Both of these types of 
economic relationships have surely existed for a long time and I do not claim that they 
were brought into existence in the last decade. I am suggesting here that their importance 
would have increased as a result of being excluded from the reserve; people can now rely 
less and less on their own resources to survive, and thus they turn increasingly to their 
better off neighbours for economic survival. It is impossible for me to verify this empirically 
as I have no information about these activities as they existed prior to people's exclusion 
from the reserve. Thus the arguments that follow are based on strong logical grounds.
Today many people from Mayo Ambak and Musa Gamba – both settlements 
created out of forced resettlement, the former being created after the 1990s, the latter after 
the first displacements of 1969 – work for their neighbours who live in outer lying villages 
not affected by the protection of the reserve. Some assist people from these places for up to 
a week in one particular activity, such as field preparation, planting, or weeding, whilst 
others are party to more binding and durable relations, such as working a piece of 
borrowed land year after year. These types of interaction are more or less balanced. The 
labourer receives either a cash payment or a percentage of the farm yield in return for his 
work and the land owner receives either assistance with preparing and weeding the land, or 
food in return for providing work or land to the labourer. I think that as a result of having 
their independent farming activities curtailed by their debarment from the reserve, more 
and more people must have been forced to enter into and depend on such alternative 
economic strategies.
Other people from these settlements have resisted the effects of conservation 
through the generous donations of their neighbours. Seeing the difficultly their neighbours 
were having growing food on their small, exhausted farms, around five years ago the people 
of Lumu Batu gave to those at Mayo Ambak and Musa Gamba a large piece of land. The 
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land was given without the expectation of the returns accruing to the donors mentioned 
above. As my assistant relayed to me:
This piece of land [that given to them by the people of Lumu Batu] was to help them…they do not 
have to give food because of getting it.
I am aware, following the Maussian tradition, that no gift is truly free; all gifts establish 
obligations of reciprocity. Therefore, by receiving the land offered to them, the inhabitants 
of Mayo Ambak and Musa Gamba are implicitly obliged to return the gift at some 
undetermined time and in some undetermined form (e.g., in political support) in the 
future.
However, whilst large, this piece of land is not well suited for farming. Being 
draped over the side of a steep valley, the nutrients that would typically accumulate on a 
level piece of land are washed downhill by rain. Nonetheless, the land is cultivated and 
people obtain a proportion of their food from it. As well as being poorly suited for 
farming, the land is very difficult to access. During my stay in Mayo Ambak I asked to be 
shown the farms on which people worked. The journey to most farms was undemanding, 
yet when it came to the parcel of land referred to above it was quite another story. To get 
to the farm one must firstly walk along a cattle track a number of kilometres through 
undulating grassland. After this the going gets slightly more arduous; one leaves the track 
and has to traverse across many very steep hillsides, fight through often dense bush and, 
finally, slide down on ones posterior another sharply inclined slope to reach the 
destination. I consider myself a fit and healthy person, yet after having made the trip I was 
exhausted and in pain, my footwear, a pair of thongs, in tatters. Perhaps the only 
redeeming feature of this piece of land is the considerable number of palm trees growing 
on it. The inhabitants of both hamlets extract palm wine from these trees nearly every day, 
and thoroughly enjoy consuming it. 
As well as utilising existing economic links with their agricultural neighbours, some 
villagers in the area have probably resisted the controls placed on their action by creating, 
or becoming increasingly dependent on existing, economic relationships with the local 
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Fulani, relations which are tilted very much in the latter's favour. Oppressive political–
economic relations between the Fulani and their agricultural neighbours antedate the 
creation of the Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve by over a century. Frantz (1981:212–214) notes 
that since the 19th century the Mambilla and other agriculturalists on the plateau have been 
subjugated by the Fulani who 'regularly raided the highlands for slaves and tribute.' He also 
notes (ibid.) that due to the increased amount of Fulani sedentarization on the Mambilla 
Plateau since the 1930s, many people have worked for their cattle–herding neighbours as 
gardeners and builders. The protection of the reserve, especially since the 1990s, has most 
likely intensified this trend. 
The people I will be referring to who have created or become more dependent on 
economic relations with their Fulani neighbours come from the villages of Yabri and 
Gidan Kuma. Following their exclusion from the reserve in the 1990s, the people living in 
these settlements had their access to arable land reduced and thus quickly exhausted the 
small amount of land that they did have access to, two important power effects of 
protecting the reserve. People have probably adapted to this economic disruption, that is, 
they have probably resisted the effects of this power relationship, by relying for land and 
work on others who had better access to resources, namely, the Fulani. As one Mambila 
farmer from Gidan Kuma put it:
A lot of people have to look outside the village [for land on which to farm]…They shall farm and 
share with the Fulani person…because of the exhausted land, that is why they look Fulani to give 
them more. 
The number of people engaged in these inter–ethnic economic relations is high. At Yabri –
a village that has always been situated outside the reserve and has not been impacted by 
resettlement – for instance, nearly all able–bodied people work for the Fulani in some 
capacity for ten months a year. The people from Yabri and Gidan Kuma who work for the 
Fulani are engaged in a system of sharecropping similar to that mentioned in relation to 
the residents of Mayo Ambak and Musa Gamba, whereby farmers cultivate land in return 
for either a cash payment or a portion of the annual yield of the farm.
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The tasks are similar to those engaged in by the people of Mayo Ambak and Musa 
Gamba with their better off neighbours, but the conditions under which they are 
established, sustained and performed are markedly different. The process whereby the 
inhabitants of Yabri and Gidan Kuma create or maintain economic relations with their 
Fulani neighbours appears to be fraught with tension. According to the Mambilla man 
from Gidan Kuma cited above, the Fulani are stubborn and unwilling to give any of their 
land to others, even if they stand to gain a share of the food taken from the farm. This led 
him to make the following evaluation, which I, having not spent any significant amount of 
time with the Fulani, can not verify:
The Fulani, they are not like us…they are not good people.
The process of borrowing land from the Fulani was described by many people as 'begging.' 
Maintaining access to land acquired through 'begging' can also pose important obstacles. 
This is a problem currently faced by a number of people from Yabri. In response to a 
shortage of land, two to three years ago the headman of Yabri approached a group of 
neighbouring Fulani and asked them if his people might use some of their spare land for 
farming, in return for which, he stipulated, the Fulani would receive a percentage of the 
food harvested each year. The Fulani agreed to this system of sharecropping, and since that 
time people from Yabri have had access to more land on which to farm, that is, more than 
the small amount that they previously had access to. This arrangement is now under threat, 
however; the Fulani are now revoking the farmers' right to use the land, claiming that they 
require it for pasture. 
Paid work is performed for the Fulani under exploitative conditions. When 
speaking with a group of men and women from Yabri I was told that the Fulani were slow 
in paying workers and that sometimes they failed to remunerate them at all, despite it 
being part of the contract into which both parties had entered. Further, when the farmers 
were paid it was often less than the agreed amount. The people with whom I spoke were 
unhappy with this state of affairs and expressed that they would prefer not to work for the 
Fulani and work only for themselves. It is probable that these labour relations also prevail 
103
at the village of Gidan Kuma, where the pressure on land is equal to, if not higher than at 
Yabri. 
I did not manage to talk to the Fulani about this phenomenon, and so I think it 
would be injudicious to label them as villains and the inhabitants of Yabri and Gidan 
Kuma as innocent targets of exploitation. I think it is wiser to treat the comments cited 
above simply as indicators of an unequal political–economic dynamic that exists between 
the two groups, regardless of its exact dimensions. 
I have suggested in this chapter that in order to adapt to their debarment from the 
Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve it is likely that many people have shifted their economic 
dependence onto certain of their neighbours. From a theoretical point of view I have 
interpreted these acts as resistance to the effects of an exercise of power, as survival 
strategies that attempt to mitigate the restrictions placed on the local field of possible 
action. Becoming dependent on others has saved the people excluded and relocated from 
the reserve from economic and social collapse, but it has also brought with it substantial 
social, economic and psychological costs. The costs involved in the adaptations of people 
from Mayo Ambak and Musa Gamba are, on the one hand, the economic cost of having to 
work extremely hard in order to make an infertile piece of land produce food and, on the 
other, the social cost of remaining beholden to the donors of that land until such time as 
they can return the gift, which, judging by their current circumstances, will not be any time 
soon. The costs involved in the adaptations of the people from Yabri and Gidan Kuma are 
much more obvious. These people have to plead, yet not in order to get a fair deal, but in 
order to enter into exploitative economic relations with the Fulani. In the context of these 
relations the payment they receive for their work is either disproportionate to the effort 
they have invested, withheld, or nullified. As I noted earlier, these imbalanced relations are 
the most recent manifestations of a long process of political subjugation of the Mambilla 
and their agricultural neighbours by the Fulani. There have also been psychological 
consequences of these adaptations. People have become demoralised as a result of no 
longer having resources of their own and of having to ask and sometimes plead with others 
to gain access to them. People are unhappy that they have lost control of their lives. 
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Livelihood Diversification
I am arguing in this thesis is that an exercise of power implemented and perpetuated by the 
parties responsible for protecting the Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve has established a barrier 
between local people and the reserve. This has most significantly affected the livelihood 
practices that presupposed significant use of the land inside the reserve, such as farming. 
But while the operation of power has placed limits on such activities, it has not stymied 
other economic practices that depended less on the land inside the reserve or did not 
depend on land at all. As I have shown above, subsequent to the 1990s the local field of 
possible action still contained within it alternative options able to be utilised in order to 
make a living, options that the operation of power failed to significantly effect. People have 
also adapted to their exclusion from the reserve, I suggest, by diversifying their livelihoods, 
that is, by diverting more of their time and energy into alternative income–generating 
strategies in an attempt to offset the losses incurred from the protection of the reserve. 
Again, following Foucault and Scott, I think this set of practices can be seen as acts of 
resistance, mainly in the sense that they are attempts to mitigate the power effects of 
protecting the reserve; people have not passively accepted the circumstances that 
conservation has created but have tried to move past or dodge those effects by various 
means. Like the other modes of resistance discussed earlier, all of the activities to be 
mentioned below probably existed prior to the 1990s and are therefore not new economic 
practices. Due to a paucity of data, however, it has been very difficult to understand how 
much importance any of these alternative revenue–generating activities had pre–exclusion. 
Consequently, the discussion of each strategy is mainly unaccompanied by historical 
information. Nonetheless, I still strongly advance the idea that people's reliance on these 
practices has increased significantly since having been excluded from the reserve from the 
1990s onwards. 
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The phenomenon of livelihood diversification has been given due attention in the 
literature. Agyemang (1996), Thompson and Homewood (2002) and Bryceson (2002), all 
agree that as people's access to agricultural land declines they will begin to employ 
alternative, usually non–agricultural means of making money. It will be seen that this 
equation between land decrease and income diversification becomes problematic where the 
alternative strategies are not sufficient to compensate for the initial economic losses. 
Where people's access to land remains inadequate and their alternative strategies cannot 
counterbalance this, the equation begins to break down and eventually rupture. 
What alternative strategies people have turned to in order to adapt to their 
exclusion from the reserve has depended on ecological, geographical as well as socio–
economic factors. When the government re–established its control over the reserve in the 
1990s, where a person lived, the resources which naturally occurred around that place, as 
well as the position they occupied in the local socio–economic hierarchy all weighed 
importantly on the decision to choose this or that activity in order to supplement their 
existing incomes. I will show this to be the case by discussing how livelihood diversification 
has played out in three settlements in the area: the hamlets of Mayo Ambak and Musa 
Gamba and the village of Yabri. 
It is likely that the people of Mayo Ambak have managed the effects of their 
exclusion from the reserve by, inter alia, diversifying their livelihoods. These strategies 
appear to orient around a single resource: the palm tree. The small amount of land the 
inhabitants of Mayo Ambak have control over, whilst not rich in much, does happen to 
have a lot of palm trees growing on it. Owing to this fact, I think that people must have 
invested a good deal of their time and energy into this resource in order to adapt to the 
disruption of their livelihoods. The people of Mayo Ambak employ the palm tree for 
manifold income–generating ends. The tree is made to yield palm fruit, alcoholic palm 
wine, and palm oil. Palm wine, an alcoholic beverage derived from the sap of the palm tree, 
is obtained through a process known as 'tapping.' Using a machete, the 'tapper' cuts the 
flower of the tree to collect the sap in a container or gourd that is fastened to the flower 
stump. The initial liquid that comes from the flower is very sweet and is not alcoholic. This 
liquid begins to ferment immediately after collection, however, and within two hours 
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fermentation yields a wine 4% in alcoholic content, mildly intoxicating and sweet. The 
men of the hamlet usually tap palm wine three times a day – immediately after sunrise, in 
the middle of the day, and before they leave their farms in the evening – and in the process 
drink a good deal themselves. Once collected in containers the liquid is taken and sold 
either at local markets (usually the weekly market held at the village of Musa Akwole each 
Monday) or at neighbouring hamlets such as Musa Gamba. The prices asked of neighbours 
are much less than those asked at market. 
From my observations it appeared that the sale of palm wine currently constituted a 
significant percentage of most people's income and presumably a much higher percentage 
than it did prior to exclusion, although, as alluded to earlier, I was not able to acquire solid 
data on this. Its importance as a revenue–generating activity was corroborated by the fact 
that the bulk of the palm wine sold at Musa Akwole was done so by people from Mayo 
Ambak. At market, people also sell palm fruit and palm oil, the latter of which is used for 
cooking and in the production of so–called 'traditional' soap. Both of these items fetch 
high prices and can also be considered vital streams of revenue. As to whether or not 
people make soap with the oil and then sell it I was unable to gather. 
The sale of products extracted from the palm tree has thus probably been the main 
way in which people from Mayo Ambak have diversified their livelihoods after being told 
to stop using the Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve in the 1990s. Their livelihood practices that 
depended on land within the reserve were constrained by an exercise of power and thus 
they have probably shifted a significant amount of time and energy onto this alternative 
activity that did not rely on land inside the reserve. I am also arguing here that such 
alternative practices can be seen as acts of resistance in that they are attempts to lessen or 
circumvent the effects generated by an exercise of power. Interestingly, people may have 
put certain of their animals into use as well. 
The inhabitants of Mayo Ambak depend for a small part of their incomes on using 
their donkeys to ferry maize. This practice entails the donkey owner transporting for a 
client an amount of maize to a specified destination, which is usually the market, a service 
for which they receive either a cash payment or a share of the food that is being carried. I 
do not know for certain (a) whether this practice was a means of making money prior to 
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the 1990s and (b) whether dependence on this activity has increased since that time. It 
could be stated after Bryceson (2002), Agyemang (1996) and Thompson and Homewood 
(2002), that because access to agricultural land has decreased, people's dependence on this 
non–agricultural source of income has probably increased and that it, therefore, probably 
constitutes a way in which this community has adapted to the effects of an exercise of 
power that deprived them of access to essential resources. However, this may not be the 
case. It will be remembered from the previous chapter that local maize production has 
decreased since people have been kept out of the reserve. Consequently, the prominence of 
this activity, which hinges on the level of maize production, may have actually declined. On 
the other hand, however, it is possible that people from this settlement are transporting 
maize produced outside their immediate vicinity, that is, from places where food 
production has not been as badly affected by the protection of the reserve, such as the 
villages mentioned earlier In this case, access to transportable maize would not be a great 
problem and ferrying maize by donkey could well have become increasingly relied upon in 
the face of decreasing agricultural returns.
A point worthy of mention is that this practice is one that brings the Ndola people 
of Mayo Ambak into social contact with members of other ethnic groups, most notably, the 
Fulani. According to my assistant, the Fulani and other ethnic groups do not usually get on 
very well. However, the Fulani are willing participants in this interaction and as a result of 
the exchange friendships between themselves and the Ndola are often forged. Have these 
economic adaptations possibly been used by other people in the area? If not, then why not? 
The inhabitants of Musa Gamba have, like the people of Mayo Ambak, probably 
diversified their livelihoods as a way of adapting to their exclusion from the reserve. Yet, 
although the two settlements are alike in this respect, they differ in others. The area of land 
the inhabitants of Musa Gamba have control over does not have many palm trees growing 
on it and not once during my stay in the hamlet did I see any pack animals such as the 
donkey. Owing to these conditions, how the process of economic reconfiguration has 
played out in Musa Gamba has probably been different from Mayo Ambak. 
The land controlled by Musa Gamba has a wide range of fruits growing on it. 
Scattered around and inside the village are mango, avocado and banana trees, which 
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typically occur in small groves of perhaps three or four trees each. These fruit trees are the 
only economically viable resource that people have had recourse to in order to adapt to the 
effects of their removal from the reserve. Consequently, I expect that people of this hamlet 
have shifted a good deal of their time and energy onto them. The headman of Musa 
Gamba had this to say:
These fruits: the banana, the avocado and the mango. Selling this is how we get [sustain a 
livelihood]…we have only small–small land and so we have to sell these.
Once collected from the tree the fruit is taken to local markets and neighbouring 
settlements and sold for cash or exchanged for food. This economic activity constitutes a 
significant percentage of most people's income and would rank alongside farming in terms 
of the revenue it generates. I did not spend a long period of time inquiring into this 
dimension of economic life of Musa Gamba, and therefore I was unable to collect any 
more detailed data on this activity, such as information relating to the amount of each fruit 
sold, the price for which it was sold, and so forth. 
I stated earlier that the range of alternative economic strategies that people have 
had recourse to after having their actions vis–a–vis the reserve constrained is influenced by 
various factors. Those discussed so far have been ecological and geographical; what 
alternative livelihood options people at Mayo Ambak and Musa Gamba have probably used 
depend largely on naturally occurring resources and the location of the settlements. But, I 
am not positing an ecologically deterministic argument. There are surely other factors at 
work. I will show this by looking at how people from the village of Yabri have adapted to 
the protection of the reserve since the 1990s. The questions I pose to guide this discussion 
is as follows: have the inhabitants of Yabri adapted to their exclusion from the reserve 
differently than the residents of Mayo Ambak and Musa Gamba? If so, then why?
As well as increasing their reliance on economic relationships with their Fulani 
neighbours, the Tigon and Mambilla residents of Yabri have probably adapted to the 
disruption of their economy by diversifying their livelihoods. The land belonging to the 
village has a range of fruits growing on it, which are taken and sold at local markets and 
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neighbouring villages. Therefore, because their agricultural activities were significantly 
impacted by the protection of the reserve, all of the three settlements examined in this part 
of the chapter would have relied more and more on selling fruit and fruit products. 
In order to cope with being excluded from the reserve, the people of Yabri have 
also increasingly relied upon selling cattle, a practice that would most likely have previously 
existed. Prior to their exclusion from the reserve, a number of people owned cattle, with 
some individuals owning up to 30 head. I was able to establish that since the mid–1990s, 
these people have had to sell their cattle in order to sustain their livelihoods. But, unlike 
the strategies mentioned up to this point, this practice is not determined by ecological–
geographic factors. Cattle are today (and I assume in the past) among the most expensive 
commodities in the area (today one head of cattle costs 100,000 Naira, which is roughly 
equivalent to 1,000 NZD). Therefore, the possession of cattle reflects the possession of a 
certain amount of wealth and social prestige, that is, a socio–economic status. One need 
only consider the Fulani as evidence of this point. The fact that people from Yabri had the 
option of selling cattle whilst the people of Mayo Ambak and Musa Gamba did not, then, 
is due to socio–economic factors; people from Yabri had the wealth to buy and breed (and 
then eventually sell) cattle whilst those from Mayo Ambak an Musa Gamba did not. 
So, the alternative livelihood strategies people have likely employed to adapt to 
their exclusion from the reserve from the 1990s onwards have hinged on various factors: 
the natural resources occurring in an area, the geographical proximity of a settlement to 
those resources, and the position that local people occupy in the local socio–economic 
system. 
This chapter has shown that local people have managed to achieve a degree of 
economic stability in spite of great difficulties. However, these people still face tremendous 
challenges. All of the people I have referred to, yet especially the people of Mayo Ambak
and Musa Gamba, do not have a reliable diet, cannot buy new clothes when needed or 
purchase medicine for the sick, and they do not have access to other amenities and 
resources that they need. The income–generating capacity of the alternative livelihood 
strategies has not been sufficient to counterbalance the economic disruption they have 
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endured as a result of being debarred from the reserve. The economic status of these places 
thus continues to decline. 
The reassertion of external control over the reserve in the 1990s placed important 
limits of people's field of possible action, which, in turn, produced a series of effects upon 
local people's lives. All of the practices that depended significantly on the reserve – such as 
farming, hunting, and so forth – were either drastically curtailed or nullified altogether. 
However, whilst the exercise of power acted to constrain people's economic repertoire, it 
did not stifle it. Those practices that did not depend in large part on the land inside the 
reserve or did not depend on land at all were seemingly 'beyond the reach' of power. In this 
chapter I have described three such options: migration, relationships of economic 
dependence, and non–agricultural livelihood practices. The possibility of engaging in these 
activities was not seriously impacted by the exercise of power and in this chapter I have 
suggested that they were probably increasingly relied upon to manage the economic 
disruption caused by the protection of the reserve. Throughout this chapter I have also 
maintained that these adaptations can be understood as acts of resistance, insofar as they 
constitute ways in which local people have tried to overcome and negotiate the effects of an 
exercise of power, namely, the ongoing protection of the reserve. Now that I have discussed 
both the definite effects of protecting the reserve as well as the potential modes of 
resistance, I can go on to conclude the thesis as a whole.
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6 .  C o n c l u s i o n
A useful way of beginning this conclusion is to readdress certain of the questions that I 
posed in the introduction. It will be recalled that I identified several key problems that 
surrounded the interaction between conservation and local indigenous people. Perhaps the 
most central question I presented was: what happens when conservation and local people 
meet? This general query has informed the entire thesis and nearly all of the data I have 
provided has, in some respect, been a reply to it. I can begin to fashion an answer to this 
question through, firstly, reiterating what form the relationship between the parties 
responsible for protecting the Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve and the local people who live in 
its vicinity has taken. 
Throughout this thesis I have adopted a theoretical approach based on the ideas of 
Michel Foucault. I have employed his understanding of power and how it functions in the 
social body to interpret the relationship between conservation and local people in a 
particular geographical setting. Thus, my work can be seen not so much as a development 
but as a complement to the work of Ferguson (1996), who applied Foucault's ideas 
explicitly when analysing development in Lesotho. I say that my work is more of a 
complement to than a development of Ferguson because his approach was centred on 
Foucault's concept of power and its effects as formulated in Discipline and Punish (1977). In 
this text, Foucault, like Ferguson after him, looks at how an intentional exercise of power 
can have other, unintended, yet still concrete side–effects, such as the creation of categories 
of people (the creation of the 'delinquent' by the prison) or the deepening of matrixes of 
governance (the extension of bureaucratic state power by projects of 'development'). In this 
thesis, on the other hand, I have applied Foucault's understanding of power in its most 
general, abstract sense. Indeed, I don't think that it would have been useful to tread the 
same path as Ferguson. Disciplinary power is all about the production of practiced, 
individualised, and ultimately docile bodies and, although certain aspects of this form of 
power find expression at Ngel Nyaki, I do not think that this is really what is going on. 
Rather, the relationship between conservationists and local people in this setting has taken 
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the form of a general exercise of power: the actions of the people protecting the reserve 
have influenced the possible actions of the local people who live in its vicinity. For local 
people, the conservation of the reserve has meant it is no longer possible to physically enter
a space they formerly had unrestricted access to. Following Foucault, it was seen that this 
exercise of power has been predicated on the operation of various material and ideological 
instruments of power. Firstly, I showed that local people's exclusion from the reserve has 
been made possible by surveillance and material coercions. Over the reserve's history, forest 
guards and patrollers have been used to enforce the legal sanctions protecting the reserve. 
Upon identifying any local people that have been exploiting the reserve, such agents have 
meted out fines and in some instances taken people to the local court for prosecution. The 
threat of these consequences has been highly effective in controlling the actions of local 
people. I also showed that this exercise of power has depended for its legitimacy and 
implementation on 'post–colonial' environmentalist discourse. Since the establishment of 
the reserve, conservationists and officials in the area have viewed the forests inside the 
reserve as irreplaceable sanctuaries of nature and represented the people who live beside 
them as destructive and ignorant. It has been seen that the functioning of this discourse, 
together with the mechanisms of surveillance and material coercions, facilitated the 
exercise of power I have described. So, this has been the basic form that the relationship 
between the parties responsible for protecting the reserve and the local people who live in 
its vicinity has taken. From here it is possible to more directly orient myself to the question 
of what happens when the two meet.
As stated above, in this thesis I have shown that the relationship between 
conservationists and local people has taken the form of an exercise of power; the former 
has stopped the latter from entering the reserve for any purpose. In Chapter 4, I discussed 
in detail the main effects of this power relationship. The first main effect of protecting the 
reserve has been the displacement and forced resettlement of the people living inside it; the 
actions of others forced local people to change where they lived. When the reserve was 
demarcated, the inhabitants of the two villages located inside the boundary of the reserve 
were evicted. The people of Gari Mando were subject to development–induced 
displacement and resettlement, or DIDR, whilst the people of Gidan Elom were subject to 
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development–induced displacement, or DID (De Wet and Fox, 2001). The former group's 
displacement was direct and final, whilst the displacement of the latter group was not; in 
1969, the population of Gidan Elom was split into numerous segments, and one of those 
groups of people were displaced for a second time in 1995.
This difference in formal oversight had important ramifications, which I explained 
in terms of Cernea's model of the risks of displacement (1997). As I demonstrated, the 
people subject to DIDR were probably exposed, in some degree, to a number of the risks of 
displacement, such as marginalisation, loss of access to common resources, social 
disarticulation, food insecurity and malnourishment, increased morbidity and mortality. 
However, through the provisions of the government they were protected from the 
fundamental risks of landlessness and homelessness. The people subject to DID were not 
protected from any of these risks; they were simply ordered to leave and left to their own 
devices. The initial act of displacement that occurred in 1969 exposed this group of people 
to the risk of social disarticulation. Those people forced to relocate for a second time in 
1995 (the move that brought into being the hamlet of Mayo Ambak) were dangerously 
exposed to becoming landless; they experienced a sharp decrease in livelihood and 
resultant marginalisation; they lost access to common resources; they had the range of 
foods they consumed significantly reduced, which created dietary problems; and, lastly, 
they saw their social and kinship networks partially disintegrate. So, while noting that all 
forms of displacement usually cause some degree of disruption to the lives of those forced 
to move, it was nonetheless seen, after De Wet (2006), that planning is an important 
precondition for 'successful' resettlement; like many of the examples I cited in my literature 
review, people subject to DIDR have fared better than those subject to DID.
After this, I went on to consider what economic effects the protection of the reserve 
produced. Protecting the reserve meant not only that people could not live within its 
boundary but also that people could no longer enter the reserve for economic purposes. 
However, before examining the economic effects in detail I firstly clarified that the 
economic effects that I would be focussing on were those caused by the re–establishment of 
governmental control from the 1990s onwards. The focus of my discussion rested on the 
inhabitants of Mayo Ambak and Musa Gamba. It was seen that as a result of being 
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excluded (and for many people displaced) from the reserve from the 1990s onwards, people 
from these hamlets have had their livelihoods seriously disrupted. The total area of land 
that people have access to, as well as the quality of the land they have access to, has been 
dramatically reduced, which has caused a decrease in food production as well as a 
significant decline in income. Exclusion from the reserve has impacted the former social 
organisation of farming and the psychological and technical benefits that were attached to 
it. The economic practices of hunting, as well as the collection of various timber and non–
timber forest products have all been impacted heavily and, in some instances, disappeared 
altogether. Lastly, the significant decrease in food production has been accompanied by a 
reduction in the diversity of what people eat. Therefore, the exclusion of local people from 
the Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve has produced economic disruption similar to that observed 
in other parts of the world (Adams and McShane, 1992; Nygren, 2003; Colchester, 2004).
Further, following these authors, it has been seen that the cause of this disruption has been 
a general neglect of the local social context. As with the many projects of nature and
wildlife conservation I referred to in my review of the literature, local people were either 
minimally consulted or not consulted at all in the reserve's planning, its demarcation, or its 
management and have thus derived little or no benefit from its existence. A 'western' 
conservation model has been applied to a non–western social context with harmful 
economic results.
However, I did not hastily generalise this specific data. Whilst acknowledging that
all local people have been subject to some degree of economic disruption, I emphasised 
that how the protection of the reserve affected their livelihoods was an inherently uneven 
process. It was seen that the main variable influencing this process was the amount of 
unused land the inhabitants of any given settlement had access to subsequent to their final 
exclusion from the reserve after the 1990s. At Musa Akwole and Gidan Kuma, economic
disruption was not pronounced, while at Mayo Ambak, Musa Gamba, and Yabri, it was 
more serious. This was especially the case at Mayo Ambak and Musa Gamba, where many 
people also had to manage being displaced for a second time. 
I then went on to discuss the positive economic effects the protection of the reserve 
has had. I brought attention to the fact that the principle source of these has been the 
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Nigerian Montane Forest Project managed by Dr Hazel Chapman. However, I noted that 
these economic benefits were insignificant when compared to the economic disruption 
caused by the protection of the reserve. As well as being relatively insignificant, it was seen 
that they were also distributed unevenly. Variables influencing this process were gender, 
age and the proximity of any settlement to the NMFP field station. The fact that both the 
negative and positive economic effects of protected areas are often distributed unevenly is 
something also noted by Thompson and Homewood (2002).
Following this discussion I went on to examine the social and cultural impacts of 
protecting the reserve. This section of the thesis took the form of a case study, wherein I 
looked at how the conservation of the reserve has disrupted one particular social 
institution, namely, 'contribution.' I showed that significant decreases in food production 
gave rise to selfishness and the consequent erosion of this series of institutionalised food 
sharing practices, a chain of events similar to that described by Turnbull in his study of the 
Ik (1972). This social erosion has continued to the point where today intra–village 
'contribution' is rarely practiced. I concluded this section by bringing to attention the fact 
that inter–village food sharing was still prevalent and that its existence was the principle 
reason underlying why the structure that housed 'contribution' at Musa Gamba was in 
good repair, whilst that at Mayo Ambak was dilapidated. Thus, in this section it was seen 
that conservation and protected areas impact strongly on learned and habitual patterns of 
behaviour (Brockington, 2002; Fabricius and De Wet, 2002; Anderson and Berglund, 
2003).
I also demonstrated in this chapter that how people think has also been affected by 
the protection of the reserve. Many local people feel that they are powerless to change the
circumstances created by conservation and that the trajectory their lives will take is at the 
mercy of exogenous forces. This sort of demoralisation is an important dimension of how 
local people are impacted by protected areas (Hagberg, 1992; Egbe, 1997). As well as 
feeling disempowered, local people feel resent towards the parties responsible for 
protecting the reserve for not fulfilling certain promises and it was seen that many local 
people appear to not fully support the existence of the reserve. Following Scott (1985; 
1990) and Foucault (1978; 1982), I suggested that the resentful statements I was told are 
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acts of resistance, insofar as they both challenge the claims made on local people by 
conservationists as well as advance the claims of local people vis–a–vis that superordinate 
group. As well as openly critiquing the exercise of power in which they are embedded as 
subordinates, I provided two examples of where local people issued favourable remarks to 
me regarding the reserve and its continued protection. Both of these outward signs of 
affinity with the actions and ideals of environmentalism were revealed to be specious. In 
one case I demonstrated, after Scott (1990), that the positive comments were a 'public 
transcript' of power beneath which lay a 'private transcript' that secretly critiqued the 
avowed support. In the other case it was seen that the positive remarks had less to do with 
any genuine affinity with conservation and more to do with the acquisition of personal and 
collective goods and services. So, in some instances, while local people may appear to 
approve of, or even espouse conservation, beneath the surface they may be either secretly 
critiquing it or attempting to use it as a conduit through which to acquire wealth.
After having shown in Chapter 4 how the protection of the reserve, as an exercise 
of power, affected the lives of local people, I then went on to discuss in Chapter 5 how 
these effects might have been negotiated. It was seen that although the exercise of power 
implemented and maintained by the external organisations responsible for protecting the 
reserve had imposed serious limits on the local field of possible action, it had not
completely stifled it. Despite being unable to enter or use the reserve for any purpose, local 
people still had available to them alternative economic practices that continued to be put 
to use, and which might well have been put to greater use than before, in order to make a 
living. At this point I emphasised the limitations of the data that I possessed and made 
clear that I could not establish with any certainty the 'before' picture for many of these 
activities. The corollary of this was that I would argue, mainly on logical grounds, that 
because their access to the reserve had been prohibited, local people would have probably 
come to depend increasingly on the alternative livelihood strategies that remained in their 
possible field of action. From here, I went on to argue that these possible adaptations could 
be understood, after Scott and Foucault, as indirect and non–confrontational acts of 
resistance. It was seen that whilst they were not open and direct attacks on the ongoing 
exercise of power they could, nonetheless, be construed as resistance, insofar as they 
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constituted attempts by local people to mitigate the effects of an exercise of power. That is, 
my argument centred on the fact that local people had not simply accepted the 
circumstances generated by the protection of the reserve but had actively tried to 
circumvent, negotiate, and ultimately resist them. As Foucault argued about power 
relations in general, I showed that when local people and conservation meet the 
relationship is never unidirectional.
The first mode of resistance that I detailed was migration. It was seen that all 
migrants are driven by economic forces; they are moving away from sites of economic 
disruption to places that they hope will afford better access to the resources that they need 
in order to survive. I showed that migration takes two main forms: 'polar' and permanent 
migration. The main reason why some migrants chose to return to their home villages after 
leaving, whilst others chose not to, was kinship and family. I finished this section with a 
brief discussion of the prominence of migration within the various settlements that 
surround the reserve. Where settlements possessed an inadequate amount of land after 
being excluded from the reserve in the 1990s migration tended to be prominent, and at the 
one village that had recourse to significant amounts of spare land, migration appeared to 
be slight. 
I demonstrated in this chapter that local people have probably also resisted the 
effects of protecting the reserve by increasing the amount they work on their neighbours' 
land for either food or money. These were further practices that lay beyond the reach of 
power. I showed that these economic linkages usually take either of two forms, namely, 
sharecropping or paid work, and that they obtain between local people and either of two 
groups: other cultivators that live in nearby villages not significantly affected by the 
protection of the reserve or the mainly pastoralist Fulani. I argued that since the 1990s 
reliance on these linkages has probably increased and that more and more people would 
have been forced into and made to depend on them. 
Lastly, it was seen that, in adapting to their exclusion from the reserve, certain local 
people have probably shifted their economic dependence onto the Fulani. Considerable 
numbers of people are currently employed by local Fulani, with some people engaged in 
these relations for up to ten months a year. They work as gardeners and farmers on Fulani 
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land, in return for which they are supposed to receive either food or money. However, I 
showed that local people claim that the conditions under which labour relations are 
established, maintained and performed are unfair and exploitative. I ended this section by 
making some brief remarks regarding the various costs 'paid' by local people for shifting 
their economic dependence onto their better off neighbours. It was seen that all people 
have had to bear significant socio–economic costs as a consequence of working for their 
various neighbours, and I showed how these costs are the product of the different relations 
of dependence in which local people engage. 
The final segment of this chapter focussed on livelihood diversification as a 
potential mode of resistance to the effects of protecting the Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve. I 
reiterated that my data on the pre–exclusion status of the practices to be described was 
sparse and that, again, my argument was based more on strong logical grounds than on 
empirical data. Following Bryceson (2002), my argument was that in response to their 
exclusion from the reserve, many local people had, in addition to the two adaptations 
mentioned above, probably placed greater time and energy than they had before into 
alternative, non–agricultural livelihood strategies. These included: selling products derived 
from the versatile palm tree, using pack animals to ferry maize to markets selling various 
fruits, and selling cattle. It was assumed that local people had not always relied on these 
practices so significantly and that their current prominence could be in some way be 
explained by the economic disruption caused by the protection of the reserve. I showed 
that the range of non–agricultural livelihood strategies that people had recourse to after 
their exclusion from the reserve depended significantly on various ecological–geographical, 
as well as socio–economic factors. 
I think that my analysis of local people's adaptation to conservation is one of the 
main things this research has contributed to the academic literature. As noted in Chapter 
2, there exist very few studies on how the effects of nature and wildlife conservation are 
negotiated by indigenous populations. While it was noted that my data was limited in 
certain respects, I feel that I have shed light onto this important dimension of the local 
experience of protected areas. Most studies of the 'people and parks' issue have tended to 
focus on the effects of conservation and therefore usually treat local people as passive, inert 
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entities unable to help themselves. I hope that in this thesis I have, mainly through my use 
of a Foucauldian theoretical perspective, overcome this epistemological barrier and shown 
that people strategise and negotiate by virtue of the fact that power is exercised over them; 
resistance is built into power. It should have been seen that for there to be power there 
must be resistance and for there to be resistance there must be power. 
The foregoing review of my thesis has shed some light on the main question I 
posed at the beginning of this conclusion, as well as the other problems that I identified in 
my introduction. In this thesis I have shown what happened when conservation and local 
people met at the Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve in eastern Nigeria. Although a process marked 
with notable punctuations, the protection of the reserve has caused serious disruption to 
the lives of the local people who live in its vicinity. However, as I noted, this exercise of 
power has been a social phenomenon; it has not simply involved the aggressive imposition 
of a superordinate group's interests onto another, subordinate group. The disruption 
caused by restricting the local field of possible action has probably been negotiated through 
indirect and non–confrontational forms of resistance. Despite these attempts to mitigate
the claims made on them by conservationists, however, it has been seen that local people 
have undoubtedly experienced a significant drop in living standards as a result of being 
excluded from the reserve, especially since the 1990s. Thus, local people have been the 
'losers' in this relationship whilst the parties behind the protection of the reserve have been 
the 'winners.' It has been seen that conservationists have 'won' not due to their successful 
integration of the preservation of both biodiversity and people's livelihoods (the current 
definition of a 'successful' conservation project) but because they have had access to and 
employed an apparatus of power in order to achieve their goal of establishing and 
maintaining a protected natural area free from human intrusion. 
As a way of bringing the thesis to a close, I would like to offer some parting 
thoughts about my research as well as potential directions for future projects. Firstly, the 
near total absence of the Fulani in this thesis is something that has vexed me from the time 
I commenced writing up until the present. As expressed in my background chapter, there 
are a significant number of Fulani pastoralists that openly and directly resist the exercise of 
power that has maintained the exclusion of the villagers focussed on in this thesis. They are 
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the only local group that continues to live temporarily in the reserve as well as exploit it for 
livelihood purposes on a day to day basis. Therefore, the Fulani are to me a highly 
interesting object of study and I think that any future research I conduct in the area could 
possibly be focussed on them. How have they managed to directly resist the exercise of 
power that has so severely reduced other local people's field of possible action? Is this 
resistance dependent on the wealth and political power of the Fulani? Are their livelihood 
practices the cause of any serious ecological degradation? When studying the Fulani it is 
these sorts of questions that I would pose. I am confident that the main obstacle I 
encountered in incorporating them into this thesis, namely, their distrust of my motives to 
be in the area, could be overcome provided I could spend a longer period of time in the 
field than I did in 2006.  As I stated, I decided early on in my fieldwork that three months 
was not long enough for me to dedicate any time to establishing rapport with a group that 
held serious doubts about me. 
Another aspect of my work which has slightly disappointed me was my inability to 
provide much verifiable data on the pre–exclusion status of the practices probably 
employed by local people to negotiate the effects of protecting the reserve. It was not the 
main thrust of my data collection in the field, and it was only after I had returned to New 
Zealand that I realised that I would encounter difficulty making an argument about 
resistance based only on empirical grounds. From my own experiences at Ngel Nyaki I am 
confident that the practices described in Chapter 5 have been important ways in which 
local people have mitigated the disruption caused by conservation, but without hard 
evidence to back up my inclinations, however strong, I fear that the reader may have been 
left feeling a little doubtful. If I could somehow have the fieldwork over again, this is 
definitely an aspect of people's lives that I would have focussed on much more closely. This 
empirical gap could also be filled by any future research that I conduct in the area. I would 
also have liked to explore in greater detail local people's direct resistance to the reserve, 
namely, through illegal hunting, farming, fruit cultivation etc. During my stay I was able to 
establish that practices of this kind did exist in some shape or form, but I was prevented 
from discovering their prevalence and frequency. It would be interesting to look into how 
many people participate in illegal livelihood activities, how they are able to 'get away' with 
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them in the context of increased surveillance, and also if the local people employed by the 
various organisations responsible for protecting the reserve collude in these activities in any 
way. 
To conclude, in this thesis it has been seen what happened when a group of local 
indigenous people met with conservation; who 'won' and who 'lost' in this relationship; as 
well as why this was the end result. It is apparent that the organisations currently 
responsible for protecting the reserve are presented with a significant problem as they face 
the future: a local population that has had their lives seriously disrupted by nature and 
wildlife conservation. This is a problem that cannot be ignored but must be acknowledged 
and acted upon immediately. Local people's livelihoods, psychological well–being, and 
their society and culture, need protection just as much as the biodiversity harboured within 
the Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve. The 'double sustainability' of both must now be the 
objective (Cernea and Schmidt–Soltau, 2006). The main question is now how this can be 
achieved.
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